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"THE DOOR THAT NEVER OPENS"?:
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AND POSTCONVICTION REVIEW OF DEATH
SENTENCES IN THE UNITED STATES
AND JAPAN
Daniel H. Foote*
PREFACE

I begin this article with a short cautionary tale regarding
the perils of legal scholarship in a constantly changing world. I
started the research that led to this article in 1984, when I
was in Japan on a Fulbright Fellowship. In earlier years,
Japan's system governing criminal retrials was widely referred
to as "the door that never opens (akazu no mon)";1 the standards were interpreted so strictly that virtually no petitioner
could obtain a new trial.2 In 1975, however, the Japanese Supreme Court issued a decision relaxing the retrial standards;3
and in 1983 Menda Sakae, after spending nearly thirty-two
years on death row, became the first death row inmate to bene* Professor of Law, University of Washington School of Law. I am grateful
to the Japan-United States Educational Commission for the support of a Fulbright
Research Fellowship and to the Council on Foreign Relations for the support of an
International Affairs Fellowship during work on this article. I would also like to
thank former Justice Dand5 Shigemitsu, Professor Matsuo K6ya, Professor
Shibahara Kuniji, Professor Tanaka Hiraku, Professor J. Mark Ramseyer, Professor
John Haley, and Mr. Yanagida Yukio for their advice, encouragement, and assistance. I owe special thanks to Professor Inouye Masahito of the University of
Tokyo Faculty of Law. The views expressed herein are, of course, mine alone.
Except where citing to works published in English, throughout this article I
have followed traditional Japanese order for personal names-i.e., family name
first, followed by given name. Unless otherwise noted, all translations from the
original Japanese sources contained herein are mine. In citing to cases, I have
included the names of the parties if the names appear in the case report.
1. See SAISHIN [RETRIALS] 1 (Nihon bengoshi rengakai-hen [Japan Fed'n of
Bar Ass'ns] ed. 1977).
2. See infra text accompanying notes 261-98.
3. See infra text accompanying notes 340-49.
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fit directly from that relaxation by winning acquittal following
a new trial.4 Thus, when I began my research Japan had just
experienced a great liberalization in opportunities for postconviction review. I described that liberalization in the first
draft of this article, which I completed in 1986. In reviewing
the impact of the change, though, I concluded that draft by
observing, that the "door" to retrials in Japan still remained
much smaller than the "door" to federal habeas corpus in the
United States.
Soon thereafter, I returned from Japan and joined private
practice. Despite the best of intentions, I never finalized the
article. By late 1988, when I entered academia and again began to think seriously about the topic, the balance had shifted.
While the new retrial standards had taken root in Japan,. the
United States Supreme Court had begun a campaign to tighten
the limits on habeas.5 When I re-examined my draft at that
time, I envisioned a major revision in which I would describe
how the two systems, despite very different underlying premises, seemed to be on a convergence course.
Other projects intervened, and by the time I was able to
update my research and finalize this article for submission to
law reviews, the balance had shifted yet again. Japan's standards had remained generally stable, and over the intervening
years three other death row inmates had joined Menda in
winning acquittals following new trials.6 Further decisions by
the United States Supreme Court, however, threatened to
render federal habeas "the door that never opens." Those decisions appeared to leave the door open at least a crack for cases
involving vindication of "actual innocence."7 Yet as I was
working on my final revisions prior to publication, the
Rehnquist Court issued its decision in Herrera v. Collins,8

4. See infra text accompanying notes 372-81.
5. See infra text accompanying notes 112-226.
6. See infra text accompanying notes 382-409. For detailed descriptions of
Mendm and the other so-called death penalty retrial cases, see Daniel H. Foote,
From Japan's Death Row to Freedom, 1 PAC. RIM L. & POL'Y J. 11 (1993).
7. See infra text accompanying notes 194-97.
8. 113 S. Ct. 853 (1993). See infra text accompanying notes 198-213.
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closing even that gap and leaving federal habeas, more than
ever, "the door that never opens."
This cautionary tale carries one simple and obvious lesson,
which can be summed up by a slight variation on an old adage:
never put off until tomorrow an article you could write today.
The account, of course, carries a deeper lesson as well. At the
same time that Japan moves away from use of the death penalty, along with most of the rest of the world, and toward ever
greater care in those isolated instances when it is applied, the
United States finds itself as a rare exception travelling in the
opposite direction.
I.

INTRODUCTION

In the field of capital punishment, the United States and
Japan share many features. They are two of only a handful of
developed nations in the world that retain the death penalty.'
In each nation, movements to abolish capital punishment
gained strength in the 1960s and 1970s, and then faded. Moreover, in both the United States and Japan abolition advocates
achieved initial success at the judicial level; but the Supreme
Courts of both nations have since considered, and rejected,
attempts to invalidate capital punishment as a system.
These losses by abolition advocates have not stopped individuals facing death sentences from seeking to prevent-or at
least delay-their own executions in any way they can. Challenges to individual convictions and sentences abound. Both
nations have witnessed the use of repeated requests for review
and for clemency, in many cases apparently instituted whenever the possibility of execution draws near. This, in turn, has
led to long delays in the execution of death sentences, with
some convicts spending years or even decades on death
row-on occasion even dying of natural causes before the executions can be carried out. Under these circumstances, the
Supreme Courts of both nations have faced calls for reconsider9. See generally Joan Fitzpatrick & Alice Miller, International Standards in
the Death Penalty: Shifting Discourse, 19 BROOK. J. INT-1 L. 273 (1993).

370

BROOK. J. INTL L.

[Vol. XIX:2

ation and revision of the standards permitting review of capital
sentences. With individual Justices playing key roles in instigating changes, both Supreme Courts have responded by altering the existing standards.
There the similarities end. In the United States, recent
decisions by the Supreme Court involve a tightening of the
limits on federal habeas corpus review of capital sentences. As
a consequence, recent legislative attempts to limit capital review-attempts that Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist has
actively promoted and vocally supported-seem almost redundant. In contrast, the Supreme Court of Japan has loosened
the requirements for obtaining retrials, thereby enabling several death row inmates to obtain long-sought rehearings. In
four highly celebrated cases over the last few years, these
retrials in turn have resulted in the acquittal of four capital
convicts, who collectively had spent well over one hundred
years on death row.
The impact of those cases on the public consciousness has
resulted in perhaps the most striking difference between the
United States and Japan. In the United States in recent years,
capital punishment has largely been staked out as an issue by
the political right. Conservatives have stressed the image of
death row inmates and their "do-gooder" attorneys "frustrating" the purposes of the law and the wishes of the community.
In sharp contrast, the specter of these four wrongfully convicted individuals, each of whom spent virtually his entire adult
life on death row before finally obtaining release, has had
virtually the opposite impact in Japan. Those cases have
spurred debate over numerous aspects of the criminal justice
system and considerable soul searching by members of the
procuracy and the judiciary. To date, there have been few concrete changes. Yet, as of this writing, the movement to abolish
Japan's death penalty has taken on new strength, in part due
to the active involvement of a former Supreme Court Justice
affected by his own experience in handling retrial cases.
The capital punishment system and current standards for
collateral review of capital sentences appear quite similar in
the United States and Japan. On a deeper level, though, the
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systems are moving in very different directions. Given. the
extensive literature on capital punishment and capital habeas
in the United States, 0 this article focuses chiefly on Japan,

examining the process by which the standards governing postconviction review have been relaxed and the impact of that
change. Japan's Supreme Court bears the image of being a

highly conservative, passive institution resistant to dramatic
.change of any sort." Yet this examination reveals that, in the
area of post-conviction review of capital sentences, individual
Japanese Justices were able to effectuate changes in standards

they believed to be mistaken. At a broader level, this examination also discloses very different attitudes toward the adversary process, the role of courts in criminal proceedings, the
notions of speed and finality, and punishment itself in the
criminal justice systems of the two nations.

10, As one of the leading commentators on federal habeas has observed, "[any
exhaustive bibliography of habeas corpus would itself require an article, if not a
book." Vivian 0. Berger, The Supreme Court and Defense Counsel: Old Roads, New
Paths-A Dead End?, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 9, 17 n.43 (1986) [hereinafter Berger,
Dead End]. The same is true in spades with respect to capital punishment as a
whole. For a partial listing of major works on habeas, see id.; Vivian 0. Berger,
Justice Delayed or Justice Denied?-A Comment on Recent Proposals to Reform
Death Penalty Habeas Corpus, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1665, 1672 (1990) [hereinafter
Berger, Justice]. With regard to capital punishment generally, see MICHAEL L.
RADELET & MARGARET VANDIVER, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA. AN ANNOTATED BMLIOGRAPHY (1988).
11. See Yasuhiro Okudaira, Forty Years of the Constitution aid Its Various Influences: Japanese, American, and European, 53 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 17, 37,
38 (1990) ("[Nlegativism in judicial review is one of the most characteristic features of the Japanese Supreme Court ....
[T]here is a general tendency for the
Supreme Court to avoid constitutional judgments as much as possible."); Nobuyoshi
Ashibe, Human Rights and Judicial Power, in CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEMS IN -LATE
TWENTIETH CENTURY ASIA 224-61 (Lawrence W. Beer ed., 1992) ("Judicial passivity
has been too great in Japan. Too much modesty has been shown and too much
deference has been paid to the policy makers of the legislative and executive
branches,"); HIROSHI ITOH, THE JAPANESE SUPREME COURT. CONSTITUTIONAL POLICIES 159-247 (1989) (chapters discussing the "self-restrained Supreme Court" and
the "conservative Supreme Court").
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II. CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN
This section examines trends in the use of capital punishment and legal battles over the constitutionality of capital
punishment in the United States and Japan, focusing on the
two nations in that order. This account reflects significant
parallels: wide use of the death penalty in earlier times, followed by a period of gradually declining use and increasing
calls for abolition; and judicial decisions casting doubt on. the
death penalty's constitutionality, followed by stern re-affirmation of the constitutionality of capital punishment by the respective Supreme Courts. The description also reveals one
important difference: whereas Japan's use of the death penalty
continues on a downward trend today, death sentences and
executions are both on the rise in the United States.
A. The United States
As with other aspects of substantive criminal law in the
United- States, capital punishment is primarily a creature of
state law. A handful of states abolished capital punishment in
the mid-1800s and a few more joined them in the early
1900s.' For most states, however, capital punishment has
been a standard feature of the criminal justice system throughout much of their history. The roots of capital punishment in
the United States can be traced back to the influence on. the
colonies of the English law in the eighteenth century, 3 when
over one hundred types of crimes-including a wide range of
property offenses-were subject to the death penalty." Despite wide variations among the states, capital punishment
was once the mandatory penalty for a wide range of crimes in
most states.' 5 Over the years, the death penalty became dis-

12. See THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA 21-23 (Hugo A. Bedau ed., 3d ed.
1982).
13. See id. at 6-9.
14. See WLLIAm J. BOWERS, EXECUTIONS IN AMERICA 169-72 (1974).

15. THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA, supra note 12, at 6-9.
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cretionary, the list of crimes punishable by death was gradually reduced, and the number of crimes for which the death penalty was actually imposed dropped sharply. 6
Even though the United States was in the middle of a
period of gradually declining use of the death penalty, 17 as
late as 1951 there were over one hundred executions 8 in the
United States. By the late 1950s, movements to abolish the
death penalty legislatively had gained strength in many
states. 9 In the 1960s, attacks on the death penalty through
the judicial process began. These litigational challenges initially stemmed from efforts by the NAACP Legal Defense Fund,
Inc., to invalidate the death penalty for rape on the basis of
racial disparity in application, but soon extended to attacks on
numerous other fundamental aspects of capital punishment. 0
This litigation campaign resulted in a de facto moratorium on
executions between 1967 and 1976,21 a period during which
the Supreme Court issued several key rulings on the death
penalty.
In Witherspoon v. Illinois" in 1968, a majority of the
Warren Court expressed doubts about the propriety of capital
punishment but did not directly address its constitutionalityY Then, in the 1972 decision in Furman v. Georgia,' five
Justices on the Burger Court agreed that the death penalty
constituted cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States
Constitution. Although none of the five could agree on the rele-

16. See THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA, supra note 12, at 6-12; BOWERS,

supra note 14, at 4-12, 43-56.
17. See THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA, supra note 12, at 22-26.
18. See THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA, supra note 12, at 25.
19. See THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA, supra note 12, at 22.

20. See, e.g., BOWERS, supra note 14, at 13-16; Jack Greenberg, Capital
Punishment as a System, 91 YALE L.J. 908 (1982).
21. See THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA, supra note 12, at 24; Robert A.
Burt, Disorder in the Court: The Death Penalty and the Constitution, 85 MICH. L.
REV. 1741, 1745-46 (1987).
22. 391 U.S. 510 (1968).
23. See Burt, supra note 21, at 1746-50.
24. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
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vant grounds, advocates on both sides of the abolition debate
saw Furman as effectively barring the death penalty for the
foreseeable future.25 The four dissenters were not so sure.
Two of them indicated personal doubts about the death penalty,2" but all agreed that the matter was for state legislatures
to decide, not the Court. Moreover, as Chief Justice Burger
stated in his dissent, the opinions of at least two members of
the majority left a possible route open for state legislatures to
enact constitutionally valid capital punishment schemes, "by
providing standards for juries and judges to follow in determindefining
ing the sentence in capital cases, or by more narrowly
27
imposed."
be
to
is
penalty
the
which
for
crimes
the
Furman was seen by many scholars and politicians as an
unwarranted intrusion on legislative prerogatives.' Rather
than serving as an affirmation of the trend toward abolition,
the decision generated a strong backlash. 29 Within a year after Furman was announced, twenty states had adopted new
death penalty statutes." Although the Supreme Court invalidated schemes that sought to make capital punishment mandatory for certain specified crimes,3 ' in the 1976 decision in
Gregg v. Georgia 2 a seven member majority upheld the con-

25. See FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING & GORDON HAWKINS, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AND

THE AMERICAN AGENDA 37-38 (1986).
26. See 408 U.S. at 375 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) ("If we were possessed of

legislative power, I would . . . at the very least, restrict the use of capital punishment to a small category of the most heinous crimes."); id. at 405-06 (Blackmun,
J., dissenting) ("I yield to no one in the depth of my distaste, antipathy, and,
indeed, abhorrence for the death penalty .... ").
27. Id. at 400 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
28. See ZIZUING & HAWKINS, supra note 25, at 38-45.
29. See ZIMRING & HAWKINS, supra note 25, at 38-45.

30. See THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA, supra note 12, at 22.
31. See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976) (for first-degree mur-

der); Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976) (same).
32. 428 U.S. 153, 157 (1976) (the Georgia scheme provided for a bifurcated
procedure, with a penalty stage separate from the determination of guilt;
permitted the sentencing jury to consider both mitigating and aggravating
circumstances; required the jury to find one or more of certain specified
aggravating circumstan-ces to impose the death penalty; and called for autoinatic
review of all death sentences by the state supreme court).
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stitutionality of capital punishment statutes that contain properly drawn standards to guide juries and judges in their sentencing decisions. In announcing the judgment, Justice Potter
Stewart stated that "[t]he death penalty is said to serve two
principal social purposes: retribution and deterrence .... ,,33
The Court then deferred to the state legislature's decision
regarding whether the death penalty actually serves those
purposes, and to the state's judgment on the social utility of
capital punishment.'
Since Gregg the Court has faced numerous issues regarding the permissible scope of capital punishment, and the cases
have often generated great divisions among the Justices. 5
Nevertheless, a solid majority has been in agreement that the
death penalty per se is not unconstitutional.3 6 States may, of
course, choose to abolish capital punishment if they wish, but
under current case law that is a legislative matter, not a requirement of the United States Constitution.
In fact, the trend in the United States since Gregg has
been toward ever greater use of the death penalty. Thirty-seven states now have a death penalty,37 and Congress has recently reintroduced the death penalty for certain federal
crimes." Since 1984, the number of executions has been in
the low double digits each year, 9 rising to a post-Furman
high of thirty-one in 1992." 0 Yet the number of prisoners facing death sentences has been rising steadily. As of January 15,
1993, 2676 inmates were on death row throughout the United

33. Id. at 183.
34. Id. at 183-87.
35. See generally Burt, supra note 21.
36. See Burt, supra note 21.
37. See ZIMEING & HAWKINS, supra note 25, at 43.
38. See Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, 102 Stat. 4181,
4387 (murders committed in connection with narcotics offenses).
39. See U.S. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE

UNITED STATES 1992, Table 335, at 200 (between 1984 and 1990, number of executions ranging from low of 11 in 1988 to high of 25 in 1987).
40. Telephone Interview with John Lamson, Death Penalty Information Center,
Washington, D.C. (Feb. 22, 1993).
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States.4 ' For many of them, appeals and petitions for postconviction collateral review have delayed executions for considerable periods.4 2 With the recent cutbacks in availability of
federal habeas described in Section III(A) below,4" however, it
seems only a matter of time before far larger numbers of prisoners will be put to death.
B.

Japan

The early history of capital punishment in Japan bears
many striking parallels to that in the West. One of the earliest
written records in Japan, the Kojiki, dating from the seventh
century, contains references to the death penalty; records reveal use of the death penalty during each dynasty from then
through the Nara period in the early ninth century. At that
point, however, an unusual development occurred: executions
ceased. Partly due to the influence of Chinese Buddhist teachings from 810 through 1156, the death penalty reportedly was
imposed on only two occasions, both involving leaders of the
defeated Taira clan." Although the death penalty was never
formally abolished, during that period all other cases in which
the death sentence might legally have been imposed were
commuted to exile or other lesser punishments.4"
As though to make up for lost time, during most of the
succeeding seven centuries of samurai rule, stretching from the
Kamakura period (beginning in the late twelfth century)
through the Tokugawa era (ending in 1867), the death penalty
seems almost to have become the punishment of choice in
Japan. For much of that time, nearly all crimes from petty
larceny and fraud to murder were punishable by death;46 the

41. Id.

42. See infra text accompanying notes 109-19.
43. See infra text accompanying notes 96-226.
44. See IsHII RYoSUKE, HOSEISHI [LEGAL HISTORY] 76 (Taikei Nihonshi sSsho 4

[4 Systematic Japan History Series], 1964); DANDO SHIGEMITSU, SHIKEI HAISHIRON
[THE ABOLITION OF THE DEATH PENALTY] 152-53 (2d ed. 1991).
45. See DANDO, supra note 44, at 152-53.
46. See, e.g., Tsujhnoto Yoshio, Shikei seido no hajimari (Nihon)-jinshin no
khai ni tomonau zankoku na keibatsu [The Beginnings of the Death Penalty Sys.
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arsenal of execution methods was elaborate and severe, including boiling,
burning, crucifixion, and several levels of behead7
4

ing.

Numerous revisions to the penal standards accompanied
the opening of Japan in the Meiji era, which began in 1868.
These revisions included eliminating many of the most common crimes, including fraud and larceny, from the list of offenses punishable by death, as well as establishing hanging as
the sole method for execution.48 Still, during the early Meiji
era hundreds of people were executed each year.49
With the enactment of the current Penal Code in 1907,"0
the number of crimes punishable by death was further reduced
to a total of thirteen-where the number stands today.5 The

tern (Japan)-CruelPunishment Accompanying the Devastation of Human Feeling],
in HOGAKU SEMINA ZOKAN, SOGO ToKusHO sHRmzu 46, SHIKEI NO GENZAI [HOGAKU
SEMINAR ExTRA NUMBER, THE DEATH PENALTY TODAY] [hereinafter THE DEATH
PENALTY TODAY] 236-37 (1990). During at least the latter half of the Tokugawa

era, from the early eighteenth century through 1867, however, minor thefts were
not punishable by death, and officials reportedly deliberately charged many offenders with lesser crimes than actually committed in order to avoid the death penalty, HIRAMATSU YOSHIRO, KINSEI KELJISOSHOHO NO KENKYCr [RESEARCH ON CRIMINAL

PROCEDURE OF THE RECENT ERA] 833-34 (1960), summarized and translated in
part in Summary of Tokugawa Criminal Justice, 22 LAW IN JAPAN 105 (1989).
47. See Tsiimoto, supra note 46, at 236. Apart from simple beheading, the
penalty of beheading could be enhanced by, for example, parading the convict
through the streets before the execution or displaying the convict's head on a pike
after the execution. See FUSE YAHEIJI, SHOTEI NIHON SHIKEISHI [HISTORY OF THE
DEATH PENALTY IN JAPAN] 44-45 (rev. ed. 1983).

48. See Tsujimoto, supra note 46, at 237.
49. See DANDO, supra note 44, at 280-81, 284-85; Miyazawa Setsuo, Keiji seido
o safji de miru me [Looking at the Criminal System Through Numbers], 427
HOGAKU SEMINA 32, 53 (1990).

50. KEIHO [PENAL CODE], Law No. 45 of 1907.
51. Tsujimoto Yoshio, Shikei ni ataru tsumi-Nihon de wa satsujin, sekai de
wa tasai [Crimes Punishable by Death-in Japan Murder, Worldwide Varied] [hereinafter Crimes Punishable by Death], in THE DEATH PENALTY TODAY, supra note
46, at 238. The thirteen, with the respective articles in the Penal Code, KeihS,
are: insurrection, art. 77(1); causing a foreign state to use armed force against
Japan, art. 81; entering into military service of a foreign state against Japan, art.
82; arson of structure where persons are present, art. 108; destruction by explosives, art. 117(1); causing inundation of structure where persons are present, art.
119; causing death by overturning train, etc., art. 126(3); aggravated crime of
endangering traffic, thereby causing death, art. 127; poisoning or polluting water,
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Juvenile Act, enacted in 1948, exempts from the death penalty
crimes committed by juveniles under eighteen years of age.2
Otherwise, the postwar legal reforms did not address the death
penalty directly. Article 36 of the postwar Constitution, however, prohibits "cruel punishments."53 Based in large part on
this provision, defense counsel in an early postwar case argued
that the death penalty was unconstitutional. In a 1948 judgment, the Supreme Court sitting en banc rejected that
claim." Early in its opinion, the Court stated, "Human life is
precious. The life of a single person is worth more than the
entire world."55 But the Court went on to hold:
The death penalty, through its power of intimidation, provides general deterrence; the execution of death sentences
eliminates a certain form of social evil; and in these ways the
death penalty seeks to protect society. Moreover, the death
penalty gives priority to a collective view of morality over an
individual view of morality. We affirm the need for continuation of the death penalty system in order to promote the
public welfare of society.5
The decision was unanimous, although four of the fifteen justices joined in a supplementary opinion suggesting that the
time might come when the death penalty would no longer be
needed for deterrence, and that, at such time, capital punishment might be declared unconstitutional as a cruel punishment.57

thereby causing death, art. 146; homicide, art. 199; killing an ascendant, art. 200;
robbery causing death, art. 240; and robbery and rape causing death, art. 241. A
few other crimes, such as causing death in the course of an airline hijacking and
murdering a hostage, are specified as punishable by death under special penal
statutes. See Crimes Punishable by Death, supra.
52. SHONENHO [JUvENILEs AcT], Law No. 168 of 1948, art. 51.
53. KENPO [CONSTIrUTION], art. 36.
54. Judgment of March 12, 1948 (Murakami v. Japan), Saik6sai [Supreme
Court], 2 Keishdi 191 (Grand Bench), translated in JOHN M. MAMl, COURT AND
CONSTITUTION IN JAPAN 156 (1964).

55. Murakami, 2 Keishfi at 193.
56. Id. at 194.
57. Id. at 196.
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Despite these and other judicial pronouncements upholding the death penalty," a movement to abolish capital punishment arose during the early postwar years.59 This movement had its roots in the early Meiji era; however, from about
1910 through the end of World War II, it fell largely silent.
Then, in part based on the view that abolition accorded with
the spirit of freedom and democracy in postwar Japan, the
movement redeveloped, taking on considerable strength after
1955.60 In 1963 a panel considering revision of the Penal Code

prepared a draft calling for further reductions in the number of
crimes subject to the death penalty, and for special care in
applying the death penalty."' In 1967 the Legislative Council
(hrsei shingikai) considered calling for abolition of the death
penalty. While ultimately rejecting that position, in part on the
basis of a public opinion poll showing that seventy percent of
those questioned support the death penalty, the Council also
recommended limiting the number of crimes punishable by
death.62
These proposals were never adopted by the Diet. However,
during the postwar years, imposition of the death penalty in
Japan has, in practice, been limited almost entirely to the

In 1955, the Supreme Court, in another en banc opinion, rejected a claim
that Japan's sole method of execution-hanging-constituted cruel punishment.
Judgment of April 6, 1955 (Hirasawa v. Japan), Saik6sai [Supreme Court], 9
Keishil 663 (Grand Bench).
58. For a list of key judicial precedents regarding the death penalty, see
Yokomizo Hideki, Jay5 hanrei gaido-shiei [Guide to Important Precedent-The
Death Penalty], in THE DEATH PENALTY TODAY, supra note 46, at 272.
59. The history of the abolition movement is described concisely in Fujioka
IchirS, Nihon gy6keishi no naka no shikei haishi no shis5 to tatakai [The Thinking
and the Struggle for Abolition of the Death Penalty in Japan's Penal History]
[hereinafter Japan's Penal History], in THE DEATH PENALTY TODAY, supra note 46,
at 197, 200-04.
60. See id. See generally MIHARA KENZO, SHIKEI HAISHI NO KENKYC [RESEARCH
ON ABOLITION OF THE DEATH PENALTY] [hereinafter ABOLITION OF THE DEATH
PENALTY] (1990).

61. Japan's Penal History, supra note 59, at 203.
62. See DANDO, supra note 44, at 240-41 (describing his criticisms, as a member of the Legislative Council, of the manner in which the relevant questions in
the opinion poll were posed).
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crimes of murder, robbery-murder, and rape-murder.63 Moreover, the number of convicts sentenced to death in Japan
dropped steadily during most of the postwar period, from an
average of over seventy a year between 1946 and 1950 to an
average of under six per year between 1971 and 1980." Similarly, the number of executions, which had reached as many as
thirty-nine in both 1957 and 1960, dropped to only one each
year from 1979 through 1984.65

Given these circumstances, some critics of the death penalty voiced hope that a 1981 judgment by the Tokyo High Court
might effectively signal an end to the death penalty's use in
Japan.66 In that case, the defendant, Nagayama Norio, had
been charged with a series of four separate brutal murders, all
committed in cold blood during a month-long period in late
1968.67 The District Court found Nagayama guilty as charged
and sentenced him to death.68
Under sentencing practices that prevailed at the time, the
District Court's sentence seemed foreordained. 9 On appeal,
however, the Tokyo High Court reduced Nagayama's sentence
to life imprisonment."0 The court found various extenuating
circumstances"' and concluded that "it is too harsh to apply
63. See Crimes Punishable by Death, supra note 51, at 238 (technically, the
latter two crimes are "robbery resulting in death" and "rape resulting in death").
64. See DANDO, supra note 44, at 280-81.
65. See DANDO, supra note 44, at 284-85.
66. See, e.g., MURANO NOBORU, SHIKEI'TrE NAN DA [WHAT IS THE DEATH PEN-

ALTY?] 98 (1992) (decision was seen as possible opportunity for ending the death
penalty as a practical matter).
67. In each of the murders Nagayama allegedly had shot the victim multiple
times in the face and head with a handgun-despite, in at least one case, 'pleas
for mercy by the victim. See Judgment of July 8, 1983 (Japan v. N), Saik6sai
[Supreme Court], 37 Keishfi 609, 614 (2d Petty Bench).
68. Judgment of June 10, 1979, Chisai [District Court] (Tokyo) (unreported
case).
69. At the time, multiple murders, especially if premeditated, were almost certain to warrant the death penalty. See, e.g., DANDO, supra note 44, at 254-55
(from District Court's perspective, the defendant may have had an unfortunate upbringing, but under the circumstances there was no question that the death penalty would apply).
70. Judgment of Aug. 21, 1981, K6sai [High Court], 1019 HENREI JIHO [HANJI]
20 (Tokyo).
71. These included findings that Nagayama was only 19 at the time of the of-
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the death sentence to defendant, and is more appropriate to
have him devote the rest of his life to atoning for his offenses
and praying for the repose of the victims' souls."72 The court
formally based its reduction in Nagayama's sentence on the extenuating circumstances. But in its reasoning, the court as
Court to review the constitutionmuch as invited the Supreme
73
punishment.
ality of capital
Prosecutors immediately appealed the sentence, claiming
was
too lenient.74 That appeal was assigned to the Second
it

fenses; had been raised in a "very bad home environment" (with, the court strongly implied, the "government's insufficient social welfare policy" being one of the
causes for his criminality), id. at 43; had undergone a "remarkable" transfornation
following his conviction, resulting in part from his marriage to a woman with
whom he exchanged letters while in prison; and had sought to console the families
of his victims by providing them with the royalties from books he wrote while in
prison. Id
72. "Id.
73. After stating that "under established precedent of the Supreme Court, the
death penalty is not in violation of any articles, including article 36 (the prohibition of cruel punishment) of the Constitution," id. at 42, the court added:
Assuming there are occasions on which courts should impose the death
sentence on given defendants, we believe that such occasions should be
limited to those in which the circumstances are of such a degree that
any and every court would select the death sentence if faced with the
same case. As a legislative matter, the view has been expressed that
imposition of the death sentence should require the unanimous agreement
of all judges. We believe that that same spirit should be accorded weight
in the administration of the current system.
Id. at 43.
74. Prosecutors in Japan have the right to appeal acquittals and sentences
they consider too lenient, KEIJI SOSHOHO [CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE], Law No.
131 of 1948, arts. 351(1), 381, 382 (appeals from trial court decision) [hereinafter
KEISOH0]. Grounds for appeal to the Supreme Court are limited, however. *Such
appeals normally must be framed either as presenting issues of constitutional
error or conflict with prior Supreme Court precedent. Id. art. 405. The Supreme
Court may, in its discretion, decide to review other cases if it feels that they contain important matters relating to statutory interpretation, id. art. 406, and may
reverse lower court opinions if it concludes that they are "patently unjust," with
one of the specified categories for such "injustice" being "grossly improper sentencing determinations." Id. art. 411. To date, the Nagayama case is the only one in
which the Supreme Court has ever reversed a sentence for being too lenient. See
MAINICHI SHINBUN SHAKAXBU [SOCIETY SECTION OF THE MAINICHI NEWSPAPER],

KENSHO-SAIKOSAIBANSHO-HOFUKU NO MUKO DE [INVESTIGATIVE INSPECTION: THE
SUPREME COURT-BEHIND THE JUDICIAL ROBES] 33 (1991).
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Petty Bench of the Supreme Court. 5 Recognizing that the
High Court decision cast doubt over the continued applicability
of the death penalty, lower courts considering potential death
penalty cases refrained from issuing judgments until the Supreme Court addressed the case. 6 Moreover, at the Supreme
Court level, each of the three Petty Benches held all pending
appeals in death penalty cases while the case was under review." Thus, it is clear that the judiciary recognized
Nagayama as a potential watershed decision.
Under the Court Organization Act,7 if one Petty Bench is
planning to issue an opinion that conflicts with prior Supreme
Court precedent, it must refer the case to the so-called Grand
Bench-the entire Court sitting en banc-for decision. 9 Even
when a Petty Bench is not planning to diverge from established precedent, the Court's rules call for a Petty Bench to
refer a case to the Grand Bench if it concludes that the case
presents important issues worthy of consideration by the full
Court.80 In Nagayama, the Second Petty Bench took an intermediate course. It did not formally refer the case to the Grand
Bench. Behind the scenes, however, the Justices from the two
other Petty Benches were consulted as to their views on the
case.8 ' Apparently, only after the Second Petty Bench had obtained consensus from the Court as a whole did it issue its
decision in the matter.

75. The Japanese Supreme Court is composed of fifteen justices, separated
into three Petty Benches of five justices each. Cases are normally assigned to the
Petty Benches equally, without regard to the field of law involved. The Petty
Benches decide most cases themselves, but, as described below, certain classes of
cases are referred to the Court sitting en banc-the s6-called Grand Bench-for
decision by the entire Court. See ITOH, supra note 11, at 74-75.
76. See EImuro Katsuhiko, Nayamanaku natta saibankan [Judges Who Stopped
Worrying] [hereinafter Judges Who Stopped Worrying], in THE DEATH PENALTY
TODAY, supra note 46, at 106-07.

77. See id.; MAINICHI SHINBUN SHAKAIBU, supra note 74, at 35.
78. SAIBANSHOHO [COURT ORGANIZATION ACT], Law No. 59 of 1947.

79. Id. art. 10, item 3.
80. SAIKOsArBANsHo SAIBAN JIMU SHORI KISOKU [SUPREME COURT RULES FOR
HANDLING JUDICIAL MATrERS], S. Ct. R. 6, art. 9 (2), item 3 (1947).

81. See DANDO, supra note 44, at 248; MAINICHI SHINBUN SHAKAiBU, supra
note 74, at 33-36, 50-51.
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That decision reafirmed the continued constitutionality of
the death penalty. While agreeing with the High Court that
capital punishment must be applied very carefully, the Supreme Court held that:
Under the current penal system, the death penalty can be
imposed on a defendant whose culpability is so weighty as to
necessitate that maximum penalty for the purposes of justice
as well as general deterrence, taking into consideration the
nature, motive and modus operandi of the offense (especially
the persistency and brutality of the act of killing), the seriousness of the consequences (especially the number of murder
victims), the feelings of the victims' families, the effect on
society, the age and prior record of the defendant, and the
circumstances subsequent to the commission of the offense.82
After sharply criticizing most of the High Court's findings
on extenuating circumstances,' the Supreme Court reversed

82. Judgment of July 8, 1983 (Japan v. N), Saikasai [Supreme Court], 37
Keishfi 609, 613 (2d Petty Bench).
83. In the view of the Supreme Court, the High Court was wrong to place
weight on Nagayama's age. Given the motives-robbery or concealing other
offenses-and persistency of the offenses, these were crimes of an adult, not a
juvenile. Id& at 615. Nor was the Supreme Court convinced by the arguments concerning Nagayama's upbringing. Nagayama may have grown up in a bad environment, but so did his brothers, and they turned out fine. Id.
Furthermore, it is not proper to correlate the defendant's offenses directly
with the governmental social welfare policy. The defendant has persisted
in his buckpassing attitude, asserting before the courts as well as in his
writings that it was not him, but his parents and brothers, the society
and the government who should be blamed for the offenses.
Id.
The Court also found it improper to place much weight on Nagayama's
marriage or his payments to the victims' families, observing, "Indeed, [two families] have rejected any consolation money from the defendant. [One family] .even
says that it would never forgive him for any reason whatsoever." Id. at 614.
As this reflects, views of victims may be considered in assessing penalties
in Japan. Cf JAPAN TIMES WEEKLY INVL ED., Aug. 6-12, 1990, at 21 (translation
of excerpts of article in which investigative writer argues that the amount of compensation money paid to victims' families is often the decisive factor in whether a
murderer is sentenced to death in Japan); compare Payne v. Tennessee, 111 S. Ct.
2597, 2609 (1991) (overruling prior precedents and permitting reference to impact
on victims in a proceeding considering imposition of death penalty).
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and remanded for "further thorough consideration."8' Given
the Supreme Court's reasoning, it is hardly surprising that on
remand the High Court sentenced Nagayama to death, 5 a
decision that the Supreme Court later affirmed. 6
Although praised by a number of scholars for having clarified and somewhat tightened the standards for application of
the death penalty, 7 the Supreme Court's reversal in
Nagayama served as a forceful reaffirmation of the death penalty. After reaching a low of only two in 1981 (the year the
High Court reduced Nagayama's sentence), the number of new
death sentences rose to between five and ten each year from
1983 (the year the Supreme Court reversed) through 1988. The
number of actual executions, which had dropped to one per
year from 1979 through 1984, also rose slightly, to two or three
each year from 1985 through 1 9 8 8 .' Any predictions of the
demise of the death penalty after the 1981 Tokyo High Court
decision were premature.
Despite these figures, and despite the judicial debate engendered by the High Court's decision in Nagayama, capital
punishment is not a hotly contested, highly controversial issue
in Japan. Death sentences are a matter of public record; currently such sentences are given wide press coverage. Yet the
actual executions are not publicly announced in Japan, nor are
they normally reported by the media. The only official announcement reflecting executions appears in the annual statistics.89 Thus, the general public may know that a particular
individual has been sentenced to death but is highly unlikely
to know whether the execution has actually occurred. In part
84. 37 KeishT1 at 616.
85. Judgment of March 18, 1987 (Japan v. Nagayama), K6sai [High Court],
1226 HANJI 142 (Tokyo).
86. Judgment of April 17, 1990 (Nagayama v. Japan), Saik6sai [Supreme
Court], 1348 HANJI 15 (3d Petty Bench).
87. See Yokomizo, supra note 58, at 274; DANDO, supra note 44, at 249-50,
257 (expressing view that spirit of the Tokyo High Court's judgment was reflected
in Supreme Court's reference to the necessity of applying the death penalty very
carefully).
88. See DANDO, supra note 44, at 280-81, 284-85.
89. See MURANO, supra note 66, at 76-77.
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because executions remain so completely hidden from public
view, capital punishment has not been the kind of topic that
generates great public sentiment. For this reason, although
public opinion polls continue to show that a substantial majority of the Japanese people favor retaining the death penalty,"
this support appears quite passive. In striking contrast to
politicians in the United States, most Japanese politicians simply do not regard capital punishment as a significant election
issue. In a 1985 survey of members of the Japanese Diet, only
four percent of those responding felt that the death penalty
issue would have any effect on voters.9'
Since 1988, moreover, the number of death sentences has
dropped again to just two or three per yearY2 And, following
just one execution in 1989, 9' Japan went over three years
without any executions at all, until three prisoners were reportedly executed the same day in late March 1993.' Accordingly, while Japan's Supreme Court has reairmed the death
penalty's constitutionality, and the number of prisoners on
death row has gradually increased to fifty-eight,95 in practice
the imposition of the death penalty has slowed sharply.

90. See Fujiyoshi Kazushi et al., Yoron che5sa ni okeru shikei [The Death Penalty in Public Opinion Polls], in THE DEATH PENALTY TODAY, supra note 46, at
150.
91. See MURANO, supra note 66, at 70.
92. See DANDO, supra note 44, at 280-81 (two new death sentences at district
court level each year in 1989 and 1990); SAIKOSAIBANSHO JIMUSOKYOKU, SHIH0
TOKEI NENPO, 2 KEIJI-HEN, HEISEI 3-NEN [SUPREME COURT GENERAL SECRETARIAT,
ANNUAL REPORT OF JUDICIAL STATISTICS FOR 1991, Vol. 2, CRIMINAL CASES] 202
(Table 36-1) (1991) (three new death sentences in 1991).
93. See DANDO, supra note 44, at 284-85.
94. See, e.g., Yoshiald Itoh, Reported Executions Revive Debate Over Capital
Punishment: Opponents Decry End to Moratorium, THE NIKEEI WEEKLY, Apr. 5,
1993, at 2 (noting that three executions were reportedly performed, but thai Justice Ministry was holding to its policy of refusing to confirm or deny the reports).
95. See, e.g., Number of Death-row Convicts in Japan Climbs to 58, Kyodo
News Service, Japan Economic Newswire, Feb. 19, 1993 [hereinafter Number of
Death-row Convicts].
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POST-CONVICTION REVIEW OF CAPITAL CASES

Despite the efforts of abolition advocates, capital punishment as a system remains in place in both the United States
and Japan. Of course, that does not mean that convicts sentenced to death are always content to go quietly to their executions. To the contrary, challenges to the underlying conviction
or to the death sentence abound in individual cases, with many
capital convicts in each country seeking to prevent or delay
their executions in any way they can. In both the United
States and Japan, capital convicts and their representatives
frequently file petitions for clemency with the appropriate
governmental authorities. In addition, they often seek postconviction review of their cases: in the United States, frequently in the form of petitions for writs of federal habeas corpus; in
Japan, typically through requests for retrials. Both nations
have witnessed repeated requests for review, at times seemingly instituted in a deliberate attempt to forestall execution.
Moreover, courts in both nations have faced strikingly similar
questions concerning what grounds are acceptable for such
requests and what constitutes abuse of the process. Yet the
responses in the two nations have differed dramatically.
The following section examines those responses. It first
summarizes important aspects of the United States Supreme
Court's habeas jurisprudence, beginning by tracing the liberalization of standards, primarily by the Warren Court. This
liberalization was followed by gradual cutbacks which culminated in widespread restrictions on the availability of habeas
by the Rehnquist Court. The article then turns to an examination of trends in application of retrial standards in Japan,
focusing particularly on the restrictive interpretation of those
standards in the first three decades after World War II and the
great liberalization engineered by the Supreme Court in decisions issued in 1975 and 1976.
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The United States

The writ of habeas corpus-a legal process, widely referred
to as the Great Writ, for reviewing the legality of a person's
detention is a fundamental feature of United States law that
was brought to the colonies from England and enshrined in the
Federal Constitution. 6 Initially, the federal writ did not extend to prisoners held under state law, who constitute the vast
majority of all criminal detainees in the United States.97 Following the Civil War, the system of habeas corpus was greatly
expanded. The Habeas Corpus Act of 1867, which, with certain
procedural amendments, is still in effect today, provided federal courts the "power to grant writs of habeas corpus in all
cases where any person may be restrained of his or her liberty
in violation of the Constitution, or of any treaty or law of the
United States ... ."98
That statute plainly was designed to extend the right of
federal habeas review to state prisoners in some cases. The
precise parameters of review permitted under that statute
have shifted significantly over the intervening 125 years, however, and remain the subject of great debate.99
A major step in the development of the federal habeas
remedy occurred in 1953 in Brown v. Allen.'00 Previously, the
Supreme Court had recognized use of the writ to remedy certain constitutional violations,'
but had not directly addressed the question of whether federal courts could re-exam96.

U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 9; see generally Herbert Wechsler, Habeas Corpus

and the Supreme Court: Reconsidering the Reach of the Great Writ, 59 COLO. L.
REV. 167, 168 (1988).
97. See Ex parte Dorr, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 103 (1845).
98. Act of February 5, 1867, ch. 28, § I, 14 Stat. 385 (codified at 28 U.S.C. §
2241-2255 (1988)).
99. See, e.g., Wechsler, supra note 96, at 171; Berger, Justice, supra note 10,
at 1672-73 n.47 and sources cited therein.
100. 344 U.S. 443 (1953).
101. See, e.g., Wechsler, supra note 96, at 171-75; Paul M. Bator, Finality in

Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners, 76 HARV. L. REV.
441, 463-99 (1963); Gary Peller, In Defense of Federal Habeas Corpus Relitigation,
16 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 579, 610-63 (1982).
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ine all constitutional claims, even if the claims had received a
prior "full and fair hearing" by a state court. Without intimating that it was expanding the scope of habeas, the Court in
Brown concluded as a matter of course that the petitioner was
entitled to review of his constitutional claims (alleged discrimination in the selection of jurors and admission of an allegedly
coerced confession) in habeas. Justice Frankfurter treated this
as an issue of statutory interpretation and clear congressional
intent:
Congress could have left the enforcement of federal constitutional rights governing the administration of criminal
justice in the States exclusively to the State courts. These
tribunals are under the same duty as the federal courts to
respect rights under the United States Constitution ....But
... [Congress having vested jurisdiction to enforce those

rights in the federal courts,] it is for this Court to give fair
effect to the habeas corpus jurisdiction as enacted by Congress ....
... [It would be in disregard of what Congress has

expressly required to deny State prisoners access to the federal courts."
A decade later, in Fay v. Noia, °3 the Supreme Court further expanded the scope of habeas by holding that a
defendant's failure to exhaust available state remedies would
not bar habeas review unless that failure constituted "an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or
privilege... [amounting to a] deliberate by-passing of state
procedures .... 0' This and other Warren Court decisions

favorable to habeas petitioners, coupled with that Court's expansion of constitutional rights for suspects and defendants
(rights on which habeas petitioners were often entitled to rely),
resulted in nearly a tenfold increase in the number of habeas

102. Brown, 344 U.S. at 499-500, 509-10 (opinion of Frankfurter, J.).
103. 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
104. Id. at 439.
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petitions filed in the federal courts by state prisoners during
the decade of the 1960s, to over 8400 per year."5
Although the number of state prisoners has more than
doubled since that time, the number of federal habeas petitions
has only increased gradually and remains below 10,000 per
year today.' Moreover, these petitions are by no means all
from death row inmates."7 Nonetheless, as a strong advocate
for the rights of capital convicts has observed, "[death-sentenced prisoners] constitute the most serious, persistent, and
controversial consumers of habeas corpus, and their efforts-and the efforts of other persons on their behalf-have
elicited much attention and, at times, invective over the
years."0 8 Pointing to successive petitions and resultant delays in executions, conservative critics of the current state of
capital punishment have argued that the existing system of
habeas review in capital cases has been subject to widespread
and deliberate abuse intended to frustrate the administration
of justice through endless delaying tactics.' 9 Despite
counterarguments that the key problems with death penalty
review in the United States today involve not delay but rather
such matters as inadequacy of counsel, fundamental unfairness
at the original trial, and inadequacy of review,"0 the deliberate abuse view has taken center stage in the public debate,
helping to spur various moves to tighten limits on habeas."'
105. See Wechsler, supra note 96, at 180 (during the decade of the 1960s, increase from 868 to 8423 petitions per year).
106. See, e.g., Berger, Justice, supra note 10, at 1669 n.23 (9880 habeas petitions from state prisoners in 1988).
107. Berger, Justice, supra note 10, at 1665 n.1.
108. Berger, Justice, supra note 10, at 1667.
109. See, e.g., Berger, Justice, supra note 10, at 1668-69 and sources cited
therein. According to a study conducted in the late 1970s, 30.6% of federal habeas
corpus petitioners had previously filed at least one other habeas petition, and over
10% had filed at least two prior petitions. Karen M. Allen et al.,
Federal Habeas
Corpus and Its Reform: An Empirical Analysis, 13 RUTGERS L.J. 675, 708-12
(1982). Given later restrictions on the availability of habeas, the figures today
would likely be lower. See The Supreme Court, 1990 Term, 105 HARV. L. REV. 177,
324 n.41 (1991).
110. See Berger, Justice, supra note 10, at 1670-72.
111. See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 117-23.
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Members of the Supreme Court have been at the forefront
of these moves. Over the years, nearly all the Justices in the
conservative bloc have expressed frustration with successive
petitions and other aspects of habeas. 112 The two Justices
who have played the most visible roles in moves to restrict federal habeas are Chief Justice Rehnquist and former Justice
Lewis F. Powell, Jr. In 1971, while serving as Assistant Attorney General prior to his appointment to the Court, Rehnquist
argued for legislative restrictions on the scope of habeas."' If
anything, his opposition to any expansive interpretation of
habeas, especially in capital cases, has hardened since that
time."" Following his appointment as Chief Justice,
Rehnquist stepped up his efforts to modify the governing standards. In 1988, under the umbrella of the Judicial Conference
112. For example, Chief Justice Burger, prior to his retirement, commented
that "abuse of the Great Writ needs to be curbed so as to limit, if not put a stop
to, the 'sporting contest' theory of criminal justice so widely practiced today."
Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 461 (1986) (Burger, C.J., concurring). Justice
O'Connor, while serving as a state appeals court judge prior to her appointment to
the Supreme Court, described federal collateral review of state criminal cases as a
"strange" system worthy of reform. Sandra D. O'Connor, Trends in the Relationship
Between the Federal and State Courts frorm the Perspective of a State Court Judge,
22 WM. & MARY L. REV. 801 (1981). Justice O'Connor has continued to voice criticisms in judicial decisions since her appointment. See, e.g., Coleman v. Thompson,
111 S. Ct. 2546, 2563-64 (1991). And Justice Kennedy has flatly stated, "[it is
well known 'that prisoner actions occupy a disproportionate amount of the time
and energy of the federal judiciary,' . . . and that many of these petitions are
entirely frivolous." Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 282 n.6 (1989) (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting) (quoting Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545, 584 (1979) (Powell, J., concurring in judgment)). Some of the harshest language to date came in Gomez v. United States Dist. Court, 112 S. Ct. 1652 (1992), where, in connection with an application for a stay by Robert Alton Harris, who previously had filed four fdderal
habeas petitions, the Court in a per curiam opinion stated: "Equity must take into
consideration the State's strong interest in proceeding with its judgment and
Harris' obvious attempt at manipulation ....
There is no good reason for this
abusive delay, which has been compounded by last-minute attempts to manipulate
the judicial process." Id. at 1653.
113. See Speedy Trial Hearings on S. 895 Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 264, 269
(1971) (letter from William Rehnquist, Ass't Att'y Gen., to Sen. Sam Irvin,
Subcomm. Chair), quoted in Wechsler, supra note 96, at 181.
114. See generally Berger, Justice, supra note 10, at 1669, 1675-76; Alan I.
Bigel, Rehnquist on Capital Punishment, 17 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 729 (1991).
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of the United States, he appointed the Ad Hoc Committee on
Federal Habeas Corpus in Capital Cases, "to inquire into 'the
necessity and desirability of legislation directed toward avoiding delay and the lack of finality' in capital cases ..... 115 He
named former Justice Powell to chair that committee (hence
the committee's popular name). Rehnquist chose four judges
from the deep South to serve as members. 1 6
In reporting back to the Judicial Conference, the Powell
Committee criticized the "piecemeal and repetitive litigation of
claims" under the existing system, noting that "many capital
litigants return to federal court with second-or even third and
fourth-petitions for relief."" 7 The Committee also noted the
slow pace of executions in the United States, citing an average
time lag between crime and execution of eight years and two
months, with the longest case "cover[ing] a period of 14 years
and six months," and attributed these delays in large part to

115. Report on Habeas Corpus in Capital Cases, 45 Crim. L. Rep. (BNA) 3239
(Sept. 27, 1989) [hereinafter Powell Committee Report].
116. The members were Chief Judge Clark of the Fifth Circuit, Chief Judge
Paul H. Roney of the Eleventh Circuit, and District Judges William Terrell Hodges
of Florida and Barefoot Sanders of Texas. Id.
The appointments surely were not the product of coincidence. Over his
years on the Court, Powell had voiced increasing frustration with delays in capital
cases resulting from repetitive habeas petitions. In his most frequently quoted
criticism, Powell (joined by four other Justices) expressed the view that:
A pattern seems to be developing in capital cases of multiple review in
which claims that could have been presented years ago are brought forward-often in a piecemeal fashion-only after the execution date is set
or becomes imminent. Federal courts should not continue to tolerate-even in capital cases--this type of abuse of the writ of habeas corpus.
Woodard v. Hutchins, 464 U.S. 377, 380 (1984) (Powell, J., concurring in order
vacating stay of execution).
The ostensible reason for the appointment of the other Committee members
was their "extensive experience with federal review of capital cases." Powell Committee Report, supra note 115, at 3239. All four judges come from the regions with
the greatest numbers of capital sentences. Critics have suggested, however, that
the pattern of appointments reflected an aim of limiting habeas, arguing that all
four members share "heavily conservative" outlooks. Berger, Justice, supra note 10,
at 1675.
117. Powell Committee Report, supra note 115, at 3239.
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the habeas review process."' The Committee reserved some
of its harshest criticism for the last-minute nature of much
capital habeas litigation, concluding that, "[in most cases,
successive petitions are meritless, and we believe many are
filed at the eleventh hour seeking nothing more than delay."" 9 To meet these perceived problems, the Committee rec-

ommended a major overhaul of federal habeas corpus review in
capital cases, so as to permit one full opportunity for federal
review of claims but stringently limit any successive petitions.'
Given the makeup of the Committee, its conclusions were
hardly surprising. It did surprise many observers, however,
that Rehnquist immediately forwarded the report to Congress,
over the opposition of a majority of the Judicial Conference.' By doing so, he triggered a fifteen-day period within
which the chair of the Senate Judiciary Committee was required, by terms of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, to introduce legislation modifying habeas corpus procedure.'22 The
Committee's chair, Senator Joseph Biden, complied by introducing a modified version of the Powell Committee's proposal;
and Senator Strom Thurmond introduced a competing bill that
reproduced the Committee proposal verbatim.2' While those
bills were before Congress, Rehnquist publicly declared his
support for the Powell Committee's proposal. In doing so, he
stated: "Reasonable people have questioned whether a criminal
defendant ought to have as broad a 'second bite at the apple' in
the Federal courts as he presently does, but that is a question
of policy for Congress to decide."'

118. Powell Committee Report, supra note 115, at 3239-40.
119. Powell Committee Report, supra note 115, at 3240.

120. For a summary of this and a maJor competing proposal, prepared by the
American Bar Association's Task Force on Death Penalty Habeas Corpus, see
Berger, Justice, supra note 10, at 1665 n.3.
121. See, e.g., Berger, Justice, supra note 10, at 1676 & nn.69-70.

122. See Berger, Justice, supra note 10, at 1676.
123. See Berger, Justice, supra note 10, at 1677.

124. William H. Rehnquist, Speech to the American Law Institute (May 15,
1990) reprinted in part in N.Y. TIMES, May 16, 1990, at A14 (emphasis added).
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As of this writing, the bills that grew out of that proposal
and other competing legislative packages..5 have yet to be enacted. However, rather than waiting for Congress to resolve
this "question of policy," the Supreme Court, with its solidified
conservative majority, has largely taken matters into its own
hands through restrictive interpretations of several key elements of habeas procedure." In one of the early decisions
restricting federal habeas, Wainwright v. Sykes 2 ' in 1977,
then-Associate Justice Rehnquist noted the sweeping nature in
which the Warren Court had expanded the scope of habeas in
Fay v. Noia. At the time, Rehnquist commented, "[w]e do not
choose to paint with a similarly broad brush here."28 A skeptic might wonder whether this "choice" was voluntary or was
forced on Rehnquist by the absence of a majority willing to join
a broader opinion. In any event, in the past few years, as the
conservative majority has grown, the Court has begun repainting the world of habeas in broader and broader strokes. It has
done so on a number of fronts, as discussed in the following
section.
1.

Substantive Scope of Reviewable Issues

In Brown v. Allen, the Supreme Court took the language of
the Habeas Corpus Act at face value in concluding that habeas
petitions could be filed with respect to any alleged constitutional violation." 9 Later, in Stone v. Powell,86 the Supreme
Court backed away from that position when it excluded from
federal habeas review Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule
claims that had been "fully and fairly litigated" in state court
proceedings. Despite predictions by some commentators that
Stone might represent the first wedge in a gradual restriction
of the types of substantive constitutional claims that might be
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.

See generally Berger, Justice, supra note 10.
See generally infra notes 171, 182-226 and accompanying text.
433 U.S. 72 (1977).
Id. at 88 n.12.
See supra text accompanying notes 100-02.
428 U.S. 465 (1976).
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raised in habeas,'' and despite some subsequent proposals
for such restrictions, 13 2 neither the Powell Committee nor
Rehnquist has yet urged such a change. In this context,
Rehnquist publicly expressed his disagreement with a proposal
by Senator Strom Thurmond that would have excluded from
federal habeas review any case that had received a "full and
fair adjudication" in state court-albeit while further commenting that "this approach might commend itself some years
hence." 3 Moreover, in a 1991 decision, McCleskey v.
Zant,'" a solid conservative majority that included Rehnquist
announced, "[w]ith the exception of Fourth Amendment violations that a petitioner has been given a full and fair opportunity to litigate in state court [citing Stone], the writ today appears to extend to all dispositive constitutional
claims present135
ed in a proper procedural manner."
Just a year later, the Court granted certiorari in Withrow
v. Williams, 3 ' in which the petitioner warden argued that
the scope of the Stone exception should be expanded beyond
the Fourth Amendment arena to bar habeas review of Fifth
Amendment Mirandaclaims that had been fully and fairly litigated in state court. In a five to four decision, the Supreme
Court rejected that claim and expressly "declined to extend the
rule in Stone beyond its original bounds." 7 It remains to be
seen, moreover, how the key adjective "dispositive" in the
statement from McCleskey quoted above may be interpreted in
the future. 8'

131. See, e.g., Peller, supra note 101, at 596-602.
132. See, e.g., OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, REPORT TO THE
ATTORNEY GENERAL: FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS REVIEW OF STATE JUDGMENTS 85-67

(1988) (proposal to exclude Miranda and Massiah claims from federal habeas review).
133. See Linda Greenhouse, Rehnquist Urges Curb on Appeals of Death Penalty,
N.Y. TIMES, May 16, 1990, at Al, A18.
134. 111 S.Ct. 1454 (1991).
135. Id. at 1462 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
136. 112 S.Ct. 1664 (1992).
137. Withrow v. Williams, 113 S.Ct. 1745, 1750 (1993).
138. Restrictive interpretations of the underlying constitutional rights themselves will of course also effectively limit the availability of habeas.
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2. Retroactivity
Regardless of whether the Court further restricts the substantive grounds for habeas, cutbacks at the procedural level
have abounded. One major debate has centered over whether
prisoners should be permitted to seek habeas on the basis of
constitutional standards announced after their convictions
have become final." 9 Decisions dealing with this issue have
largely been concerned with seeking to define the proper balance between protecting individual constitutional rights and
ensuring finality of criminal proceedings-two themes that permeate the debate over the appropriate limits of habeas. The
decisions on retroactivity also highlight two other recurrent
themes relating to the proper role of habeas: federal/state comity and the degree of importance to be accorded to questions
of factual innocence.
A complicated set of standards on retroactivity evolved
under the Warren and Burger Courts.'40 More recent decisions from the Rehnquist Court have sought to simplify those
standards, although it is surely not just coincidental that in
the process those decisions have sharply limited the ability of
habeas petitioners to rely on newly announced constitutional
standards. In Teague v. Lane,' Justice O'Connor characterized the purpose of federal habeas review of state proceedings
as being one of deterring state courts from committing consti-

139. With the expansion of constitutional rights under the Warren Court, this
issue of retroactive applicability took on great importance for defendants whose
trials had commenced or whose cases were on direct appeal, as well as for prisoners seeking review in habeas. As the Rehnquist Court has cut back on certain
constitutional rights, that issue is likely to decrease somewhat in importance for
death-sentenced prisoners, but the converse situation has arisen--i.e., habeas
claims based on rights that existed at the time of trial but have since been overturned. In Lockhart v. Fretwell, 113 S. Ct. 838 (1993), the Court held that habeas
petitioners may not rely on such since-repudiated rights as a basis for ineffective
assistance of counsel claims.
140. See generally WAYNE R. LAFAVE & JEROLD H. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 84-91 (2d ed. 1992).
141. 489 U.S. 288 (1989).
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tutional errors. 4 2 That purpose, she concluded, would not be
served by permitting federal habeas courts to reverse prior
state court judgments on the basis of a "new rule";' to the
contrary, in her view, such reversal would represent an unwarranted intrusion into the state judicial process.'" As one
commentator has observed, subsequent decisions have defined
"new rule" so broadly that a habeas petitioner appears to have
little basis for a claim unless a state court has failed
"to obey
45
the most obvious federal constitutional precedents."
Teague and its progeny have recognized two exceptions to
this standard: (1) new rules placing "certain kinds of... conduct beyond the power of the criminal law-making authority to
proscribe"; and, (2) "new procedures without which the likelihood of an accurate conviction is seriously diminished." 46
The former is by its own terms very narrow. The Court has
narrowly construed the latter as applying only to " 'watershed
rules of criminal procedure' implicating the fundamental fairness and accuracy of the criminal proceeding."'47 Accordingly,
in the area of retroactivity the Court appears to have been
charting a course that would largely reserve habeas for those
claims
where an innocent individual was wrongly convict4
ed.'

142. Id. at 306 (plurality opinion).
143. Id. at 307.
144. Id. at 310. See Joseph L. Hoffman, Retroactivity and the Great Writ: How
Congress Should Respond to Teague v. Lane, 1990 B.Y.U. L. REV. 183, 204-06.
145. Hoffman, supra note 144, at 211 (referring to Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S.
288 (1989); Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989); and Butler v. McKellar, 494
U.S. 407 (1990)).
146. Teague, 489 U.S. at 311, 313.
147. Saffile v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484 (1990) (quoting Teague, 489 U.S. at 311).
148. See, e.g., Kathleen Patchel, The New Habeas, 42 HASTINGS L.J. 941, 993
(1991); The Supreme Court, 1989 Term, 104 HARV. L. REV. 43, 318-19 (1990);
Bruce Ledewitz, Habeas Corpus as a Safety Valve for Innocence, 18 N.Y.U. REV. L.
& SOC. CHANGE 415, 416-32 (1990-91).
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3. Procedural Default
Another area of debate concerns the proper treatment of
procedural default in state courts. In 1963's Fay v. Noia,49
the Supreme Court held that even where a petitioner has
failed to comply with reasonable state procedures requiring the
assertion of claims, a federal habeas court must consider the
merits of federal claims unless there was "an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege"
amounting to a "deliberate by-passing of state procedures. "50
This expansive interpretation has encountered great opposition. One frequently voiced concern is that the standard has
undermined interests in finality of criminal proceedings and
encouraged piecemeal litigation. 5 ' A second line of attack is
based on concerns of federalism and comity. The dissenters in
Fay highlighted this argument, 2 which recently has taken
on increased prominence in opinions of the Supreme Court.
The argument is based on a view that the "deliberate bypass"
standard condones and even promotes nonutilization of state
procedures and reflects a fundamental distrust of the ability
and willingness of state court judges to uphold their constitutional duty to apply federal law faithfully. 5 '

149. 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
150. Id. at 439.
151. See, e.g., Henry Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral Attacks on
Criminal Judgments, 38 U. Cli. L. REV. 142, at 160 n.91 (1970) (broad attack on

scope of federal habeas generally, with specific reference to Fay v. Noia as a
"fountainhead of... error"); Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 88-90 (1977).

152. See 372 U.S. at 446-47 (Clark, J., dissenting); id. at 464-67 (Harlan, J.,
dissenting).
153. See, e.g., Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. at 88-89; Teague, 489 U.S. at 311
(1989) (O'Connor, J., plurality opinion) (emphasizing intrusiveness on states in

context of retroactive application of new constitutional precedents); Coleman v.
Thompson, 111 S. Ct. 2546, 2565 (1991) ("Fay was based on a conception of feder-

al/state relations that undervalued the importance of state procedural rules.");
Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 112 S. Ct. 1715, 1719-20 (1992) ("[Eincouraging the full

factual development in state court... advances comity by allowing a coordinate
jurisdication to correct its own errors .... Just as the State must afford the
petitioner a full and fair hearing on his federal claim, so must the petitioner af-
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The deliberate bypass standard did not survive under the
Burger Court. In Wainwright v. Sykes,' 5 ' the Court held that
procedural default bars habeas review unless the petitioner
can demonstrate "cause" for the default and actual "prejudice"
resulting from it. In subsequent cases, the Court extended the
cause-and-prejudice standard to other situations 5' and interpreted the cause requirement quite narrowly. 5 ' Without
seeking to define that concept precisely, the Court provided the
following examples of factors that will constitute cause: " 'interference by officials' that makes compliance with the state's
procedural laws impracticable," 5 7 "a showing that the factual
or legal basis for a claim was not reasonably available to counsel,"' 5 8 and "ineffective assistance of counsel."'59
In addition, the Court has announced one exception to its
procedural default standard: such default will be excused'if a
"miscarriage of justice" would otherwise result." In recent
years, the Court has made clear that it regards such "fundamental miscarriages of justice" as being limited to "extraordinary instances when a constitutional violation probably has
caused the conviction of one innocent of the crime."' 6 ' Again,
this time in the procedural default area, the Court has largely
tied federal habeas to the vindication of factual innocence,

ford the State a full and fair opportunity to address and resolve the claim on the
merits.").
154. 433 U.S. 72 (1977).
155. See, e.g., McCleskey v. Zant, 111 S. Ct. 1454 (1991) (application to claims
of abuse of the habeas writ); Coleman v. Thompson, 111 S. Ct. 2546 (1991) (application to failure to pursue right to appeal); Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 112 S. Ct.
1715 (1992) (application to failure to develop material facts in state court).
156. See, e.g., McCleskey v. Zant, 111 S. Ct. at 1470-72 (construing "cause" for
application of "inexcusable neglect" standard).
157. Id. at 1470 (quoting Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986)).
158. Murray, 477 U.S. at 488.
159. McCleskey, 111 S. Ct. at 1470 (quoting Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478,
488 (1986)).
160. Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. at 91.
161. McCleskey v. Zant, 111 S.Ct. at 1470; see Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. at
496 (miscarriage of justice where constitutional violation "has probably resulted in
the conviction of one who is actually innocent.").
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4. Successive Petitions
In the procedural default cases, comity between federal
and state courts constitutes a central concern. That concern is
muted when a prisoner has properly complied with all state
procedural rules, but then files a series of habeas petitions in
federal court following conviction. In some such successive
petition cases, the petitioner may re-allege grounds already
advanced in prior petitions. In others, the petitioner may raise
new claims never before considered by the federal courts. Of
course, in any such case a state court might be offended if a
federal court disagrees with the state court's judgment on a
federal constitutional claim. Yet that is an inevitable consequence of the current system permitting federal collateral
review of state court constitutional determinations. It represents a quite different level of intrusion on federalism concerns
than that presented in the procedural default situation, where
the petitioner has not even accorded the state court an opportunity to consider the federal claims.
The successive petition cases present two additional concerns: 1) over finality, and 2) over piecemeal litigation. Where
a petitioner alleges the same claims in successive petitions, she
may be getting two or more "bites at the apple." Moreover, if
new claims may be raised in subsequent petitions, a petitioner
hoping to delay her execution might file a series of petitions,
each alleging at most a few claims, rather than consolidating
them all into the initial petition. In the new claim situation, as
with procedural default, one can further identify two broad
classes of cases: those where petitioners deliberately engage in
piecemeal litigation by consciously withholding possible claims;
and those where the initial failure to assert a claim arises from
inadequate counsel, neglect, inadvertence, lack of knowledge,
or some other cause. In any of these situations, permitting the
successive petition will lead to delay and lessen the degree of
finality of judgments.
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In 1948 Congress enacted a statute dealing with successive habeas petitions.'62 That statute directly addressed the
same claim situation, providing that no federal court need
consider an application for a writ of habeas corpus if a federal
court previously rejected another habeas claim and the later
petition "presents no new ground not theretofore presented and
determined."" In its 1963 decision in Sanders v. United
States,' the Supreme Court stated that a federal court
might nonetheless be required to consider a subsequent petition asserting a claim that had previously been resolved on the
merits if the "ends of justice" so require, giving as an example
an intervening change in the law.'65 As noted above, recent
Court decisions have virtually barred subsequent petitions
seeking retroactive application of new rules.'66 In addition, a
plurality of the Court has concluded that a second or successive petition based on a claim that has already been rejected
on the merits should not be considered unless the petitioner
"supplements his constitutional
claim with a colorable showing
67
innocence."
factual
of
Defining the proper standards for successive petitions
presenting new claims has proven more problematic. The 1948
statute did not address such "new claim" petitions. Fifteen
years later in Sanders," the Warren Court established standards for such petitions that closely followed the standards it
162. 28 U.S.C. § 2244, as adopted in 1948, provided:
No circuit or district judge shall be required to entertain an application
for a writ of habeas corpus to inquire into the detention of a person
pursuant to a judgment of a court of the United States if it appears that
the legality of such detention has been determined by a judge or court of
the United States on a prior application for a writ of habeas corpus and
the petition presents no new ground not theretofore presented and determined, and the judge or court is satisfied that the ends of justice will
not be served by such inquiry.
28 U.S.C. § 2244 (1964).
163. Id.
164. 373 U.S. 1 (1963).
165. Id. at 17.
166. See supra text accompanying notes 139-48.
167. Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 454 (1986) (opinion of Powell, J.).
168. 373 U.S. 1.
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had announced for procedural default earlier that year in Fay
v. Noia.6 9 The Court concluded that federal courts normally
must consider the merits of second or successive habeas petitions raising new claims. Based on equitable notions, however,
the Court held that a federal court might refuse to entertain a
subsequent habeas petition if the prisoner had abused the
writ, giving as examples of abuse "deliberately withhold[ing]
one of two grounds for federal collateral relief.., in the hope
of being granted two hearings rather than one or for some
other such reason... [or] deliberately abandon[ing] one of his
grounds at the first hearing."' ° The Court then added,
"Nothing in the traditions of habeas corpus requires the federal courts to tolerate needless, piecemeal litigation, or to enterproceedings whose only purpose is to vex, hatain collateral 17
rass, or delay." '
In 1966 Congress amended the governing statute to deal
expressly with the new claim situation. 72 Newly added language closely paralleled the Sanders standard, providing that a
federal habeas court need not entertain a subsequent habeas
petition raising a new claim if the petitioner had "deliberately
withheld the newly asserted ground or otherwise abused-the
In 1976 Congress again considered the proper stanwrit."
dard in the new claim situation when it reviewed a habeas
rule proposed by the Supreme Court.'7 4 The proposed rule
would have permitted a judge to dismiss a "new claim" petition

169. 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
170. 373 U.S. at 18; see John B. Morris, Jr., Note, The Rush to Execution:.Successive Habeas Corpus Petitions in Capital Cases, 95 YALE L.J. 371, 374-76 (1985).
171. 373 U.S. at 18. In discussing the abuse of the writ doctrine, the Court
also cited earlier decisions, including one which had referred to "inexcusable neglect" by the petitioner as a proper ground for denying a habeas petitioner an
evidentiary hearing (although the Sanders Court itself never quoted the phrase
"inexcusable neglect"). Id. at 18 (citing Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 317
(1963)).
172. Act of Nov. 2, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-711, 80 Stat. 1104.
173. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b) (1991) (emphasis added).
174. See Steven M. Goldstein, Application of Res Judicata Principles to Successive Federal Habeas Corpus Petitions in Capital Cases: The Search for an Equitable Approach, 21 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 45, 70-73 (1987).
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if "the judge finds that the failure of the petitioner to assert
those grounds in a prior petition is not excusable."'75 Congress rejected the proposal, based on a concern that the highlighted phrase "created a new and undefined standard that
gave a judge too broad a discretion."176 In substituting the
phrase "constituted an abuse of the writ," Congress explicitly
indicated its intention to codify the Sanders standards.'77
That did not end the debate. Sanders, after all, did not set
out precise standards, but rather used examples and case citations to explain "abuse of the writ." Over the years, conservative Justices have become increasingly vocal in criticizing successive capital habeas petitions raising new claims in a piecemeal fashion. 78 In fact, the Powell Committee recommended
a flat ban on successive petitions unless "the facts underlying
the [new] claim would be sufficient, if proven, to undermine
179
the court's confidence in the jury's determination of guilt."
However, bills incorporating that 80 and other strict limits on
successive petitions'' have yet to pass Congress.
In the meantime, the Court itself has established sharp
limits on successive habeas petitions. In 1991 McCleskey v.
Zant.s2 treated the issue as a matter of properly defining the
doctrine of abuse of the writ in accordance with "a complex and
evolving body of equitable principles.""8 Despite Congress'

175. See H.R. REP. No. 94-1471, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1976), reprinted in
1976 U.S.C.C-AN. 2478, 2485 (emphasis added).
176. H.R. REP. No. 94-1471, supra note 175, at 5, reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2482.
177. H.R. REP. No. 94-1471, supra note 175, at 5, reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.CA.N. at 2482.
178. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 112-19 and sources cited therein.
179. Powell Committee Report, supra note 115, at 3243 (proposed § 2257(c)).
180. See Berger, Justice, supra note 10, at 1713-14 (bill proposed by Rep.
Hyde).
181. H.R. REP. No. 101-681, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 29 (1990), cited in
McCleskey v. Zant, 111 S. Ct. 1454, 1482 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (requiring dismissal of second or successive claims by capital convicts unless the petition
raised a new claim "the factual basis of [which] could not have been discovered by
the exercise of reasonable diligence").
182. 111 S. Ct. 1454 (1991).
183. Id. at 1467.
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explicit rejection of the Supreme Court's proposed "not excusable" language fifteen years earlier, 1 the Court concluded
that these "complex and evolving... equitable principles"
warranted defining abuse of the writ to include not only deliberate abandonment, but also "failing to raise a claim through
inexcusable neglect."'85
The Court in McCleskey proceeded to define the term "inexcusable neglect" and concluded that it is governed by the
same standards as procedural default.'8 6 Accordingly, as with
the procedural default standards described above,'87 "[tlo excuse his failure to raise the claim earlier, [a habeas petitioner
alleging a new claim in a second or successive petition] must
show cause for failing to raise it and prejudice therefrom .... ,1' In line with the procedural default cases, the
Court recognized one narrow exception to this standard: cases
involving a "fundamental miscarriage of justice" in those "extraordinary instances when a constitutional violation probably
has caused the conviction of one innocent of the crime. " 189
The Court confidently described the concepts of cause and
prejudice as "[w]ell-defined in the case law... [and] familiar
to federal courts.""9 As though to minimize the risk that the
lower courts might be overgenerous in interpreting those "welldefined" concepts, however, when the Court later applied those
standards in its decision, it took the opportunity to elaborate
on them. Adding its own emphasis to language from an earlier
opinion, the Court stated, "'[C]ause... requires a showing of
some external impediment preventing counsel from constructing or raising a claim. '""'
184. See supra text accompanying note 176.

185. 111 S. Ct. at 1468 (emphasis added). As proof that this was not a radical
change, the Court observed that Sanders itself had cited a decision applying the
"inexcusable neglect" standard. Id.; see supra note 175.
186. 111 S." Ct. at 1468.

187. See supra text accompanying notes 149-61.
188.
189.
190.
191.

111 S. Ct. at 1470 (emphasis added).
Id.
Id. at 1471.
Id. at 1472 (quoting Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 492 (1986)) (empha-

sis added by Court in McCleskey).
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In applying that standard, the Court rejected McCleskey's
habeas petition, which was based on a claim that the prosecu-

tion had infringed his right against self-incrimination by deliberately planting an informant in the adjoining cell. The Court
accepted a district court finding that McCleskey did not know
of a twenty-one page statement that the alleged informant had

provided to the prosecutors and could not reasonably have
discovered it when he filed his first habeas petition.'92 None-

theless, concluded the Court, that did not excuse McCleskey's
failure to raise the claim in that petition. Since McCleskey
himself had participated in the conversations with the alleged

informant and knew that the informant had told the police
about the conversations, McCleskey had all the information he

needed to be on notice to pursue the claim in his initial habeas
petition.
His failure to do so constituted inexcusable ne93
glect.1

The Court further elaborated:
Abuse of the writ doctrine examines petitioner's conduct: the question is
whether petitioner possessed, or by reasonable means could have obtained, a sufficient basis to allege a claim in the first petition and pursue the matter through the habeas process ....
[P]etitioner must conduct a reasonable and diligent investigation aimed at including all relevant claims and grounds for relief in the first federal habeas petition . . . . Omission :of [a] claim will not be excused merely because
evidence discovered later might also have supported or strengthened the
claim.
Id. (emphasis in original).
192. 111 S. Ct. at 1472-73. The prosecutors had not included that document
when they gave McCleskey's counsel a copy of the supposedly "complete" file in
connection with an earlier proceeding, the document came to light only after a
change in interpretation of the state "open records" law. Id. at 1487 n.11 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
193. Id. at 1473-74. In closing, the Court briefly considered whether the ."miscarriage of justice" exception might apply. Given the Court's view that that exception is limited to the wrongful conviction of the innocent, that issue did not detain
the Court long. To the contrary, observed the Court, the Evans document simply
confirmed McCleskey's guilt. Id. at 1474-75.
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"Actual Innocence" Exception

In the course of its cutbacks, the Supreme Court has repeatedly referred to exceptions that would warrant a grant of
habeas review, despite other procedural bars, where appropriate to vindicate claims of actual innocence. In the context of
the relitigation of previously asserted claims, the Court spoke
of an "ends of justice" exception;" in the procedural default
and new claim areas, the Court set forth the "fundamental
miscarriage of justice" exception;'95 and in the retroactivity
situation, the Court announced an exception for cases involving
' 96
'
These "excep"'watershed rules of criminal procedure. ""
tions" all follow a common theme: each depends upon a showing that a constitutional violation probably 197resulted in the
wrongful conviction of an innocent individual.
With most other bases for habeas review so firmly closed,
the Court's references to these exceptions naturally led to the
question of whether new evidence supporting a petitioner's
actual innocence would be sufficient to obtain habeas review.
In early 1993 the Rehnquist Court answered that question
with a rather resounding "no" in another capital case: Herrera
v. Collins.'98 Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Rehnquist
stated:
Claims of actual innocence based on newly discovered
evidence have never been held to state a ground for federal
habeas relief absent an independent constitutional violation
occurring in the underlying state criminal proceeding .... 199
The fundamental miscarriage of justice exception is
available "only where the prisoner supplements his constitutional claim with a colorable showing of factual inno194. See supra text accompanying note 165.
195. See supra text accompanying note 160-61.
196. See supra text accompanying note 147.

197. See generally Patchel, supra note 148.
198. 113 S. Ct. 853 (1993).
199. Id. at 859.
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cence."... We have never held that it extends to free-standing claims of actual innocence.2"
This conclusion reflects the language of the Habeas Corpus
Act, which defines federal habeas as a remedy for "any person
...restrained of his or her liberty in violation of the Constitution, or laws or treaties of the United States."2 ° ' Moreover, it
is in keeping with prior precedent of the Court, including Chief
Justice Warren's conclusion in Townsend v. Sain,2 2 that "the
existence merely of newly discovered evidence relevant to the
guilt of a state 203prisoner is not a ground for relief on federal
habeas corpus."
Herrera argued that his case involved more than simply
new evidence concerning guilt or innocence. Characterizing his
case as involving the execution of an innocent man, he asserted two independent constitutional claims: a violation of, the
Eighth Amendment's proscription of "cruel and unusual punishments" and a violation of due process under the Fourteenth
Amendment. Rehnquist rejected Herrera's characterization of
the case, stating that "petitioner does not come before the
Court as one who is 'innocent,' but on the contrary as one who
has been convicted by due process of law of two brutal murders."2 ' In the view of the Court, the fact that Texas law limits petitions for new trials based on newly discovered evidence
to the first thirty days after conviction does not violate due
process.0 5 The Court also rejected the Eighth Amendment
claim, although the reasoning was a bit unclear.0 6

200. Id. at 862 (quoting Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 454 (1986) (plurality op.)).
201. 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (1988).

202. 372 U.S. 293 (1963).
203. Id. at 317. As the dissent in Herrera observed, however, this holding is
distinctly at odds with the rhetoric the Rehnquist Court used in first announcing
the various "miscarriage-of-justice"-type exceptions, where the Court emphasized
that habeas would remain available in the successive petition context for claims of
innocence. See 113 S.Ct. at 880 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
204. 113 S. Ct. at 860.

205. Id. at 864.
206. Id. at 863. The Court's Eighth Amendment analysis is a mishmash of
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Perhaps to satisfy the cohcurring Justices,
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Rehnquist:

[A]ssume[d], for the sake of argument in deciding this case,
that in a capital case a truly persuasive demonstration of
"actual innocence" made after trial would render the execution of a defendant unconstitutional, and warrant federal
habeas relief if there were no state avenue open to process
such a claim.2"
However, this remaining "actual innocence" exception, if it

exists at all, would be very narrowly circumscribed. According
to the majority:
[Blecause of the very disruptive effect that entertaining
claims of actual innocence would have on the need for finality
in capital cases, and the enormous burden that having to
retry cases based on often stale evidence would place on the
States, the threshold showing for such an assumed right
would necessarily be extraordinarily high.2"

several themes: the refusal to treat capital cases differently from noncapital cases
for habeas purposes (even though capital punishment has been treated far differently from other punishments for purposes of Eighth Amendment analysis, as the
dissent observed, id. at 876 (Blackmun, J., dissenting), and the majority at least
implicitly acknowledged, id. at 864); the assertion that a reexamination of the case
would be no more reliable than the original trial; and a distinguishing of other
cases granting more lenient review for capital punishment than non-capital cases.
Id. The Court never directly explained why Herrera's Eighth Amendment claim
failed to provide an independent constitutional basis for the habeas petition.
207. In a concurring opinion joined by Justice Kennedy, Justice O'Connor
strongly implied her approval of the majority's approach of leaving open the possibility of an exception where the new evidence clearly establishes innocence. Id. at
870 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
208. Id. at 868.
209. Id. Justice White, concurring in the judgment, and Justice Blackmun,
joined by Justices Stevens and Souter in dissent, would have made this exception
explicit; but they differed in the standards that would apply. For Justice White,
"petitioner would at the very least be required to show that based on proffered
newly discovered evidence and the entire record before the jury that convicted
him, 'no rational trier of fact could [find] proof of guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt.'" Id. at 875 (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 324 (1979) (White,
J., concurring)). In the view of the dissenters, "a prisoner must show not just that
there was probably a reasonable doubt about his guilt but that he is probably
actually innocent." Id. at 878 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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In the view of the majority, the standard remedy for a
death row inmate alleging new evidence of actual innocence
after the period permitted by state law for a new trial motion
based on new evidence has expired-a period ranging from just
ten to sixty days in seventeen states,21 ° with only fifteen
states permitting such motions more than three years after the
conviction was entered 21 -does not lie in federal habeas, nor,
indeed, in the courts at all. Rather, concluded Rehnquist, the
proper avenue is "a request for executive clemency[,] ... the

historic remedy for preventing miscarriages of justice where
judicial process has been exhausted."21

2

Thus, in Herrera the

Court almost completely foreclosed use of federal habeas to
raise claims that new evidence establishes a prisoner's actual
innocence, unless the new evidence both demonstrates an independent constitutional violation
and provides "a colorable
21 3
showing of factual innocence."

Even in such a case, the "colorable showing" required by
the Rehnquist Court is onerous. The Court first used the
phrase "colorable showing of factual innocence" in 1986, in. the
plurality opinion in Kuhlmann v. Wilson.14 There, the Court
defined the term as requiring a showing that "the trier of the
facts would have entertained a reasonable doubt of [the
petitioner's] guilt."215 When a petitioner actually tried to rely

on the exception, however, the Court adopted a much stricter
definition. Writing for the Court in 1992's Sawyer v. Whitley,
Rehnquist stated that "to show 'actual innocence' [for purposes
of the 'miscarriage of justice' exception] one must show by clear
and convincing evidence that but for a constitutional error, no
reasonable juror would have found the petitioner eligible for
the death penalty under the applicable state law."2 16 To the

210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.

See id.'at 866 n.8 (listing state time limits for motions).
See id. at 866 n.11 (same).
Id. at 866-67.
Id. at 862 (quoting Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 454 (1986)).
477 U.S. 436, 454 (1986) (plurality op.).
Id. at 454 n.17.
112 S. Ct. 2514, 2517 (1992).
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extent it still exists, the "actual innocence" exception is narrow
indeed.
6. Overview of Habeas Developments
With these decisions, the Rehnquist Court has achieved
virtually all of the limitations recommended by the Powell
Committee, without the need to await Congressional action.
Given the Court's restrictive interpretations of'retroactivity,
procedural default and abuse of the writ, coupled with the very
high degree of "reasonable and diligent investigation" demanded at the time of the first federal habeas petition-a level that
seems to presuppose not only competence but omniscience on
the part of counsel (assuming petitioners are fortunate enough
to be represented by counsel)-as a practical matter, prisoners
are now virtually limited to one round of federal habeas review. Claims that are raised in the first federal petition may
not be relitigated except in extraordinary circumstances.
Claims based on existing law that are not raised in the initial
petition are almost certain to be treated as waived on inexcusable neglect grounds, if not already barred by procedural default. And, to the extent the Rehnquist Court announces any
new constitutional standards that might benefit petitioners,
their reliance on such new standards will likely be barred on
retroactivity grounds. Moreover, despite lip service to an "actual innocence" exception, "mere" proof of innocence alone is not
enough to obtain habeas review.
Thus, through a relative handful of decisions in the span
of only four years, the Rehnquist Court has vastly altered the
world of federal habeas. In this new world, a habeas petitioner
is entitled to one round of federal habeas review. Assuming the
petitioner and her counsel, if any, have properly abided by all
state procedural rules and have exhausted available remedies,
the petitioner will be entitled to raise all federal constitutional
claims except Fourth Amendment claims at that time-at least
until the Court provides further guidance on the meaning of its
reference to "dispositive" constitutional issues. The petitioner
had better include any and all conceivable claims in that first
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petition, though. Very few grounds will justify a second or
subsequent petition in this new world of habeas.
Apart from the "actual innocence" exception discussed
above, 217 one other possible ground referred to by the Court
deserves note. In recent years, habeas petitioners have frequently raised ineffective assistance of counsel claims. On its
face, McCleskey appears to preserve this ground as a possible
basis for successive habeas petitions. In its discussion of procedural default, the Court observed that "constitutionally 'ineffective assistance of counsel ... is cause.' ,218 Given McCleskey's
adoption of the same standards to define "cause" in the "abuse
of the writ"/"inexcusable neglect" setting, it thus might seem
that ineffective assistance of counsel would constitute cause
justifying a second or successive federal petition.
That is evidently not the case. First, the Court in
McCleskey expressly emphasized that "cause" is limited to
"constitutionally" ineffective assistance, adding that "[a]ttorney
error short of ineffective assistance ... does not constitute
cause and will not excuse a procedural default."219 The Court
went on to add that "[a]pplication of the cause and prejudice
standard... does [not] imply that there is a constitutional
right to counsel in federal habeas corpus."2 20 Yet, in the absence of any constitutional right to counsel for one's first habeas petition, ineffective assistance by counsel in connection with
that petition plainly will not rise to the level of "constitutionally 'ineffective assistance" in this Court's view.22 ' Furthermore, any claims of ineffective assistance at the trial or direct

217.
218.
219.
220.
221.

See supra text accompanying notes 194-216.
111 S. Ct. at 1470 (quoting Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986)).
Id.
Id. at 1470-71.
This conclusion is confirmed by the Supreme Court's treatment of claims

of ineffective assistance of counsel in state collateral review proceedings. Just two
months after its decision in McCleskey v. Zant, the Supreme Court considered
whether ineffective assistance of counsel in connection with a state habeas petition

might constitute cause for procedural default. The Court rejected that claim. Since
there was no constitutional right to counsel in state habeas, ineffectiveness at that
level is not of constitutional dimension. Coleman v. Thompson, 111 S. Ct. 2546,
2567-68 (1991).
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appeal levels would seem to be squarely within the ambit of
the "reasonable and diligent investigation" required of petitioner in connection with the first habeas petition. Thus, ineffective assistance claims do not offer much promise as grounds for
successive habeas petitions.
The issue of assistance by counsel, moreover, represents
one key respect in which the standards developed judicially by
the Rehnquist Court are less progressive than most legislative
proposals. Both the Powell Committee Report and a competing
study undertaken by the American Bar Association Criminal
Justice Section's Task Force on Death Penalty Habeas Corpus222 identified the lack of assistance and/or the ineffective
assistance of counsel in the initial stages of capital litigation as
a major problem area in the existing system of death penalty
habeas."' Although differing considerably in the details of
their proposals, both reports recommended a two-pronged approach in which "death-sentenced prisoners would be accorded
one full opportunity for state and federal review of their claims
with representation by adequate counsel."2" McCleskey and
the other Supreme Court decisions provide no such trade-off.
To the contrary, in the new world of habeas, death-sentenced
prisoners may go without adequate representation in the initial stages of their review process." Yet if they file even a
cursory single-issue federal habeas petition on a pro se basis,
they are likely to find themselves barred from any further
review in federal courts.226
222. TASK FORCE ON DEATH PENALTY HABEAS CORPUS, CRIMINAL JUSTICE SECTION, AMERICAN BAR ASS'N, TOWARD A MORE JUST AND EFFECTIVE SYSTEM OF
REVIEW IN STATE DEATH PENALTY CASES, RECOMMENDATIONS AND REPORT OF THE
ABA TASK FORCE ON DEATH PENALTY HABEAS CORPUS (1989).

223. See Berger, Justice, supra note 10, at 1673-74.
224. Berger, Justice, supra note 10, at 1674 (emphasis added).
225. By federal statute, death-sentenced prisoners are currently entitled to
counsel in federal habeas proceedings, 21 U.S.C. § 848(q)(4) (1988). Even assuming
this right survives legislative attack, it does not extend to prisoners under lesser
sentences, nor are states constitutionally required to provide a similar system for
state post-conviction review proceedings. Furthermore, the right to counsel, while
of great importance, does not assure adequate representation at that stage. See
The Supreme Court, 1990 Term, supra note 109, at 326-27.
226. See The Supreme Court, 1990 Term, supra note 109, at 326-27.
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B. Japan
Wherever the death penalty exists, it is inevitable that
many death-sentenced prisoners will attempt to delay their
executions. Given the existence of a system for post-conviction
collateral review in Japan, it is not surprising to find much the
same phenomenon of successive, and often piecemeal, petitions
for review of capital cases that one finds in the United States.
In many cases, moreover, the delays in Japan far exceed those
on this side of the Pacific. As examples of unacceptable delays
in executions in the United States, the Powell Committee
pointed to an average of eight years between commission of the
crime and execution and noted that in one case the execution
did not occur until over fourteen years after the crime.227
That Committee also observed that "many capital litigants
return to federal court with second-or even third and
fourth-petitions for relief."2 ' By comparison, it is by no
means uncommon to find death-sentenced prisoners in Japan
who have spent two or three decades on death row prior to
their execution, acquittal, or death by natural causes. And in
Japan the number of petitions for collateral review filed by a
single prisoner may run to ten, fifteen, or even more.
In Japan, a death sentence becomes final either upon the
exhaustion of direct appeals to the High Court and the Supreme Court, or upon a convict's failure *tofile an appeal within the statutory time limits. 2 9 Once the sentence has become
final, the only remaining procedural step necessary prior to
execution is for the Justice Minister to stamp the execution

The legislative proposals also call for time limits on the filing of the initial
federal habeas petition. See Berger, Justice, supra note 10, et 1695-97. To date,
the Supreme Court has not announced any such limits. Given the Court's references to concerns over "erosion of memory," "dispersion of witnesses" and the like, see

McCleskey v. Zant, 111 S. Ct. 1454, 1468 (1991) (quoting Kuhlmann v. Wilson,
477 U.S. 436, 453 (1986)), though, it would not be surprising if this Court were to
declare that even initial petitions could be denied for "staleness."

227. Powell Committee Report, supra note 115, at 3239-3240.
228. Powell Committee Report, supra note 115, at 3241.
229. KEISOHO arts. 373, 415, 418.
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order. Normally, the Justice Minister must do so within six
months' ° and the execution must be carried out within five
days after that.2"' At least two postwar Justice Ministers
have declined to stamp any such orders out of personal opposition to the death penaltyY2 Other Justice Ministers have not
shared that view, and capital convicts have utilized two primary tools to forestall them from stamping the execution orders:
requests for retrials and requests for pardons. In theory, neither provides great assurance for the convicts, since neither is
legally sufficient to stay an execution or to prevent a Justice
Minister from stamping an execution order. Yet whenever either type of request is pending, the six-month period during
which the Justice Minister would otherwise be required to
stamp the order is tolled;"3 and in customary practice Justice
230. Id. art. 475(2). This provision was reportedly added at the "suggestion" of
the allies during the Occupation. See DANDO, supra note 44, at 263-64. When one
of the Japanese participants in the revision of the Criminal Procedure Code,
Dand6 Shigemitsu, inquired as to the reasons for this provision, he was told that
it was out of concern that it is very cruel to leave a death-sentenced prisoner in
limbo for a long period of time. DandS's personal speculation, though, is that the
allies were concerned over reports that right wing individuals who had been sentenced to death prior to and during the war had later been released in general
amnesties and were again active in China, and that the allies wanted to be sure
that the same situation would not recur in the future. See DANDO, supra note 44,
at 264. In any event, the six-month rule is regarded as a precatory provision,
rather than a binding limit. See DANDO, supra note 44, at 265. Moreover, as described below, the clock does not run when a request for either a retrial or for
clemency is pending, see infra text accompanying notes 233-34.
231. KEISOHO art. 476. See Tsimoto Yoshio, Shikk5 tetsuzuki-Nihon de mo
shidai ni shinchC ni [Procedures for Execution-Becoming More Careful Even in
Japan], in THE DEATH PENALTY TODAY, supra note 46, at 244.
232. See Han o oshita daijin, osanakatta daijin [Ministers Who Stamped [Death
Warrants], and Those Who Didn't], SHOKAN YOMIURI [WEEKLY YOmIURI], Apr. 6,
1986, at 26 [hereinafter Ministers Who Stamped Death Warrants]; DANDO, supra
note 44, at 266-67; MURANO, supra note 66, at 77-79; Inoue Yutaka, "Ninenkan
shikk6 zero" o dou kangaeru ka [What Should One Think of "Going Two Years
with Zero Executions"?], 448 HOGAKU SEMINA 46, (1992) (quoting Yomiuri shinbun,
Nov. 16, 1991: former Justice Minister Sat5 Megumu stated that documents requesting execution orders had crossed his desk, but "I did not carry out executions, based on my own beliefs and creed.").
233. KEISOHO art. 475(2). That period is also tolled by requests for reinstatement of the right to appeal and extraordinary appeals, and until the sentence of
any alleged accomplice becomes final. Id.
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Ministers will not stamp an execution order if either a retrial
request or a pardon request is pending.2"
As a result, a continuing string of retrial petitions or requests for clemency may delay an execution for many years.
On occasion, the petitions may raise doubts over guilt or the
appropriateness of the death sentence in the particular case.
Moreover, in some of the most highly publicized cases, the petitions have been accompanied by massive campaigns by supporters asserting miscarriages of justice. This popular pressure
may have some effect in deterring Justice Ministers (who,
although appointed to that post, invariably have been leading
politicians in the ruling Liberal Democratic Party) from stamping the final death warrant." 5 Yet some Justice Ministers
have stated that in many cases they had no doubts whatsoever
and were fully prepared to stamp the necessary execution
orders, but were prevented from doing so by the repetitive
filings of petitions for retrials and pardons.3 6

234. See, e.g., Okabe Yasuo, Saishinha no konnichiteki kadai [Modern Day Is.
sues in Retrial Law], J1YO TO SEIGI 34-9-28, 31 (1983).
235. See generally Ministers Who Stamped Death Warrants, supra note 232.
236. Ministers Who Stamped Death Warrants, supra note 232. In the words of
one observer:
Even if the authorities are unhappy with the current retrial system, they

observe the "custom" of not executing anyone with proceedings pending.
As a result, if they truly wish to execute a certain prisoner, the relevant
authorities confer in advance. Then, to execute a prisoner who has been
filing successive petitions, the Justice Minister issues the execution order

as soon as the pending petition is rejected, or during the very brief window before the next petition is filed.
MURANO, supra note 66, at 73.

Since a prisoner may file petitions for retrial and for clemency simultaneously, that may not always be possible, even assuming that Justice Ministers
truly want to stamp the execution orders. In fact, most Justice Ministers reportedly share the view that stamping execution orders is the most unpleasant aspect of
the position. MURANO, supra note 66, at 75-76. One former Justice Minister commented, "When I learned that I had been appointed Minister the first thing that

popped into my head was the job of stamping execution orders. I immediately
became depressed. And thereafter I spent every day trembling, wondering when
they would ask me to order someone's execution." MURANO, supra note 66, at 75-

76 (statement of former Justice Minister Karasawa).
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In the most highly publicized case of delay between sentencing and execution, the defendant, Hirasawa Sadamichi,
was accused of murdering twelve employees of the Teikoku
Bank in 1948 by deceiving them into drinking poison as a
supposed protection against dysentery. Hirasawa was convicted
and sentenced to death in 1950. Following two levels of appeals, the conviction and sentence became final in 1955. Yet
Hirasawa was never executed. He died of natural causes in
1987, at the age of ninety-five, while still on death row. At the
time of his death, his seventeenth retrial request and his fourth
and fifth pardon requests were pending. During the thirty-two
years from the time that his sentence became final until his
death there reportedly were only eighty-two days on which
neither a retrial petition nor a pardon request was pend237

ing.

His case is simply the most dramatic example of a rather
widespread phenomenon. In numerous other cases, Japanese
prisoners have spent twenty or more years on death row, their
executions forestalled in part by a continuing series of petitions for post-conviction review." Given these circumstances,
it would probably come as little surprise to learn that the Japanese Supreme Court has instituted a major change in the
standards governing the availability of post-conviction relief.
To American observers, though, the direction of the change
237. See DANDO, supra note 44, at 265. Prior to his death, Hirasawa also

sought to have the death sentence set aside on the theory that the execution had
not been carried out within the 30-year statute of limitations, but that motion was

rejected on the ground that the statute of limitations does not apply to those
being held in prison. Judgment of July 19, 1985 (Hirasawa v. Japan), Saik6sai
[Supreme Court], 1158 HANJI 28 (1st Petty Bench). See Fukuda Taira, Shikei no
jik6 ni tsuite [Regarding the Statute of Limitations for the Death Penalty], 1165
HANJI 3, 8 (1985). See generally Takezawa Tetsuo, Teigin fiken [The Teigin Case],
HORrrSU JIHO 57-10-60 (1985).
238. This was the case, for example, in each of the four celebrated death penalty retrial cases. See infra text accompanying notes 372-409. See MURANO, supra
note 66, at 157-64 (list of prisoners on death row, showing date conviction became
final, with references to pending retrial petitions; of the eleven death row inmates
whose sentences became final prior to 1984, nine were pursuing retrial petitions);
Number of Death-row Convicts, supra note 95 (26 of 56 inmates on death row
either had filed or were currently preparing retrial applications).
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may come as something of a shock. Quite unlike the Rehnquist
Court, Japan's Supreme Court has loosened the requirements
for obtaining retrials.
Japan has a system of habeas corpus. Adopted during the
Allied Occupation, the so-called Habeas Corpus Act provides
that "any person" may seek relief on behalf of one whose "personal liberty is restricted otherwise than in accordance with
due process under law." 9 The provisions of the law are rather narrowly drafted, though, and implementing rules state that
the system is supplementary in nature and to be utilized only
when no other means for relief exists.2 ' As Professor Hirano
Ryfiichi predicted in 1960,1 the law has for all intents and
purposes become a "dead letter."' 2
In contrast, the approach death-sentenced prisoners use
most frequently in seeking post-conviction review is a request
for a retrial. The standards governing that system have a
much longer history than the Habeas Corpus Act, and one
involving considerably more numerous developments, as discussed in the remainder of this section.
1.

Statutory Standards

The first formal provision allowing retrials in Japan was
contained in Decree No. 8 of January 31, 1876. 3 That decree
239. JINsHIN HOGO HO [ACT FOR THE PROTECTION OF THE PERSON], Law No.
199 of 1948, arts. 2(1) and (2).
240. See HIRANO RYGICHI, SOSA TO JINHEN [INVESTIGATIONS AND HUMAN
RIGHTS] 5-6 (1981) (reprint of an article published in 1960); JINSHIN HOGO KISOKU
[HABEAS CORPUS RULES], Sup. Ct. R. 22, art. 4 (1948) ("Petitions ... are limited
to cases in which it is clearcut that confinement or the trial or disposition relating
to confinement was made without authority or in clear violation of forms or procedures prescribed by law. Provided, however, that where another appropriate method exists for obtaining relief, petitions for habeas corpus shall not be granted
unless it is clear that relief could not be obtained through such other method
within a reasonable time.").
241. HIRANO, supra note 240, at 6.
242. See 1 SAIKOSAIBANSHO JIMUSOKYOKU, SHIH TOKEI NENPO, 1 MINJI-HEN,
HEISEI GANNEN [SUPREME COURT GENERAL SECRETARIAT, ANNUAL REPORT OF JUDICIAL STATISTICS FOR CIVIL CASES] 7 table 1-2 (1989) (only between 60 and 110

petitions filed each year from 1980 to 1989; no figures given on success rate).
243. See Odanaka Toshiki & Ode Yoshitomo, Saishin h6sei no enkaku to
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provided that the Justice Ministry should have the Supreme
Public Procurator's Office file an appeal, without regard to
whether the normal time limits for appeal had run, if matters
existed that rendered the original trial improper. Similarly,
Decree No. 49 of 1877 allowed the Justice Ministry to have
public procurators demand new trials in both civil and criminal
cases if the original trial was thought to have been
improper.'
The first provisions allowing private parties to petition for
retrials were contained in article 439 of the Chizaih5 (Criminal
Procedure Code) of 1880.25 This Code was drafted largely by
Professor Gustave Emile Boissonade, a French law professor
who was invited by the government of Japan to help codify and
modernize Japanese law.2 6 Not surprisingly, the Chizaihmondai jky6 [The History of the Retrial System and Related Issues], in KEIJI
SAISHIN NO KENKYO [RESEARCH ON CRIMINAL RETRIALS] 65, 66 (Kamo Yoshisuke
ed., 1980).
The Odanaka and Ode article provides a good overview of the history of the criminal retrial system in Japan from a progressive perspective. The most thorough
article analyzing court rulings on the retrial system prior to 1963 is Usui Shigeo,
Saishin [Retrials], in FUJII KAZUO ET AL., SOGO HANREI KENKYC SOSHO, KEIJI
SOSHOHO (14) [COMPREHENSIVE DECISIONAL RESEARCH SERIES, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
(14)] 87, 131 (1963). Usui, a prosecutor, was one of the first to take an active
interest in the retrial issue and is one of the leading authorities on the issue.
For a compilation of later cases, as well as a bibliography on the issue, see
Ode Yoshitomo, Saishin kankei shiry6 [Materials Relating to Retrials], 601
JURISUTO 79 (1975). Other bibliographies include: ZOKU SAISHIN [RETRIALS, CONTINUED] 444 (Nihon bengoshi reng6kai-hen [Japan Fed'n of Bar Ass'ns] ed., 1986);
Saishin ni kansuru bunken mokuroku [Table of Literature Regarding Retrials], in
KEIHO ZASSHI 20-1-141 (1974); Tanaka Terukazu & Ode Yoshitomo, Saishin kankei
bunken mokuroku [Table of Literature Relating to Retrials], in KELIH SAISHIN NO
KENKY0, supra, at 613; MAEZAKA TOSHIYUKI, ENZAI TO GOHAN [MISCARRIAGES OF
JUSTICE AND MISTAKEN JUDGMENTS] 260-68 (1982); Shirya/saishin kankei nenpy5
[Materials/Chronologyon Retrials], in HORITSU JIHO 64-8-23 (1992).
The July 1992 issue of HORITSU JIHO, Vol 64, No. 8, contains a symposium
on the retrial issue, providing updates on recent developments and articles examining key doctrinal issues and major cases.
244. Odanaka & Ode, supra note 243, at 66.
245. CHIZAIHO, Decree No. 37 of 1880.
246. Accordingly, the CHIZAMIO is sometimes referred to as the Boissonade
Code, but that name threatens possible confusion with the Civil Code of 1890,
which Boissonade also helped draft and which is often referred to by the "same
name. See generally, e.g., YOSIYUKI NODA, INTRODUCTION TO JAPANESE LAW 45-47
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along with its retrial provisions-was based heavily on French
law.
A new Criminal Procedure Code was promulgated in
1890."4 Although it revised the Chizaih6 in a number of
respects, the 1890 Code was also based heavily upon French
law and the retrial provisions contained in article 301 of the
1890 Code remained virtually the same as those in the prior
Code. As in the prevailing French law, new trials were only
allowed for the benefit of the defendant; the prosecution could
not seek a new trial after an acquittal. 8 However, the conditions required to obtain a new trial were strictly limited. 49
Those conditions were mainly of the so-called falsa type, in
effect requiring proof of falsehoods or serious procedural improprieties in the original trial. For example, a prisoner could
obtain a new trial in a murder case if she could show that"the
supposed victim was actually still alive after the murder was
alleged to have taken place or that someone else had been

(A. Angelo trans., 1976).
247. Law No. 96 of 1890 [hereinafter the 1890 CODE].
248. See Odanaka & Ode, supra note 243, at 67-69; Fujino Elichi, Saishin ni
tsuite [Regarding Retrials], 374 KEIsATSU KENKY [POLIcE STUDIES] 87, 88 (1961).
249. Article 301 of the 1890 Code contained six items justifying the grant of a
new trial: (1) proof, in a murder case, that the alleged victim was either still alive
after he had supposedly been killed or already had died before that date; (2) the
sentencing of someone else for the same crime (not applicable to conspiracies, of
course); (3) proof, by means of an official document, that the defendant could not
have been in the place of the crime when it took place; (4) the sentencing of a
person for having secured the conviction of the convict by fraud; (5) proof, by
means of an official document, that records in the original case were either forged
or materially in error, and, (6) showing that a civil or other judgment on which
the conviction rested had been overturned. John Gadsby, Some Notes on the History of the Japanese Code of Criminal Procedure, 30 L. Q. REV. 448, 460 (1914).
See generally Kamo Yoshisuke, Saishin no rironteki kiso [The Theoretical Basis of
Retrials], in HORrrSU Jf-O 37-4-14 (1965).
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The provisions were seldom used

and were dropped from the Code in 1908.251

A new set of retrial provisions was included in the Criminal Procedure Code of 1922.252 That Code was based primari-

ly on German criminal procedure. With respect to the new trial
provisions, this signified a shift to the so-called nova principle
of allowing new trials where newly discovered evidence disclosed differences from the facts found by the original trial
court. As interpreted by Japanese experts, the emphasis of the
falsa approach embodied in the 1890 Code was upon protecting
against procedural improprieties, whereas the nova approach
adopted in 1922-and still in effect today-emphasizes the
search for truth."s
Pursuant to the 1922 Code, both the defendant and the
prosecution were free to seek a new trial." 4 In addition, the
1922 Code modified and expanded the grounds justifying a new
trial. In this respect, the most important change was the inclusion of a provision, item 6 of article 485 of that Code, specifying that a new trial may be granted "when clear (akirakana)
evidence is newly discovered (aratani hakken shita) requiring
the declaration of innocence of, or dismissal of charges against,
one who has been found guilty, or a remission in penalty for
one previously charged, or leading to the finding of a less serious offense than that found in the original judgment."255 This

250. See supra note 249. Even as narrow as they were, the Japanese standards
were broader than those in France at that time. In France, only the first three
grounds were recognized. Odanaka & Ode, supra note 243, at 67. The fourth and
fifth grounds had been included in Japan in the CHIZATH0; the final ground was
added in the 1890 Code, apparently based on a similar German provision.
Odanaka & Ode, supra note 243, at 68.
251. See Gadsby, supra note 249, at 461.
252. KEIJISOSHOHO [CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE], Law No. 75 of 1922 [hereinafter the 1922 CODE].
253. See, e.g., Tamiya Hiroshi, Saishin no shid5 rinen [Guiding Concepts of
Retrials], in KEWJI SAISHIN NO KENKYG, supra note 243, at 19, 31; Sait5 Seiji, Keiji
saishin o meguru ikutsuka no mondai (1) [A Few Problems Relating to Criminal
Retrials, Part 11, in KEIHO ZASSHI 20-1-33, 38-69 (1974).
254. 1922 CODE, supra note 252, arts. 485, 486.
255. 1922 CODE, supra note 252, art. 485, item 6.
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was quite different from the other grounds for a new trial,
which all required proof, by means of a final judgment in an
independent proceeding, of falsities in the evidence underlying
the original conviction or certain other grave improprieties. 6
Although the Criminal Procedure Code 7 (the Code) enacted after World War II introduced numerous elements from

United States law, the new trial provisions of that Code remained virtually unchanged in all but one respect. In keeping
with article 39 of the postwar Constitution of Japan, which
provides that "no person shall be held criminally liable for an

act.., of which he has been acquitted, nor shall he be placed
in double jeopardy,""5 the current Code allows petitions for

retrials only for the benefit of the defendant; the prosecution
may not seek a new trial against a defendant who was previously acquitted." 9 The only other changes are a renumbering

256. Thus, article 485, item 1, allowed a new trial if it was shown, by a final
judgment, that documents or articles used as evidence had been forged or altered;
item 2 for false testimony; item 3 if the defendant's accuser was subsequently
,convicted of having made a false accusation; item 4 if a decision used as evidence
in the original judgment was subsequently altered; and item 5, in cases of infringement of patents, trademarks, etc., where the right allegedly infringed was
later declared invalid or yoid. The final ground, item 7, allowed a new trial if a
judge, prosecutor, or police officer was found to have committed an offense in connection with the handling of the case.
Article 489 provided an exception to the requirement of proof by a final
judgment "when such a final judgment [could] not be obtained" and the matters in
question were otherwise proven.
257. KEISOHO, supra note 74.
258. KENPO art. 39.
259. It should be noted, however, that this applies only to petitions for new
trials after the original acquittal has become final. Provided appeals are taken in
timely fashion, the proceedings do not become final until after adjudication by the
Supreme Court. Accordingly, the prosecutors are allowed to appeal acquittals to
the High Courts and the Supreme Court. See SHIGEMITSU DANDO, JAPANESE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 410-13 (B.J. George, Jr. trans., 1965). It should also be noted that
the prosecutor is both permitted and expected to seek a new trial on behalf of a
convict if the convict's innocence becomes apparent after the conclusion of the
original trial. See, e.g., Fujino, supra note 248, at 93.
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of the relevant provisions;2" a reformulation in modern Japa-

nese; and a few minor, mainly technical, changes.
2. Judicial Interpretations
Despite the nearly identical language of the two Codes,
some commentators (including at least one prosecutor) have
argued that the new Code should be interpreted more liberally

than the relevant provisions of the old Code, in keeping with
the spirit of respect for human rights underlying the postwar

Constitution.26 ' In fact, for most of the first three decades after the new Code came into effect, the retrial provisions were

interpreted, if anything, more strictly than in prewar Japan.
The vast majority of retrial petitions are based upon item
6, the "newly discovered evidence" provision.26 2 This is hardly

surprising. The other items all set forth specific, rather limited
grounds for the retrial request. Moreover, each of the other
grounds calls for proof by means of a final judgment.26 3 In

260. The overall legal framework for retrials is contained in Book IV of the
current Code, which extends from article 435 through article 453. The retrial provisions in the 1922 Code commenced with article 485.
261. See, e.g., Abe Haruo, Saishin riya to shite no sh~ko no shinkisei to
meihakusei (1) [Newness and Clarity of Evidence as a Ground for Retrial, Part 11
374 KEISATSU KENKYO 45, 54 (1961) (author was a prosecutor). Cf. Fujino, supra
note 248, at 90 (same language in both Codes, but new factors of human rights
and the adversary system must be taken into account) (author was a judge).
262. See, e.g., Nishimura Sadamu, Saishin jiken no uny& j6ky5 ni tsuite [Regarding the Circumstances of Applications for Retrials], in KEIHO ZASSHI 20-1-81,
86 (1974) (of 242 petitions between 1952 and 1972, all but two relied on item 6).
263. This represents a substantial barrier, since if the parties elect to appeal
the lower court decisions the judgment will not become final until the conclusion
of review by both a High Court and the Supreme Court (or, in earlier times, the
Daishin'in, the predecessor of the Supreme Court). A further constraint is provided
by the fact that ordinarily the prosecutors must undertake the independent proceedings necessary to establish the falsities in the prior proceedings or othei improprieties that would justify a new trial. Yet the prosecutors are likely to bring
such proceedings only in very clearcut cases. In fact, in a few highly publicized
cases, critics have contended that the prosecutors deliberately declined to institute
such proceedings in order to protect either the previously secured conviction or
their own reputations. See, e.g., Takezawa Tetsuo, SeikyiOsha no gawa kara mita
saishin seido [The Retrial System as Viewed from the Side of Petitioners], KEIHO
ZASSI 20-1-99, 112-14 (1974) (discussing the Tokushima Radio Shop Case; see
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contrast, the "newly discovered evidence" standard contained
in item 6 imposes no specific limits on the evidence which can
be advanced by the petitioner. The statute refers broadly to
"evidence," with no apparent limits on the type or nature of
such evidence-provided, of course, that the evidence satisfies
two key criteria: "newness" and "clarity." Furthermore, under
item 6, a petition for retrial may be filed by the convicted person at any time-after the original conviction has become final,
without need for a separate judgment or any action by the
prosecutors.2 Under these circumstances, it is only natural
that the overwhelming majority of retrial petitions have been
filed under item 6 and that the key debates in this area have
focussed on the interpretation of that ground.
a. PrewarPrecedent
The retrial provisions, and item 6 in particular, are frequently characterized in Japan as requiring a balance between
the competing interests of respect for finality of judgments
(sometimes phrased as the need to maintain "legal stability"' 65) and the search for truth.2" If one accepts that formuinfra notes 322-28 and accompanying text). See generally Watanabe Yasuo,
Tokushima rajio-shdjiken saishin muzai to shiho no kago no bshisaku [The Retrial Acquittal in the Tokushima Radio Shop Case and Measures for Preventing Errors in Justice], 846 JURISUTO 76, 80-81 (1985) (even if prosecutors realize that the
defendant may be innocent, once an indictment has been filed, the atmosphere of
the Prosecutor's Office is hard-line and it is difficult for any prosecutor to speak
out or back down).
As with the prewar Code, the current Criminal Procedure Code provides a
narrow exception to the requirement of proof by a final judgment "when such final
judgment cannot be obtained" and the matters are proven in another fashion,
KEISOHO, supra note 74, art. 437.
264. In fact, such a petition can be filed even after the sentence has been completed, KEISOHO, supra note 74, art. 441. Compare Maleng v. Cook, 109 S. Ct.
1923 (1989) (federal habeas petition may not be filed after the sentence for the
conviction in question has fully expired). In Japan, moreover, the emphasis on
avoiding the stigma of a false conviction is so great that a convict's spouse and
other relatives can file a retrial request even after the convict's death, KEISoH0
art. 439(1)(iv). Ultimately, this proved to be the case in the Tokushima Radio
Shop Case. See infra text accompanying notes 322-28.
265. Judgment of July 15, 1959 (Yoshida v. Japan), K6sai [High Court], 1
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lation, the leading prewar case leaned rather heavily toward
the latter interest.
That case, a 1924 ruling by the Daishin'in (the highest
regular court at that time)," 7 involved the prosecution of several defendants for stealing fish products." All were convicted on the basis of their own confessions in Hakodate Local
Court (ku saibansho). All but one of the defendants allowed
their convictions to become final. The single defendant who
elected to appeal was acquitted after the person responsible for
storing the fish testified that the supposedly stolen goods had
in fact been awarded to the defendants as incentives.
At that point the previously convicted defendants all
sought retrials, relying on this new evidence. The local and
district courts rejected their petitions.269 When the case
reached the Daishin'in,that court reversed and granted a new
trial." The court took a flexible approach, stating simply
that "the relevant provision places no limit on the nature or
type of the new evidence, and it is therefore appropriate to
conclude that there is a basis for a new trial if this evidence
would affect the determination of facts underlying the original
decision."27 ' The court went on to say that a new trial was
justified because "under the new evidence, one might also find
that the [defendants] had received the [fish]

...

and sold

like."27

While this statement
them... , or something of the
is rather opaque, the court seems to have been requiring only a
substantial possibility of the defendants' innocence."

Kakeishfi 1550, 1552 (Nagoya).
266. See, e.g., Judgment of May 27, 1958 (Ueno v. Japan), Saik6sai [Supreme
Court], 12 Keishfi 1683, 1685 (3d Petty Bench); Fujino, supra note 248, at 88.
267. That court is often referred to as either the Great Court of Cassation or
the Great Court of Adjudicature. I will simply use the Japanese name.
268. Judgment of Sept. 6, 1924, Daishin'in, 3 Daihan keishfi 663, discussed and
reprinted in part in Usui, supra note 243, at 138-39.
269. See Judgment of Sept. 6, 1924, 3 Daihan keish-a at 666-67 (listing the
decisions of the lower courts, which were not reported, in summary of the case).
270. Id.
271. Id. at 667.
272. Id. at 667-68 (emphasis added).
273. See, e.g., Abe Haruo, Saishin riya to shite no sh*ko no shinkisei to
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b. JudicialStandards:1945-1975
In contrast to this rather flexible approach, for many years
after the war, courts interpreted item 6 very narrowly, placing
primary emphasis on the importance of the finality of judgments. In a 1950 en banc ruling, the Supreme Court stated,
"The need to respect final judgments can be perceived from the
provisions of article 39 of the Constitution .... Accordingly,
the grounds for retrials attacking final judgments must be
interpreted clearly and strictly." Article 39 of the Constitution, on which the Court relied, is the double jeopardy provision referred to above.275 By its terms that provision applies
only when a defendant has been acquitted, not when a defendant is seeking a new trial after being convicted. Nonetheless,
the Grand Bench made clear its view that, by analogy, a private petitioner must satisfy a heavy burden in seeking to overturn a prior final conviction." 6

meihakusei (2) [Newness and Clarity of Evidence as a Ground for Retrial, Part 21,
375 KEISAiSU KENKYO 25, 32-33 (1961); Usui, supra note 243, at 139.
This case bears interesting parallels to Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
See supra text accompanying notes 103-04. Noia and two co-defendants had. been
convicted of felony murder. The two co-defendants appealed and eventually won release on the ground that their confessions-the sole evidence against them-had
been coerced. Noia had been convicted on the basis of his own confession, which
the state stipulated had been no less coerced than those of the other defendants;
but he decided not to appeal, partly out of fear that the life sentence he had
received after the first trial might be increased to the death penalty if he was
convicted in a second trial. As in the Japanese case, after Noia saw that his codefendants had won their release, he sought the same treatment. While a strict
interpretation of the relevant standards would probably have led to a denial of
relief in both instances, the equities favored both sets of petitioners and may have
influenced the respective courts' interpretations of the standards. See Wechsler,
supra note 96, at 178-79.
274. Judgment of April 21, 1950 (Kana v. Japan), Saikosai [Supreme Court], 4
Keishii 666, 668-69 (Grand Bench) (construing art. 485 of the 1922 Criminal Procedure Code).
275. See supra text accompanying note 258.
276. In a similar vein, in 1959 the Nagoya High Court stated:
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(i) "Newly Discovered"Requirement

This strict approach was reflected in three major ways.
First, most courts placed limits on the nature of evidence that
would be deemed "newly discovered."277 Holding that the evi-

dence must be "new" not only to the court, but also to the defendant, those courts rejected efforts to rely on evidence that

the petitioner had been aware of at the time of trial. In the
leading decision on this issue, the Supreme Court in 1954
stated, "When a defendant knows of evidence and fails to lres-

ent it at trial, but then relies on that evidence in seeking a
retrial after his conviction has become final, that evidence does

not constitute 'newly discovered evidence' within 278
the meaning
of article 435(6) of the Criminal Procedure Code."

Legal conditions finalized by opinion must be respected. Once a decision
has become final, the concept of legal stability demands that the propriety of the judgment is not open to challenge and cannot be modified. Of
course, the law does not provide that judgments are absolutely immutable .... The law recognizes that, in specified circumstances, the interest
in [protecting human rights] requires a compromise on the interest in
[the finality of judgments]. This is the so-called system for retrials. Inasmuch as the retrial system seeks to guarantee justice and human rights
even at the expense of upsetting the finality of judgments and sacrificing
the demand for legal stability, the grounds for requesting retrials must
be limited, and those grounds must be so strong that the prior judgment
simply cannot be tolerated ....
Accordingly, it is of course natural that
retrial requests cannot be allowed in cases where the factfindings of the
original judgment are merely questionable, or where the petitioner's assertions simply seem somehow plausible.
Judgment of July 15, 1959 (Yoshida v. Japan), K6sai [IHigh Court], 1 Kakydi
keish-i 1550, 1552 (Nagoya).
277. See, e.g., cases discussed in Usui, supra note 243 at 118-22.
278. Judgment of Oct. 19, 1954 (Aoyama v. Japan), Saik6sai [Supreme Court],
8 KeishAi 1610, 1612-13 (3d Petty Bench).
That case involved a rather typical Japanese pattern known as the
migawari hannin (stand-in criminal) situation. Such cases most commonly involve
relatively minor crimes, especially prosecutions arising out of traffic accidents. An
innocent individual deliberately confesses, usually to protect a superior from prosecution (and often on the request of the superior). If no prison sentence is imposed,
the case may well end there; but when prison looms the "stand-in! often has a
change of heart and seeks a retrial. See, e.g., Nishimura, supra note 262, at 83,
87-88; Takada Takuji, Migawari yazai to saishin seikya [Guilty 'Stand-ins" and
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This and similar decisions generated considerable controversy, with the opposing positions resting on contrasting views
of the proper function of retrials. On one side were those who
put primary emphasis on the search for truth and supported
reopening trials whenever new evidence was presented of
which the original court was unaware. 9 On the other were
those who emphasized the finality of judgments and argued
that the adversary system requires rejection of evidence if the
defendant deliberately
withheld it or was negligent in not
20
discovering it.

1

As reflected by the Supreme Court decision quoted above,
actual decisions for the most part fell between these two extremes. Judges typically excluded evidence that a defendant
had intentionally hidden from the court,"'1 but allowed the
introduction of evidence that a defendant could have discov- As with
ered with diligence but negligently failed to find. 82

Retrial Requests], in HIRARA YASUHARU HAKUSHI KANREKI SHUKUGA, GENDAI NO
KEIJI HOGAKU (GE) [COLLECTION OF WORKS DEDICATED TO D. HImABA YASUHARU
ON THE OCCASION OF HIS SIXTY-FIRST BIRTHDAY, MODERN-DAY CRIMINAL LAW

STUDY, VOL. 2] 287 (1977).
279. See, e.g., Mitsud6 Kageaki, Saishin shlkoMh5 [Law of Evidence for Retrials],
HORn'SU JIH0 37-6-22 (1965); Suzuki Shigetsugu, Shoko no shinkisei [The 'Newness'
of Evidence], in KEIJI SAISHIN NO KENKYO, supra note 243, at 127, 131-32.
280. See, e.g., Abe, supra note 261, at 59-60.
281. See, e.g., Usu, supra note 243, at 118-22. These decisions do not preclude
the prosecutors from requesting retrials in such cases. In fact, prosecutors are
thought to have a duty to bring such requests if they discover that the original
trial was in error, and petitions from prosecutors in such cases have traditionally
constituted the single largest group of retrial requests, Nishimura, supra note 262,
at 83 (data for 1956-1972 period); see Konishi Hidenobu, Saishin-saiban no
tachiba kara [Retrials-From the Standpoint of the Judiciary, in 2 KEI
TETSUZUKI [CRIMINAL PROCEDURE] 1011, 1011-12 (Mitsui Makoto et al. eds., 1988)
(vast majority of retrials granted between 1970 and 1984 came at request of prosecutors, in migawari hannin and automobile accident cases).
In a few cases, courts have even permitted petitioners to introduce evidence
that they had deliberately withheld from the trial court. See, e.g., cases cited in
FNino, supra note 248, at 95 & n.10.
282. See cases discussed in Usui, supra note 243, at 118-25. In a typical fdrmulation, one lower court reasoned:
[To attack the defendant's negligence and reject the relief of a new trial
would run counter to the true meaning of criminal trials, that being the
discovery of essential truth and the achievement of justice; [but] evidence
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Fay v. Noia and Sanders in the United States, the crucial
question was whether the defendant deliberately withheld
matters from the court.

that the defendant deliberately did not present at the original trial . . .
already had been discovered from the start and cannot be called "newly
discovered evidence" [as required by article 435(6)].
Judgment of February 20, 1959 (Matsumoto v. Japan), Kan'i saibansho [Summary
Court], 1 Kakyli keishfi 499, 501-02 (Shinjuku) (emphasis added).
A research judge (ch6sakan) at the Supreme Court who apparently worked
on the Supreme Court's 1954 decision, see supra text accompanying note 278, expressed similar views. Discussing that decision in an article he wrote four years
later, he stated that "under the new Criminal Procedure Code, with its strengthened adversary system, . . . responsibility should be placed [upon the defendant]
for his deliberate trial activities," but did not suggest that the adversary system
might also require the defendant to bear responsibility for negligent failure to
discover exculpatory evidence. Takada Yoshifumi, Keiji hanrei kenkya (102) [Research on Criminal Precedents (102)], 339 KEISATSU KENKYC 93, 97-98 (1958) (emphasis added). The position of chsakan is most closely analogous to that of law
clerk in the United States, although nearly all chosakan are judges with many
years of experience who are posted as research assistants at the Supreme Court
for three to five year periods. See generally TABARU GIEI, SAIKOSAI HANKETSU NO
UCHIGAWA [THE INSIDE OF SUPREME COURT JUDGMENTS] 210-20 (1965). Chsakan

serve the Court as a whole, rather than an individual Justice; and typically one
chosakan will have primary responsibility for a particular case. For many significant cases, a chsakan (usually the one who had primary responsibility for the
case) will write a semi-official commentary (a so-called kaisetsu). Their commentaries, which examine key legal points in the Court's opinions and often provide additional analysis and support, appear in the journal HOSO JIHO and are compiled into
a special annual volume. Although the commentaries have no precedential effect,
they are widely regarded as rather reliable indicators of the Court's views, as well
as a clear sign of which ch~sakan had primary responsibility. See SAIKOSAIBANSHO
[THE SUPREME COURT] 152-53 (Nihon bengoshi rengakai-hen [Japan Fed'n of Bar
Ass'ns] ed., 1980). Judge Takada's kaisetsu on the 1954 ruling, SAIKOSAIBANSHO
HANREI KAISETSU, KEIJI-HEN, SHOWA 29-NENDO [COMMENTARIES ON SUPREME COURT

PRECEDENT, CRIvNAL VOLUME] 301 (Saik6saibansho ch6sakanshitsu-hen [Supreme
Court, Clerks' Chambers] ed., 1954), was quite neutral, mainly describing what
points had and had not been resolved. He discussed his own views in more detail
in the later article cited supra).
In a few cases, courts went further and concluded that evidence would not
qualify as "newly discovered" if the defendant should have known of it at the time
of the original trial, but failed to present it, apparently through negligence or
neglect. See, e.g., Judgment of June 17, 1954 (Fukuzawa v. Japan), K6sai [High
Court], 7 Kokeishfi 805, 809 (Tokyo); Abe, supra note 261, at 59-62.
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(ii) Scope of Review

The second barrier concerned the scope of review. Virtually
all commentators agreed that a court considering a retrial
petition should not simply consider the new evidence in isolation. Rather, they reasoned, the reviewing court should combine the new evidence with the evidence adduced at the original trial and then engage in a comprehensive re-examination
of all the evidence to determine whether the new evidence
would affect the earlier judgment.' Courts were split on this
issue, however, with many courts requiring that the new -evidence alone be sufficient to overturn the earlier conviction.28 '
By the mid-1960s, most courts had begun to follow the socalled "comprehensive evaluation" (s6g6 hy6ka) approach;'
however, some still appeared to be looking only at the new evidence in isolation.2
(iii) Level of Proofand Reasonable Doubt Standard
The third barrier, which related to the level of proof required to obtain a new trial, was the most difficult to satisfy.
That barrier had two major aspects. First, the actual level of
proof required was high. In contrast to the 1924 Daishin in
decision, which had indicated that new evidence would suffice
if it "affect[ed] the factual findings underlying the original
decision," a 1958 Supreme Court ruling stated that "the term
'clear evidence' means evidence having both evidentiary capacity (sh6ko n6ryoku) and a high degree of persuasive effect
(shcmeiryoku)."'7 Similarly, in defining the term "clear evi283. See, e.g., Morinaga Eisabur6, SaishinlU kaisei mondai to saishin seikyn no
jissai [The Actual State of the Retrial Law Revision Issue and Retrial Requests],
HORITSU JIHO 37-6-12, 15 (1965); Mitsud6, supra note 279, at 23.
284. E.g., Judgment of March 12, 1957, K6sai [High Court], Kat6 saibansho
ke ij saiban tokuh6 4-6-21 (Tokyo). See Usui, supra note 243, at 14143.
285. See Odanaka & Ode, supra note 243, at 113; Ode, supra note 243 (summaries of cases numbered 28, 29, and 41).
286. This appears to have been the case, for example, in the district court's
decision rejecting the second retrial petition in the Matsuyama case. See infra text
accompanying notes 389-97.
287. Judgment of May 27, 1958 (Ueno v. Japan), Saik6sai [Supreme Court], 12
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dence," High Courts used such terms as "evidentiary value of a

high degree of reliability"'

and "evidence sufficient to create

a high probabilityfor supposing the petitioner's innocence." 9
The latter quote also reveals the second key aspect of the
debate over the level of proof: the inapplicability of the "reasonable doubt" standard.2" Courts required that the petitioner establish her actual innocence, and not simply the existence
of a reasonable doubt about guilt. This issue aroused much

controversy among practitioners and scholars. As early as
1938, several scholars-including two of the leading younger
authorities in the criminal procedure field, Dand5 Shigemitsu

and Kishi Seiichi-had argued that the reasonable doubt standard should be applied in determining whether a petitioner
had presented sufficient evidence to warrant a new trial. 9 '

Keishfi 1683, 1685 (3d Petty Bench) (emphasis added). A commentary on this case,
written by then-ch6sakan Aoyagi Fumio, noted the difference between the
Daishin'in stance and the 1958 ruling and attributed it to changes in the law
relating to evidentiary capacity. See SAIKOSAIBANSHO HANREI KAISETSU, KEIJI-HEN,
SHOWA 33-NENDO [COMMVNTARMS ON SUPREME COURT PRECEDENTS, CRIMINAL VOLUME] 383, 384 (Saik6saibansho ch6sakanshitsu-hen [Supreme Court, Clerks' Chambers] ed., 1958).
288. Judgment of June 29, 1954 (Une v. Japan), K6sai [High Court], 5 T6ky6
k6t5 saibansho hanketsu jih5 311, 313.
289. Judgment of July 15, 1959 (Yoshida v. Japan), K6sai [High Court], 1
Kakydi keishti 1550, 1556 (Nagoya).
290. The popular term in Japanese, "utagawashiki wa hikokunin no rieki ni,"
has a somewhat different nuance from the term "reasonable doubt." The Japanese
term is based upon the Latin phrase "in dubio pro reo," and the Japanese expression literally means something along the lines of "doubts are to be resolved in the
defendant's favor." Under Japanese Supreme Court precedent, however, the standard is defined as proof beyond a reasonable doubt. See, e.g., Judgment of May
20, 1975 (Murakami v. Japan), Saik6sai [Supreme Court], 29 Keishd 177, 180 (1st
Petty Bench). See infra text accompanying note 347.
291. KEIJI HANIREI HYOSHAKUSH

DAINIKAN [COMMENTARY ON CRIMINAL PRECE-

DENTS, Vol. 1] 373 (Kebji hanrei kenkyfikai-hen [Criminal Precedent Study Group]
ed., 1938) (case comment by Dand5 Shigemitsu) [hereinafter Dand5 Case Comment]; KEIJI HANREI HYOSHAKUSHO DAINKAN [COMMENTARY ON CRIMINAL PRECEDENTS, Vol. 2] 143 (Keiji hanrei kenkyag-hen [Criminal Precedent Study Group]
ed., 1939) (case comment by Kishi Seiichi). See generally Odanaka & Ode, supra
note 243, at 77-81, and authorities cited therein. Although these comments'were
addressed to the 1922 Code, numerous commentators and practitioners have echoed the criticism with respect to the identical language in the current Code. See,
e.g., KISHI SEIICHI, 2 KEI SOSHOH0YOGI [KEY POINTS OF CRMNAL PROCEDURE
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In this connection, Dand6 observed that "[Article 485(6) of the
1922 Code] requires 'clear evidence requiring the declarationof
innocence,' and from that statutory language we can see that
'clear evidence of innocence' is not required." 92
This view was far from uniform. In fact, in 1961 one commentator declared, "I would venture to state that no one would
disagree with the proposition that the reasonable doubt standard does not apply."29 ' As far as academics and practitioners
are concerned, he was plainly wrong.2 9' But his view enjoyed
nearly complete support in the courts. The first clear signs of a
shift in this judicial attitude apparently did not come until
1975, when the Tokyo District Court indicated-albeit in the
course of a ruling rejecting a retrial petition-that the law did
not require positive proof of innocence, but rather that clear
evidence of a reasonable doubt as to guilt would suffice. 9'
Accordingly, under prevailing interpretations of article
435(6), to obtain a new trial a petitioner was in effect required
to establish her actual innocence clearly on the basis of new
evidence standing alone.2 9' This standard obviously placed a

LAW] 404 (1962); MitsudS, supra note 279, at 23-25. See generally TAMIYA HnRoSHI,
KEIJI SOSHOHO NYOMON [INTRODUCTION TO CRIMINAL PROCEDURE LAW] 300-04 (3d
ed. 1982).

292. Dand6 Case Comment, supra note 291, at 375. Interpretation of the statutory language is made more difficult by the fact that the same word, muzai [literally, absence of guilt], is used in Japanese for both "innocent" and "not guilty."
The statute reads, "muzai o iiwatasubeki" (should be declared innocent, or, should
be acquitted).

293. Abe, supra note 273, at 27. This overstatement can perhaps be attributed
to the fact that the author was a prosecutor, but for years he was also one of the
most vocal proponents of a liberalization in attitudes toward retrials.
294. He found agreement at least among prosecutors, though, with German
thinking on the same issue cited in support. See, e.g., Usui, supra note 243, at

134-37; Saishin o meguru jakkan no mondai [A Few Problems Relating to Retrials], JIYM TO SEIGI 14-5-11 (1963).
295. Unreported ruling of March 31, 1975, quoted in part in Ode, supra note
243, at 86 (Case No. 49).
296. As one commentator noted, though, the petitioner was not required to
establish his innocence beyond a reasonable doubt. Abe, supra note 273, at 28-31.
Even though the Nagoya High Court opinion quoted in note 276 supra went almost that far, most rulings seemed to adopt the view that proof of innocence by a
preponderance of the evidence would be sufficient.
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heavy burden on the petitioner. Some critics argued that the
courts had interpreted article 435(6) so strictly that in practice
the standards were no different from those of the highly restrictive 1890 Code. For all intents and purposes, they claimed,
a petitioner could obtain a new trial only if she could show
that someone else had committed the crime or that, in a murder case, the supposed victim was still alive." 7 Hence, the
right to petition for a retrial was widely referred to as "the
door that never opens."29
c. Application of StandardsPriorto 1975
(i) Successful Petitions
This does not mean that no retrials were granted in the
1950s and 1960s. In a number of cases, prosecutors themselves
petitioned for retrials on behalf of improperly convicted persons.299 As far as petitions by private parties go, however,
there were two high points.
The first came in 1956 in the case of Menda Sakae.
Menda, who many years later became the first death row inmate to win ultimate acquittal following a retrial, was convicted in 1950 of murdering a husband and wife and injuring their
two daughters in connection with a robbery. After his conviction became final in 1951, Menda began filing a series of retrial requests. The first two were summarily dismissed."' 0 On
his third attempt, a three-judge panel of the Yatsushiro Division of the Kumamoto District Court, led by Judge Nishitsuji,
undertook an extensive re-examination of the case and ordered
a new trial in 1956 after concluding that Menda had a valid

297. See, e.g., Morinaga, supra note 283, at 14-15.
298. See, e.g., SAISHIN, supra note 1, at 1.
299. See generally Nishimura, supra note 262. As discussed earlier, most of
these were so-called migawari hannin-type cases involving relatively minor crimes.
See supra notes 278-81 and accompanying text.
300. See Foote, supra note 6, at 21-22, and sources cited therein.
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alibi."° ' On an immediate appeal by the prosecution, the
Fukuoka High Court reversed, sharply rebuking the district
court in the process for its handling of the case. 2 ' The High
Court announced that "the factual investigation [undertaken
by the District Court] exceeds the permissible scope for such
investigations by a court reviewing a petition for retrial, unjustifiably impairs the stability of judicial decisions, and jeopardizes the existence of the justice system."03 Menda appealed,
but the Supreme Court upheld the High Courtf °4 and the
Nishitsuji Ruling went
down in history as the so-called "phan30 5
tom retrial order."
The second high point occurred in 1961 when a retrial was
granted to Yoshida Ishimatu.0 5 That decision and the re-

301. Judgment of Aug. 10, 1956 (Menda v. Japan), Chisai [District Court] (unreported case) (Kumamoto Dist. Ct., Yatushiro Div.), reprinted in KEIJI SAISHIN
SEIDO KENKYOKAI, CHOMEI SAISHIN JIKEN MIKOKAN SAIBANREISHO DAIISSHO [STUDY
GROUP ON THE CRIMINAL RETRIAL SYSTEM, UNREPORTED COURT DECISIONS IN FAMOUS RETRIAL CASES, VOL. 11 12 (1979) [hereinafter MIKOKAN SAIBANREISHO]; reprinted in part in Usui, supra note 243, at 131.
302. Judgment of April 15, 1959 (Japan v. Menda), K6sai [High Court] (unreported case) (Fukuoka), reprintedin MIKOKAN SAIBANREISHO, supra note 301, at 52.
303. Japan v. Menda, reprinted in MIKOKAN SAIBANREISHO, supra note 301, at
53. The High Court further observed:
[Tihe retrial system seeks a balance between the contradictory demands
for pursuing the substantive truth and for maintaining concrete legal
stability represented by a judgment. Naturally, the demand for concrete
legal stability represented by a judgment should be subject to considerable compromise in the face of the pursuit of substantive truth. Yet to
permit, as did the lower court in this case, evidence already evaluated by
the original trial court to serve as newly discovered evidence for a retrial
petition, would demonstrably undermine the normal procedural structure
established by the [postwar] Criminal Procedure Code, which, unlike the
old Criminal Procedure Code, contains strict rules of evidence and prescribes rather strict standards for appeals, and would further render it
virtually impossible to maintain the legal stability of final judgments.
Japan v. Menda, reprinted in MIKOKAN SAIBANREISHO, supra note 301, at 53.
304. Judgment of Dec. 6, 1961 (Menda v. Japan), Saik6sai [Supreme Court]
(unreported case), reprinted in part in Usui, supra note 243, at 134.
305. Menda ended up spending 27 more years on death row before he gained
his ultimate acquittal, on grounds virtually identical to those identified in the
Nishitauji Judgment, after his sixth retrial request was granted. See infra text
accompanying notes 372-81.
306. Judgment of April 11, 1961 (Yoshida v. Japan), K6sai [High Court], 14
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sulting retrial represented a more significant-and at the time
much more highly publicized--episode in the history of retrials. Yoshida was convicted of robbery murder in 1914, on the
basis of testimony by two alleged co-conspirators." 7 Although
his accusers both recanted, over the years the courts rejected
four petitions for retrial. Finally, on Yoshida's fifth petition,
following considerable public outcry and the formation of a
special subcommittee within the Japan Federation of Bar Associations to help represent him, the Nagoya High Court in 1961
concluded that at least one of the accusations had been fabricated and ordered a new trial.0 8 Nearly fifty years after he
was first convicted,"0 9 this new trial ultimately led to
Yoshida's acquittal. 10
Yoshida was the first major case in postwar Japan in
which a private petitioner had secured a retrial. His success
led to a so-called "retrial boom" in which the Legal Affairs
Committee of the Japanese House of Representatives established a special subcommittee to investigate the retrial
system.' At the same time, the Yoshida decision generated
a backlash, which intensified after three supporters of another
retrial petitioner were arrested for having instigated perjury in
connection with that petition.3 2 As it turned out, only .one
other retrial was granted in a major case in the next twelve
years.

K6keishd 589 (Nagoya).
307. For a relatively concise summary of this case, see Kawasaki Hideaki,
Yoshida jiken [The Yoshida Case], in KEIJI SAISHIN NO KENKYO, supra note 243, at
289-301.
308. Judgment of April 11, 1961 (Yoshida v. Japan), K~sai [High Court], 14
KbkeishQa 589 (Nagoya).
309. Unlike Menda, Yoshida did not spend the entire period on death row--or
even in prison. Although Yoshida was originally sentenced to death, on direct
appeal the sentence was reduced to life imprisonment, and he was released on
parole in 1935. See Kawasaki, supra note 307, at 289.
310. Judgment of Feb. 28, 1963 (Yoshida v. Japan), Kdsai [High Court], 16
K6keish-a 88 (Nagoya).
311. See, e.g., Odanaka & Ode, supra note 243, at 100-03.
312. Odanaka & Ode, supra note 243, at 102-03.
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(ii) ControversialDenials
In a few celebrated cases, retrials were denied even after
other individuals confessed to having committed the crimes or
all the key witnesses recanted their testimony. One such case,
the Yonetani case, involved the 1952 attempted rape and killing of a fifty-seven year old woman in Aomori City. 1 ' A thirty year old with no fixed employment, Yonetani Shir6, was convicted of having caused the woman's death in the course of an
attempted rape and was sentenced to ten years in prison. 1 '
In 1966, eight years after Yonetani was released on parole, the
victim's nephew confessed to the crime and provided a rather
detailed account of it."15 The prosecutors then reinvestigated
the incident and indicted the nephew. He withdrew his confession and was acquitted by the Tokyo Distict Court. 16 The
prosecutors appealed, but while the appeal was pending in
1970, the nephew committed suicide. In the meantime,
Yonetani, after learning of the nephew's confession, filed a
retrial petition in 1967. Yet under the prevailing standards,
that confession did not provide sufficiently clear new evidence,
and the Aomori District Court rejected the retrial petition in
1973.17

313. Hence a popular name for the case: the Case of the Murder of the Old
Lady in Aomori. For concise summaries of this case, see Tanaka Terukazu,
Yonetani jiken [The Yonetani Case], in KELI SAISHIN NO KENKYO, supra note 243,
at 372; Usui Shigeo, Kinji no saibanrei kara mita ssa shorijo no mondaiten i00),
(cha.), (ge) [Problems with Regard to the Handling of Investigations, as Seen in
Recent Court Decisions (Parts 1, 2, and 3)], KEISATSUGAKU RONSHO [THE JOURNAL
OF POLICE SCIENCE] 36-2-20, 36-3-88, and 36-4-51, at 36-2, 24-26 (1983).
314. Judgment of Dec. 5, 1952, Chisai [District Court] (unreported decision of
Aomori Dist. Ct., discussed in sources cited in supra note 313), affd, Judgment of
Aug. 22, 1953, K~sai [High Court] (unreported decision of Sendai H. Ct., discussed
in sources cited in supra note 313).
315. See Judgment of July 31, 1978 (Japan v. Yonetani), Chisai [District
Court], 905 HANJI 15 (Aomori) (ultimately acquitting Yonetani after retrial).
316. Judgment of July 2, 1968, Chisai [District Court] (unreported decision of
Tokyo Dist. Ct., discussed in sources cited in supra note 313).
317. Judgment of March 30, 1973 (Yonetani v. Japan), Chisai [District Court],
5 Keiji saiban gepp6 [Keisai gepp6] 377 (Aomori).
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A second case in which a later confession by someone else
was not enough to warrant a retrial was the so-called Murder
of the Hirosaki University Professor's Wife, which occurred in
1949. Police arrested Nasu Takashi, a twenty-six year old local
resident. Although the authorities held him and presumably
subjected him to intense questioning for over two full
months,318 he never swayed from his absolute denial. He was
initially acquitted for lack of evidence,319 but on appeal by the
prosecutors, the Sendai High Court reversed, convicted him,
and sentenced him to fifteen years in prison.

°

After Nasu had completed his sentence and the statute of
limitations on the original crime had run, another man came
forward and confessed to having committed the murder, providing numerous details that appeared to confirm his story.
The Sendai High Court nevertheless rejected Nasu's subsequent retrial petition, suggesting that the man may have obtained his knowledge of the crime from contemporary newspaper accounts and other reports on the case.'
After the Supreme Court relaxed the retrial requirements, as discussed
below, see infra text accompanying notes 343-61, Yonetani won a new trial, Judgment of October 30, 1976 (Yonetani v. Japan), K~sai [High Court], 29 K~sai
keishii 557 (Sendai). Following the retrial, Yonetani -was ultimately acquitted in
Aomori District Court on July 31, 1978, 905 HANJI 15.
318. After being held for 20 days on the murder charge, he was confined for
observation of his mental condition for another month, then arrested on other
charges and held for another ten days before his rearrest and indictment on the
murder charges. See Tanaka Terukazu, Hirosakijiken [The Hirosaki case], in KEWI
SAISHIN NO KENKYG, supra note 243, at 331, 339. See generally Usui, supra note
243, 36-2, at 22-24.
319. Judgment of Jan. 12, 1951, Chisai [District Court] (unreported decision of
Aomori D. Ct., Hirosaki Div.). See Tanaka, supra note 318.
320. Judgment of May 31, 1952 (Nasu v. Japan), K6sai [High Court], 22 KStS
saibgnsho keiji hanketsu tokuh5 133, affd, Judgment of Feb. 19, 1953 (Nasu v.
Japan), Saikosai [Supreme Court], 7 Keishi! 305 (1st Petty Bench).
321. Judgment of December 13, 1974, K6sai [High Court] (unreported decision
of Sendal H. Ct.), reprinted in MIKOKAN SAIBANREISHU, supra note 301, at 57.
Here too, as soon as the retrial standards changed, Nasu promptly won a
retrial and eventual acquittal. The Sendai High Court granted a motion for reconsideration and ordered a retrial. Judgment of July 13, 1976 (Nasu v. Japan),
K6sa [High Court], 29 K6keishd 323. In an opinion acquitting Nasu after the
retrial, the Sendal High Court expressly concluded that the man who later confessed was in fact the real murderer and that there was not one piece of evidence
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Finally, one of the most publicized and controversial cases
was the Tokushima Radio case, in which the two central witnesses both later stated that their testimony had been false. In
that 1953 case, the owner of a radio store was murdered in his
room behind the shop.3" Eight months after the crime, following a long and largely fruitless investigation, prosecutors
began questioning two youths, aged sixteen and seventeen,
who had worked in the shop and had been living in a shed
behind the building on the night of the murder. The police
arrested the boys on minor charges and held them for twentyseven and forty-five days, respectively, questioning them intensively during that time."
It turned out that the prosecutors' main target was not the
boys themselves,"2 but rather Fuji Shigeko, the twice-divorced common law wife of the victim. The boys eventually
stated that they had seen the couple fighting on the morning of
the murder and that Fuji had requested them to help her hide
evidence. The police then arrested Fuji. She was convicted of
sufficient to show that Nasu was involved in the crime. Judgment of Feb. 15,
1977 (Nasu v. Japan), K~sai [High Court], 30 K~keishii 28. That opinion intimated
that one of the key items of evidence linking Nasu to the crime, blood on his
shirt, may not even have been there at the time it was seized-and thus implied
that the investigating authorities may have fabricated that piece of evidence. Id.
at 45.
322. The following account of this case is based primarily on the decision ultimately acquitting the defendant, Fuji Shigeko, on retrial, Judgment of July 9,
1985 (Japan v. Fuji), Chisai [District Court], 1157 HANJI 3 (Tokushima); Takada
Akimasa, Tokushima jiken [The Tokushima Case], in KEIJI SAISHIN NO KENKY0,
supra note 243, at 386; and Hayashi Nobuhide, Tokushima rajio-sh6 jiken [The
Tokushima Radio Shop Case], HOGAKU SEMINA ZOKAN, SHnZU [SHIN-ENRI NO
TAME NO TOS0], NIHON NO ENZAI [HOGAKU SEMINAR ExTRA NUMBER,
[NEw-STRUGGLE FOR RIGHTS] SERIES, MISCARRIAGES OF JUSTICE IN JAPAN] [hereinafter NIHON NO ENZAI] 220 (1983). See generally Nishijima Katuhiko, Tokushima

jiken saishin khhan no kadai [The Issues Raised by the Retrial of the Tokushima
Case], HORITSU JIHO 55-1041 (1983). Among the highly critical accounts of the
investigation in this case is Aochi Shin, Kensatsu kenryoku to enzai jiken [Prosecutorial Power and Cases of Miscarriages of Justice], HOGAKU SEMINA Z0KAN, SOGO
TOKUSHG SHIEIZU 16, GENDAI NO KENSATSU [HOGAKU SEMINAR EXTRA NUMBER,
CONPREHENSIVE SPECIAL SERIES 16, TODAY'S PROCURACY] 146 (1981).
323. See Takada, supra note 322, at 393.
324. In fact, despite the extensive interrogation of the youths, they were not
indicted for any crimes. See Takada, supra note 322, at 393.
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murder, in large part on the basis of the3 youths' statements,

and sentenced to thirteen years in prison.

2

In 1958 both youths confessed to having fabricated their
statements under pressure from the prosecutors.3 2' Both also
testified in Fuji's behalf at the time of her second and subsequent petitions for retrial. Their disavowals were not enough.
In considering the second petition the Tokushima District
Court accepted the disavowals as- "new" but found insufficient

evidence to determine whether the youths had lied originally
or later when they recanted their testimony.127 By the"stime of

the third petition their testimony was no longer "new. 2

325. Judgment of April 18, 1956, Chisai [District Court] (unreported decision of
Tokushima D. Ct.), affd, Judgment of Dec. 21, 1957, Kdsai [High Court] (unreported decision of Tokushima H. Ct.). See Takada, supra note 322.
326. They turned themselves in to police for having committed perjury and
were questioned by prosecutors and by an inquiry panel of the Tokushima
prosecutors' office. The inquiry panel concluded that there was sufficient evidence
to indict the youths for perjury in connection with their earlier testimony against
Fuji. See Takada, supra note 322, at 394. Subsequently, one of the youths held
firm to his confession of perjury, but one shifted back and forth, depending on
whether he was talking to the prosecutors or to friends and representatives of the
defendant. See 1157 HANJI at 10.
327. Judgment of Dec. 9, 1960, Chisai [District Court] (unreported decision of
Tokushima D. Ct.). See Takada, supra note 322.
328. Judgment of March 9, 1963, Chisai [District Court] (unreported decision of
Tokushima D. Ct.). See Takada, supra note 322. Thereafter, in reviewing the
fourth petition, the court accepted the continuing disavowals by the youths as
"new" evidence, but again found them insufficiently "clear" to warrant a new trial.
Judgment of July 20, 1970 (Fuji v. Japan), Chisai [District Court], 2 Keisai gepp6
760 (Tokushima).
After the Supreme Court relaxed the standards for consideration of retrial
petitions, Fuji filed a fifth petition, but that petition terminated with her death in
1979. Finally, on Dec. 23, 1980, the Tokushima District Court granted a pdsthumous petition, filed on her behalf by her siblings, 990 HANJI 20 (1981), and a
retrial was opened in 1983, after the Takamatsu High Court rejected the
prosecutors' appeal, Judgment of March 12, 1983, 1073 HANJi 3. Following the retrial, Fuji was acquitted in 1985, Judgment of July 9, 1985 (Japan v. Fuji), Chisai
[District Court], 1157 HANJI 3 (Tokushima), the first posthumous acquittal in Japan.
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d. Pressurefor Change
Over the years, cases like these generated considerable
publicity and led to various movements for change in the retrial standards. Although many of the most famous cases date
from the early 1950s, the petitions for retrials, for the most
part, didn't occur until some years later; and the retrial issue
attracted relatively little notice until the late 1950S.129 The
first real attention came from the Supreme Public Prosecutor's
Office, which in 1954 undertook a survey of cases involving
mistaken indictments.330 The Japan Federation of Bar Associations (JFBA), through its Committee for the Protection of Human Rights, first took up the issue in 1959, when it established teams to assist in the retrial petitions in Menda,
Tokushima Radio, Yoshida and other cases."3 ' At about the
same time, the first articles began to appear;.32 however, initially only practitioners, prosecutors and judges wrote about
the issue. It had not yet reached the academic world.
Thereafter, JFBA kept pressing the issue, continuing to
organize and fund defense teams to pursue retrials in cases it
deemed worthy.33 With the publicity surrounding the
Yoshida case, the retrial issue began to attract much wider
attention. The Legal Affairs Committee of the House of Repre-

329. Nonetheless, public concern over the general issue of fair trials was high
during the mid-1950s, spurred on by allegations that Communist sympathizers had
been unjustly prosecuted or framed in the so-called Maisukawa case and several
other incidents. See generally CHALMERS JOHNSON, CONSPIRACY AT MATSUKAWA

(1972).
330. H6mu kenshgjo [Justice Research Office], isogo shinhannin no arawareta
jiken no kent5 [Consideration of Cases in Which the Real Criminal Was Discovered
after the Indictment], Parts 1, 2 & 3, published in KENSATSU KENKYD SOSHO [PROSECUTORIAL RESEARCH SERIES] 14, 15 (1954) & 17 (1955).
331. See SAISHIN, supra note 1, at 164-207.
332. For a chronological bibliography, see Saishin ni kansuru bunken mokuroku,
supra note 243.
333. See SAISHIN, supra note 1, at 164-207. See generally Tokushtl, Saishin to
Nichibenren [Special Issue, Retrials and Nichibenren], JY TO SEIGI 34-9 (1983).
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sentatives of the Japanese Diet organized a special subcommittee to investigate the retrial system, which held a series of
meetings with academics, defense attorneys, prosecutors, and
judges in 1962 and 1963." Moreover, by this time the retrial
issue had become a popular issue among academics. The Japanese Criminal Law Society took up the topic in 1962,'3 ' and
by the mid-1960s a steady stream of academic articles had
begun to appear. Finally, across Japan supporters of several
petitioners organized separate movements for retrials in those
specific cases. 36
While the legislative efforts stalled, the other activities
steadily expanded. But the next major developments did not
occur until the early 1970s. In 1972 JFBA established an internal group to study the actual operation of the retrial system.
In 1973 a national coordinating committee was established,
bringing together JFBA, interested academics, and the various
separate support groups. In November of that year the committee invited Professor Karl Peters of Titbingen University, the
leading expert on retrials in West Germany, to visit Japan and
speak on retrial reform in West Germany.33 7 Professor
Peters's visit appears to have placed the imprimatur of an
established and respected movement on the retrial efforts. In
early 1974 the Criminal Law Society established a study group
on the retrial system and later that year devoted an issue of
its journal to the topic, leading off with an article by Professor
Peters on retrial reform.33 8
Very soon thereafter, in a landmark ruling by its First
Petty Bench, the Japanese Supreme Court greatly revised the
standards governing grants of retrials. 9 If one looks only at

334. See Odanaka & Ode, supra note 243, at 100-01.
335. Odanaka & Ode, supra note 243, at 97.
336. Odanaka & Ode, supra note 243, at 109. See generally Nomura Jir6,
Menda fiken no muzai hanketsu [The Menda Acquittal], 500 HANREI TAB.rZU
[HANTA] 44, 46 (1983).
337. Odanaka & Ode, supra note 243, at 109-10.
338. Karl Peters, Saishinhd no kaikaku [Reform of Retrial Law], KEIHO ZASSHI
20-1-1 (1974).
339. See infra notes 346-61 and accompanying text.
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the timing involved, it would seem that the various efforts
described above had paid off. Yet a closer examination suggests
that that may not have been the case at all. Rather, the crucial
factor appears to have been a series of chance events relating
to the workflow and composition of the Supreme Court.
e. 1975 and Beyond: The Supreme Court's Shiratoriand
SaitakawaRulings
In 1971 Murakami Kuniyasu filed an appeal in the Supreme Court from a Sapporo High Court ruling rejecting his
retrial petition in a controversial case known as the Shiratori
case.' Presumably by chance, that case was assigned to the
First Petty Bench. That same year Kishi Seiichi, then a judge
at the Tokyo High Court, was appointed to fill a vacancy on
the First Petty Bench. In 1974 Justice Kishi was still a member of the First Petty Bench, and the Shiratori case was still
pending," when Dand6 Shigemitsu, previously a professor at

340. That case involved the 1952 murder of a Sapporo policeman named
Shiratori Kazuo (hence the popular name of the case), who was shot while riding
home on a bicycle. Nine months after the murder, Murakami, a local Communist
Party official, was arrested. After being held in confinement for nearly three years
on a series of arrests and indictments on a total of 14 other charges, he was
finally arrested and indicted in late 1955 for conspiring to murder Shiratori. He
was convicted on that and other charges in Sapporo District Court in 1957 and
sentenced to life imprisonment. In 1960 the Sapporo High Court affirmed the
conviction but reduced the sentence to 20 years. The First Petty Bench of the
Supreme Court rejected Murakami's appeal in 1963. Judgment of Oct. 17, 1963
(Murakami v. Japan), Saik6sai [Supreme Court], 17 Keish-a 1795 (1st Petty Bench).
Two years later Murakami filed a retrial request in Sapporo High Court. That
petition was rejected in 1969. Judgment of June 18, 1969 (Murakami v. Japan),
K6sai [High Court], 558 HANJI 14 (Sapporo). Soon after the same court rejected a
motion for reconsideration, Judgment of July 16, 1971 (Murakami v. Japan), K~sai
[High Court], 3 Keisai gepp6 869 (Sapporo), Murakami filed his appeal in the Supreme Court. Particularly because of allegations that Murakami had been singled
out for his political affiliation, this case was controversial. See generally Matsuoka
Masaaki, Shiratorijiken [The Shiratori Case], in KEIJI SAISHIN NO KENKYB, supra
note 243, at 357. Over 1.4 million people reportedly signed a petition in
Murakami's support. Odanaka & Ode, supra note 243, at 115.
341. Currently, the average criminal case takes about five months between
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the University of Tokyo, was appointed to the Court and joined
the same Petty Bench. As a reader with a very good memory

for names might recall, those same two Justices, while both
young criminal law specialists, had each written commentaries

in the late 1930s critical of Daishin'in rulings refusing retrials.
At that time, both had criticized the Daishin'in for failing to

apply the "reasonable doubt" standard in considering retrial
petitions. In 1962 Kishi (then a Tokyo District Court judge)

had repeated this very point.3 2 Plainly, the two had not forgotten these views when they reached the Supreme Court.
Arguably, the Shiratori case should have been referred to the

Grand Bench for decision.3'" Nonetheless, the First Petty
Bench retained the case.'

4

In view of the fact that there

filing at the Supreme Court and decision by that Court, but more difficult or controversial cases may take much longer, with occasional cases taking five, seven or
even more years after filing before the Supreme Court renders a decision. See
SAiKOSAIBANSHO JImUSOKYOKU, SHIHO TOKEI NENPO, 2 KELJI-HEN, HEISEI 2-NEN [SuPREME COURT GENERAL SECRETARIAT, ANNUAL REPORT OF JUDICIAL STATISTICS FOR
1990, VOL. 2, CRIMINAL CASES] 21 (table 27) (average of 5.4 months), 358 (table
67) (two cases between five and seven years, two cases over seven years).
342. See KISHI, supra note 291, at 404.
343. As noted earlier, the Court Organization Act requires a Petty Bench to
refer a case to the Grand Bench for decision if the Petty Bench's decision would
conflict with a prior ruling of the Court; and the Court's rules call for a Petty
Bench to refer a case to the Grand Bench if the Petty Bench deems that decision
en bane would be appropriate, see supra notes 78-79 and accompanying text. In
prior rulings, including rulings by the Grand Bench itself, the Supreme Court had
taken a rather strict stance toward retrials, and a committee of the Diet had considered but declined to adopt a proposal to modify the retrial standards legislatively. Although, narrowly speaking, the ruling ultimately entered in Shiratori did not
directly conflict with the Supreme Court's prior rulings, one might think that
under these circumstances a decision announcing broad new standards considerably
more liberal than traditional judicial attitudes would have warranted review by
the entire Court.
344. It should be noted, however, that the full Court has sometimes been reluctant to accept discretionary referrals from the Petty Benches, on occasion sending
back to the Petty Bench cases that the members of that Petty Bench had thought
were important enough to warrant en banc consideration. See Purakutisu
kenkyaikai, Saik6sai no purakutisu ni tsuite (M) [Practice Study Group, Regarding
Supreme Court Practice, Part 3], 40 HO NO SHIMAI 57, 88 (1979) (comments of former Justice Iwata). The informal polling of Justices on other Petty Benched conducted in connection with the Nagayama case, see supra text accompanying note
81, represents one way of ensuring consensus on important decisions without con-
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were two leading criminal law experts on that Petty Bench, 5
both of whom felt very strongly about the need for change and
agreed on the proper standard, it is hardly surprising that the
Shiratoricase resulted in a major revision in retrial standards.
Without intimating that it was doing anything more than restating the existing law, the unanimous panel set out the following standard at virtually the outset of its ruling, which it
announced on May 20, 1975:"6

The phrase "clear evidence requiring the declaration of innocence" should be deemed to refer to evidence that gives rise
to a reasonable doubt concerning the factflndings of the original judgment and that is sufficient to give rise to a probability that those findings would be overturned. The judgment of
whether evidence is "clear evidence" within this meaning
should be based on a comprehensive evaluation of the new
evidence along with all the other evidence, from the standpoint of determining whether the factual findings contained
in the original judgment would have been reached had the
new evidence been presented during the deliberations of the
court that entered the original judgment. In making that

vening the en banc Court.
345. In Japan, judges at the District Court and High Court levels are usually
classified into either civil or criminal panels, and most lower court judges specialize in one field or the other. At the Supreme Court level, Justices handle all issues, although the chOsakan who assist them are divided into three chambers:
civil, criminal, and administrative and labor. Of the other Justices on the Shiratori
panel, Presiding Justice Kishigami was a career judge with a background primarily in the fields of civil law and judicial administration; Justice (later Chief Justice)
Fijibayashi had been a practicing lawyer and had also served on the Central
Labor Commission; and Justice Shimoda was a former diplomat.
346. That opinion was unsigned, in keeping with the Japanese practice that
only separate opinions at the Supreme Court level are signed. It seems safe to
assume that Justice Dand6 was the primary author, however. Although Danda is
known as "the great dissenter," in an article after his retirement from the Court
he emphasized that he had written majority opinions as well, and went on to
describe Shiratori as a decision in which his views were reflected fully in the
mAjority opinion. See Dand6 Shigemitsu, Saik6saibansho to Nihon no saiban [The
Supreme Court and Japanese Trials], in HOGAKu SEMINA ZOKAN, SOGO TOKUSHO
sHIuU 27, GENDAI NO SAIBAN [HOGAKU SEMINAR EXTRA NUMBER, SPEcIAL COMPREHENSIVE SERIES No. 27, TODAY'S TRIALS] 2, 13 (1984) [hereinafter GENDAI NO
SAIBAN].
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determination, the hard and fast rule of criminal trials that
"doubts are to be resolved in favor of the defendant" should
be applied, in the sense that if a reasonable doubt is raised
as to the factual findings contained in the original judgment,
that will be a sufficient basis for ordering a retrial. 4
In this one matter-of-fact paragraph containing no references to earlier decisions or to the vigorous debate over the
issues involved, the Shiratori decision adopted both the "comprehensive evaluation" and "reasonable doubt" standards for
which critics of the retrial standards had been fighting for
fifteen years. The Court also appears to have relaxed the level
of proof required-from the "high probability" that some other
courts had demanded to a simple "probability" that the prior
findings would be altered.
Despite this rather sweeping success, retrial supporters
were not entirely satisfied, for one simple reason: the above
statement was, technically speaking, dictum. Even under the
new, more liberal standard, the Court concluded that the new
evidence in Shiratori-scientific analyses raising doubts about
two bullets used as, key evidence against the defendant-was
insufficient to warrant a new trial."48 In this respect, as well
as in its broad expansion of existing rights to review without
referring to the ongoing debate or intimating that it was doing
anything more than restating settled principles, this opinion
thus bears great similarity to the United States Supreme
Court's expansion of federal habeas in its 1953 ruling in Brown
v.Allen. 49
While welcoming the new formulation in Shiratori, critics
expressed concern over whether it would really be applied in
actual cases. 5 The First Petty Bench (of which Justices

347. Judgment of May 20, 1975 (Murakami v. Japan), Saik6sai [Supreme
Court], 29 Keishfi 177, 180 (1st Petty Bench).
348. Id. at 192-94.
349. See supra text accompanying notes 100-02.
350. See, e.g., Mitsud6 Kageaki, Saishin ni kansuru jakkan no mondai [A Few
Issues Concerning Retrials], 601 JURISUTO 22, 28 (1975); Matsuoka Masaaki,
Saishin riya toshite no sh6ko no "meihakusei" ["Clarity" of Evidence as a Ground
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Kishi and Dand6 were still members) wasted little time in
making clear its intention that the Shiratori standard should
not be ignored.
In late 1974 a death row inmate, Taniguchi Shigeyoshi,
had asked the Supreme Court to review the Takamatsu High
Court's rejection of his second retrial request in the so-called
Saitakawa case. 5' This was another of the controversial re-

for Retrials], 593 JURIsUTO 42, 44-46 (1975).
This concern was not wholly unwarranted. In a number of other cases, the
Japanese Supreme Court has announced fairly broad and rather liberal standards
that it says are to apply in the proper case, yet has rejected the appeals in the
cases before it. Thus, the decision whether to actually allow relief under the broad
standards is left for the lower courts; and the new standards often go little used
or even unused. One example is the exclusionary rule. In a 1978 decision by the
First Petty Bench, the Japanese Supreme Court indicated that "evidentiary cipacity should be denied in cases where there is major illegality of the sort that involves disregard for the spirit underlying the warrant requirement . . . and where
permitting the use of the evidence would be inappropriate from the standpoint of
deterring illegal searches in the future." Judgment of Sept. 7, 1978 (Hashimoto v.
Japan), Saik6sai [Supreme Court], 32 Keish
1672, 1682-83 (1st Petty Bench).
Although the Court found that the police had acted illegally in searching the pocket of a person they had stopped for questioning, it concluded that the illegality
was slight and did not rise to the level warranting exclusion of the evidence. Id.
Subsequently some lower courts have excluded evidence under the above standard,
see, e.g., Judgment of Jan. 23, 1981, K6sai [High Court], 998 HANJI 126 (Osaka),
but such decisions have been rare. See INOUYE MASAHITO, KEIJISOSHOHO NI OKERU
SHOKO HALJO [EXCLUSION OF ILLEGALLY OBTAINED EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE] 539-88, 595-602 (1985).
In this instance, a few lower courts-including the Sendai High Court in
the Hirosaki University Professor's Wife case, Judgment of July 13, 1976 (Nasu v.
Japan), K6sai [High Court], 29 K6sai keishii 323 (Sendai)-were quick to rely on
Shiratori in ordering the opening of retrials. But other courts remained reluctant
to grant retrials. One notable example of the latter is the Menda case, in which
the District Court recited the Shiratori standard word for word, yet went on to
reject Menda's retrial petition in its first ruling on that petition after Shiratori.
Judgment of April 30, 1976 (Menda v. Japan), 828 HANJI 95, 100-01; 114
(Kumamoto D. Ct., Yatsushiro Div.).
351. The trial court judgment c6nvicting Taniguchi and sentencing him to
death, Judgment of Jan. 25, 1952 (Japan v. Taniguchi), Chisai [District Court] (unreported decision of the Takamatsu Dist. Ct., Marukame Div.); the High Court
decision, Judgment of June 8, 1956 (Taniguchi v. Japan), K~sai [High Court] (unreported decision of the Takamatsu H. Ct.) (rejecting appeal); and the Supreme
Court decision, Judgment of Jan. 22, 1957 (Taniguchi v. Japan), Saik6sai [Supreme
Court] (unreported decision of the 3d Petty Bench) (rejecting appeal), all are reprinted in MIKOKAN SAIBANREISHEI, supra note 301, at 127, 128, and 131, respec-
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trial cases. Largely on the basis of a confession that investigators obtained after holding and questioning him for nearly four
months, Taniguchi was prosecuted for murdering and robbing
a black-market rice dealer in 1950. Prior to trial Taniguchi
recanted his confession, but he was convicted and sentenced to
death in 1952. His appeals to the High Court and Supreme
Court were rejected, as was his first request for a retrial filed
in 1957. 85 In 1969 the Takamatsu district court decided to
treat a letter Taniguchi had written five years earlier as a new
retrial petition and undertook an extensive review of the
case." 3 In a long and detailed ruling," the district court
outlined several doubts concerning the conviction. The court
nonetheless held that Taniguchi had raised no claims sufficient
to obtain a new trial under the existing standards, but expressly requested the High Court to conduct a critical review of the
case. Despite this plea, the High Court summarily affirmed the
district court's denial of a new trial. 5 5 Taniguchi appealed.
Presumably by chance, that appeal came to the First Petty
Bench. It was still pending when that panel issued its
Shiratoriruling a few months later. Saitakawa thus provided
the panel with a perfect opportunity to reinforce the views it
had announced in Shiratori.

tively. A summary of the case to that point is set forth in Judgment of Oct. 12,
1976 (Taniguchi v. Japan), Saik6sai [Supreme Court], 30 Keishii 1673, 1675-84 (1st
Petty Bench). For other summaries, see Kitayama RokurS, Saitakawa fiken [The
Saitakawa case], in NIHON NO ENZAI, supra note 322, at 216; ZOKU SAISHIN, supra
note 243, at 70-142; and TAKASUGI SHINGO, KENRYOKU NO HANZAI [CRIMES OF
POWER] 3-25 (1980). The popular name of the case derives from the Saita River,
Saitakawa in Japanese, into which Taniguchi was alleged to have thrown the
knife used in the killing.
352. For details of this case, see Foote, supra note 6, at 30-42.
353. The court, on its own initiative, reexamined many of the original witnesses and appointed a handwriting expert to examine five statements Taniguchi had
allegedly written voluntarily while in confinement. See Foote, supra note 6, at 3536.
354. Judgment of Sept. 30, 1972 (Taniguchi v. Japan), Chisa [District Court]
(unreported decision of the Takamatsu Dist. Ct., Marukame Div.), reprinted in 30
Keishil 1793.
355. Judgment of Dec. 5, 1974 (Taniguchi v. Japan), K6sai [High Court] (unre-"
ported decision of the Takamatsu H. Ct.), reprinted in 30 Keishd 1841.
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The Court's precise ruling in its October 1976 decision in
Saitakawa was that the High Court had acted illegally by
summarily affirming the lower court's decision without giving
sufficient consideration to the case, "notwithstanding the district court's unusual step of setting out many doubts and requesting the higher court to conduct a critical review," and
that the district court, as well, had erred by not considering
the case sufficiently."' 6 In reaching that conclusion, the First
Petty Bench carefully applied the rules governing requests for
retrials based on new evidence. The court cited Shiratori and
set forth the controlling standard in almost identical language, 57 then re-emphasized that the reasonable doubt standard applies and that the petitioner does not bear the burden
of establishing his or her own innocence. 8 ' Turning to the
facts, the court noted that the only new evidence presented in
the proceedings on the retrial request was a handwriting analysis that the district court itself had ordered. 59 The court
held that this satisfied the statutory requirement of "newly
discovered" "clear evidence," since the handwriting analysis
might cast doubt on the reliability of handwritten confessions
Taniguchi had supposedly written voluntarily, and that in turn
might raise doubts about his final, more detailed, confession
and thus his conviction.6 ' The court remanded the case for
further consideration of the retrial request, in the process
leaving little doubt as to its belief that the lower court should
grant that request.36 '

356.
clusions
357.
358.

30 Keishfi 1673, 1684-85. In this manner, the Court characterized its conas issues of law, not of fact.
See supra text accompanying note 347.
The Court stated that "itis . . . sufficient that there be doubts . . . as to

the propriety of the factual findings of the prior judgment. Accordingly, the above
principle will apply if it is clear that there is insufficient proof of the crime." The

Court went on to state, though, that "this does not constitute approval for a
court . . . to intrude recklessly on the views of the original court, in the absence
of special circumstances." 30 Keishdi at 1698-99.
359. Id. at 1697.
360. Id. at 1697-98, 1700-01.
361. See Foote, supra note 6, at 38-39.
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The Impact of Shiratoriand Saitakawa

Through the Saitakawa ruling, the Supreme Court unequivocally demonstrated its commitment to the new standards. The Court also made clear that even relatively limited
new evidence might be enough to tip the scale in favor of a
new trial. As with the judicially developed standards for habeas in the United States, these new Japanese standards are not
limited to the cases of death-sentenced prisoners. In theory,
the precedential effect of a Japanese Supreme Court decision is
confined to subsequent proceedings in that particular case. In
practice, however, Supreme Court rulings typically have great
impact on later decisions by courts at all levels, and nothing in
Shiratori or Saitakawa suggested that the Court intended to
limit the principles it announced in those cases to capital prisoners. In fact, Murakami, the defendant in Shiratori,had never been under a death sentence at all.
Japan's Criminal Procedure Code expressly provides that
petitions for retrials may be filed after a person's sentence has
been completed, 62 and that a spouse or other relative may
request a retrial even if the one who was convicted has
died.8 6 If successful, moreover, petitioners are entitled to
compensation from the government under the Criminal Redress Act'--compensation that may be very substantial,
since it is calculated on the basis of the number of days spent

362. KEISOHO art. 441.
363. Id. art. 439(1)(item 4).
364. KEIJI HOSHO HO [CRIMINAL REDRESS ACT], Law No. 1 of 1950, art. 1(1)
("One who has been acquitted in normal criminal proceedings [or] on retrial ...
and who has been confined pending judgment or has been imprisoned ...
may

claim compensation...

from the state."). Heirs, including those who have ob-

tained posthumous acquittals on behalf of a family member, may also file demands

for compensation under the Act. Id. art. 2. This Act implements article 40 of the
Constitution, which provides that "[any person who is acquitted after he has been
arrested or detained may sue the State for redress as provided by law."
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in confinement." Thus, the range of potential retrial petitioners is vast.
Once the Court had so plainly indicated its intention that
the retrial provisions should be interpreted broadly, lower
courts (several of which had previously made clear their desire
that the Supreme Court reconsider the standards) showed
themselves more than willing to comply. Later during the very
month that the Supreme Court issued its decision in
Saitakawa, the Sendai High Court ordered a new trial in
Yonetani. Then, in 1979, retrials were ordered in Saitakawa
itself on remand, in Menda, and in the so-called Matsuyama
case,3 6 another case involving a death row inmate. These
were followed in subsequent years by a gradual stream of reopenings in other major cases." 7
It would nonetheless be an overstatement to suggest that
Shiratori and Saitakawa led to a flood of retrials. In 1976, the
year after Shiratori was decided, the number of retrial requests jumped by nearly fifty percent and the number of retrials granted nearly tripled, but the absolute numbers were still

365. Id. arts. 4(1) (amount of compensation to be between V1000 and V9400 per
day of confinement or imprisonment), 4(3) (amount of compensation for one who
was wrongly executed to be no more than V25 million, plus actual monetary damages if proven).
Article 5(1) of the Criminal Redress Act specifically states that relief thereunder does not bar claims under the National Compensation Act, KOKKA nAISHO
HO, Law No. 125 of 1947. Accordingly, individuals who are acquitted either at
trial, on direct appeal, or on retrial may have a claim against the state under the
National Compensation Act, based on illegality by governmental authorities in
pursuing the prosecution or in entering the original conviction. Although it is not
uncommon for individuals acquitted at their original trials to obtain compensation
through this latter route, to date no one has succeeded in such a claim following
acquittal on retrial. See 1393 HANJI 19, 20 (1991) (comment accompanying Judgment of July 31, 1991, of Sendal Dist. Ct.) (claims granted at District Court level
in two cases, but both were reversed on appeal).
366. Judgment of Dec. 6, 1979 (Sait5 v. Japan), Chisai [District Court], 949
HANJI 11 (1980) (Sendai), affd, Judgment of Jan. 31, 1983 (Japan v. SaitS), Kasai
[High Court], 1067 HANJI 3 (Sendai).
367. These include the Hirosaki University Professor's Wife and Tokushima
Radio cases discussed earlier. See generally Saishin kankei nenpya-chizu [Chronology and Map of Retrial-Related Events], JIYO TO SEIGI 34-9-49 (1983); Konishi, supra note 281, at 1014-15.
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modest: petitions rose from ninety-three to one hundred thirtyfive, and retrials granted rose from twenty to fifty-two."s The
numbers have never been that high since 69 and even during
that year almost all of the retrials granted-forty-six of the
fifty-two--were relatively minor matters handled by Petty
Courts."' Furthermore, just as in the period prior to
Shiratori, the vast majority of the granted retrials have come
at the request of the prosecutors. 7'
Yet the impact of Shiratoriand Saitakawagoes far beyond
these bare numbers. The retrials that have been granted have
included some of the most highly publicized cases in Japan,
and the facts and implications of those cases are troubling.
Needless to say, the most troubling are the four cases involving
mistaken death sentences.
The Menda Case:7 2 This case stemmed from a 1948 robbery in Hitoyoshi City, Kumamoto Prefecture, in which the
robber murdered a husband and wife and injured their two
daughters. Following a tip that a suspicious person had said he
was investigating the case, the police picked up Menda Sakae,
the twenty-three-year-old son of a local farmer. After questioning him for nearly three full days and nights, apparently without letting him sleep, police obtained a full confession. During
the trial, Menda withdrew the confession and asserted an
alibi. 73 The court rejected the alibi and convicted him, largely on the basis of his confession and a spot of type 0 blood
(that of the victims, not Menda) on a hatchet found at the
home of one of his friends.

368. See Konishi, supra note 281, at 1012.
369. See Konishi, supra note 281, at 1012 (figures through 1985);
SAIKOSAIBANSHO JIMUSOKYOKU, supra note 341, at 5 (table 2-3 for District Court
filings through 1990, table 2-4 for Petty Court filings).
370. See Konishi, supra note 281, at 1012.
371. Konishi, supra note 281, at 1012.
372. For details of this case, see Foote, supra note 6, at 14-30.
373. Menda claimed that he had spent the night of the crime with a prostitute.
She gave conflicting testimony, first stating that Menda had spent the night after
the crime with her but later agreeing with Menda's account.
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After his conviction became final in 1951, Menda began
filing a series of retrial petitions. 4 As described earlier, on
Menda's third petition, the district court ordered a new trial
after finding a valid basis for his alibi, but the Fukuoka High
Court reversed on the ground that the district court had overstepped proper bounds." 5 After the Supreme Court relaxed
the standards, Menda finally won a retrial in 1980, on his
sixth request.376
Following the retrial, the court fully exonerated
Menda. 77 It upheld his alibi," s rejected his confession on
credibility grounds,3 79 and found that, given the level of blood
testing techniques in 1951, the identification of type 0 blood
was unreliable.38 Accordingly, the court acquitted Menda in

374. Menda was represented during the initial trial and direct appeals, and on
his second retrial petition, by local counsel from Kumamoto Prefecture. He filed
the first and third petitions on his own, apparently with some advice from another
prisoner who had studied some law. Beginning with his fourth retrial petition in
1961, he was represented by a team of attorneys under the aegis of the Committee for the Protection of Human Rights (jinken y6go iinkai) of the Japan Fdderation of Bar Associations (JFBA). See ZOKU SAISHIN, supra note 243, at 25-27. In a
striking contrast with the United States, the organized bar in Japan has played
an active role in most of the major retrial cases and in the movement to relax the
governing standards. See SAISmN, supra note 1, at 164-207 (activities of JFBA
through 1976); ZOKU SAISHIN, supra note 243, at 479-93 (activities of JFBA
through 1985); Okabe Yasuo, Nichibenren kara mita saishin seikya [Retrial Requests, as Viewed by JFBA], HOR TsU JIH0 64-8-60 (1992) (activities of JFBA since
1986; explaining that JFBA's activities fall into three main categories: providing
support in individual retrial cases, compiling and exchanging information and providing interchange among the individual groups, and pressing for revision of the
law governing retrials).
375. See supra text accompanying notes 300-05.
376. Judgment of Dec. 11, 1980 (Menda v. Japan), Saik6sai [Supreme Court],
34 Keishfi 562 (1st Petty Bench). The "new evidence" presented at that time included an expert opinion challenging the blood analysis.
377. Judgment of July 15, 1983 (Japan v. Menda), Chisai [District Court], 1090
HANJI 21 (Kumamoto Dist. Ct., Yatsushiro Div.).
378. The court found that evidence clearly established that Menda had spent
either the night of the crime or the following night with the prostitute, but other
objective evidence showed that he had spent the latter night with another friend.
So, by a process of elimination, Menda must have spent the night of the murders
with the prostitute. See id. at 36.
379. Id. at 90-91.
380. Id. at 102.

19931

CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN JAPAN

451

an opinion that flatly declared him innocent of the murders
and sharply criticized many of the investigators' activities,
including their three days of nonstop questioning.3 8' The
prosecution elected not to appeal this verdict, and Menda was
released on July 29, 1983, over thirty-three years after he was
first sentenced to death.
The Saitakawa Case:3 82 Taniguchi Shigeyoshi was convicted in 1952 of murdering a black-market rice dealer two
years earlier. At the time of the crime, Taniguchi was nineteen
years old and had a police record for minor crimes. He was
convicted of the murder largely on the basis of a series of confessions, including five handwritten statements, obtained by
investigators during more than four months that he was held
in confinement. One of the key indicia of reliability for these
confessions was his description of how he had finished off the
victim-with two knife thrusts to the heart. This was supposedly a 3"secret" that only the real offender would have
38
known.
When it remanded the case after applying the Shiratori
standard, the Supreme Court listed a series of doubts concerning the evidence that it felt the lower courts should re-examine.3M One of these was the possibility that the investigators
had known of the two thrusts to the heart from an autopsy
report before Taniguchi so confessed, and thus might have
induced that part of the confession. On remand, the district
court obtained previously undisclosed prosecution records
which showed that the autopsy finding was in fact widely
known among the investigators long before Taniguchi confessed to that aspect of the crime. In part for that reason, the
court found
a reasonable doubt as to guilt and ordered a new
385
trial.
381. See id. at 83-91.
382. For details of this case, see Foote, supra note 6, at 30-42.
383. Other evidence included various items of clothing he was supposedly wearing at the time of the crime, along with an expert opinion that Type 0 blood-the
blood type of the victim-had been found on the trousers.
384. Judgment of Oct. 12, 1976 (Taniguchi v. Japan), Saik6sai [Supreme Court],
30 Keishfi 1673, 1700-01 (1st Petty Bench).
385. Judgment of June 7, 1979 (Taniguchi v. Japan), Chisai [District Cburt],
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After a new trial spanning numerous sessions over a twoyear period, the district court acquitted Taniguchi on March
12, 1984.386 The court rejected the confessions on credibility
grounds3 87 and also rejected a blood analysis that had served
as corroborating evidence."8 While acknowledging-and in
fact describing with some specificity-numerous grounds for
suspecting that Taniguchi may in fact have committed the
crime, the court could find no evidence sufficient to establish
his guilt. The court therefore acquitted for failure to prove
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The prosecution did not appeal, and Taniguchi was released on March 12, 1984, nearly
thirty-four years after he was first arrested and over twentyseven years after the death sentence had become final.
The Matsuyama Case:.89 This case involved the brutal
1955 murders of a day laborer, his wife and their two children
in Matsuyama, Miyagi Prefecture. Police included Salt5 Sachio,
the twenty-four-year-old son of a local lumber dealer, on the
list of suspects largely because of his reputation as a delinquent and because he apparently knew that the day laborer
had just received payment for a construction job. They arrested
Salt5 for a fight he had been in a few months earlier and proceeded to question him about the murders. He confessed on, the
fifth day of questioning. He renounced that confession about a
week later, but was convicted in 1957 primarily on the basis of
the confession and a futon cover from his bed, which was
stained with a large quantity of type A blood (the victims'
blood type).3"

929 HANJI 37 (Takamatsu), affd, Judgment of March 14, 1981 (Japan v.
Taniguchi), K~sai [High Court], 995 HANJI 3 (Takamatsu).
386. Judgment of March 12, 1984 (Japan v. Taniguchi), Chisai [District Court],
1107 HANJI 13 (Takamatsu).
387. Id. at 38-39.
388. The court accepted the blood type identification, but found it lacked relevance, since the blood was on old trousers that Taniguchi and his two brothers
had all used and it was unclear when the blood had gotten on them or even if
Taniguchi had been wearing them on the night of the crime. Id. at 31, 33-34.
389. For details of this case, see Foote, supra note 6, at 42-51.
390. Judgment of Oct. 29, 1957 (Japan v. Sait6), Chisai [District Court] (unreported decision of Sendal Dist. Ct., Yoshikawa Div.), affd, Judgment of May 26,
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In his first retrial request, filed in early 1961, Sait5
claimed that he had been convicted on the basis of peijured
testimony by a cellmate and asserted that new evidence would
show that the blood stain on the futon cover had been fabricated. Over three years later, the district court rejected that petition; two years after that, the High Court affirmed that ruling;
and after another three years, the Supreme Court also af3 91
firmed.
Less than two weeks after the Supreme Court's ruling,
Sait5 filed a second retrial petition relying on new opinions by
experts in blood analysis. After another two years, the district
court rejected this petition as well, noting that several of the
claims had already been considered and rejected at the time of
the first retrial petition and thus were no longer "new." While
implying that there were weaknesses in the original evidence,
the court found itself without authority to order a new trial,
stating: "In deciding whether to reopen a trial, the role of the
court is not to form its own independent impression of the evidence, but rather to accept the evaluation contained in the
guilty verdict and determine whether that
evaluation can be
39 2
overturned on the basis of new evidence."
Two years later, the Sendai High Court vacated this ruling
on procedural grounds. 9 3 The case was thus on remand at
the district court when the Supreme Court announced its
Shiratori and Saitakawa decisions. In its 1979 decision on

1959 (Sait6 v. Japan), K6sai [High Court] (unreported decision of Sendai H. Ct.),
affd, Judgment of Nov. 1, 1960 (Sait6 v. Japan), Saikasai [Supreme Court] (unreported decision of the 3d Petty Bench). These are reprinted in MIKOKAN
SAIBANEEISHO, supra note 301, at 153, 157, and 170, respectively.
391. Judgment of April 30, 1964 (Sait6 v. Japan), Chisai [District Court] (unreported decision of Sendai Dist. Ct., Yoshikawa Div.), affd, Judgment of May 13,
1966 (Sait6 v. Japan), K~sai [High Court] (unreported decision of Sendai H. Ct.),
affd, Judgment of May 27, 1969 (Sait5 v. Japan), Saikbsai [Supreme Court] (unreported decision of the 3d Petty Bench). These rulings are reprinted in MIKOKAN
SAIBANREISHO, supra note 301, at 171, 193, and 212, respectively.
392. Judgment of Oct. 26, 1971 (Sait5 v. Japan), Chisai [District Court], 301
HANTA 133, 137-38 (1974) (Sendai Dist. Ct., Yoshikawa Div.).
393. Judgment of Sept. 18, 1973 (Sait5 v. Japan), K~sai [High Court], 721
HANJI 104 (Senda).
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remand, the district court granted a new trial, finding doubts
about the blood analyses and other elements of the case. 94
Following the retrial, the district court completely exonerated Sait6. 395 It rejected his confessions on credibility
grounds,396 and rejected the evidentiary value of the bloodstained futon cover, in an opinion that came very close to saying that the evidence had been fabricated. 97 Having thus rejected all the key evidence, the court acquitted Sait5 on July
11, 1984, nearly twenty-seven years after he was first sentenced to death.
The Shimada Case:3 9' In early 1954, a man lured a six
year old girl away from a school festival being held at a temple
in Shimada City, Shizuoka Prefecture. Her body was found
three days later; she had been beaten, raped and strangled.
Akabori Masao was twenty-four years old at the time. He
had been raised on a local farm, was of low intelligence, and
had served time in prison for a series of thefts after his return
from World War II service. Following his release from prison
he had drifted around, returning from time to time to his
brother's home in the area. Two and a half months after the

394. Judgment of Dec. 6, 1979 (Sait6 v. Japan), Chisai [District Court], 949
HANJI 11 (Sendal), affd, Judgment of Jan. 31, 1983 (Japan v. SaitS), Ksai [High
Court], 1067 HANJI 3 (Sendai).
395. Judgment and Judgment of July 11, 1984 (Japan v. Sait6), Chisai [District
Court], 1127 HANJI 34 (Sendai).
396. Id. at 60.
397. The new expert studies raised numerous doubts about the manner in
which the blood was deposited on the futon cover. Id. at 51. Other evidence suggested that the investigators had covered up an earlier analysis of the blood stains
conducted by the police laboratory. That analysis found only a few small spots of
blood, in sharp contrast to the large amounts found in the later examination by
an outside expert. Id. at 57. The court found insufficient evidence to establish
fabrication conclusively, but rejected the evidence in part because the prosecution
was unable to rebut the inference that blood was placed on the futon cover'after
the police seized it. Id.
The court also sharply criticized the police and prosecutors for numerous
illegalities and improprieties in connection with the investigation, including SaitS's
arrest on an unrelated minor charge as a pretext to pursue questioning about the
murders and the use of another detainee to spy on SaitS. For a description of
these issues, see Foote, supra note 6, at 47-50.
398. For details of this case, see Foote, supra note 6, at 51-64.
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crime, police began questioning him about the crime when he
was stopped in a neighboring prefecture early one morning."'
Police questioned him for two days, then released him, but
arrested him three days later for stealing clothing from a local
girls' high school and again began questioning him about the
girl's abduction. After two more days of questioning, Akabori
confessed. He subsequently provided a series of detailed confessions. Based on the confessions, police collected the rock he
supposedly used to beat the girl.
At trial, Akabori recanied his confessions and claimed to
have been walking from Tokyo to Yokohama on the day of the
crime, but he was convicted and sentenced to death.0 0 After
the conviction and sentence were affirmed, he began filing
retrial petitions. Courts summarily rejected the first three. The
fourth-which relied largely on new expert opinions challenging the order and nature of the injuries that his confessions
described, and thereby the reliability of the confessions themselves-received a more extensive review; but in early 1977,
after Shiratori and Saitakawa had both been handed down,
the district court rejected the petition, saying it remained convinced that the confessions were reliable. 0 '
The Tokyo High Court undertook its own careful review of
the case and, six years later, reversed and remanded for further investigation.0 2 After another thorough review, the district court finally granted Akabori's retrial request three years

399. His name had been placed on a list of suspects ten days after the crime,
when a local resident reported that he had waved to an elementary school girl at
a shrine, but police did not question him at that time. See Foote, supra note 6, at
52.
400. Judgment of May 23, 1958 (Japan v. Akabori), Chisai [District Court]
(unreported decision of Shizuoka Dist. Ct.), affd, Judgment of Feb. 17, 1960
(Akabori v. Japan), K6sai [High Court] (unreported decision of Tokyo H. Ct.), .affd,
Judgment of Dec. 25, 1960 (Akabori v. Japan), Saik6sai [Supreme Court] (unreported decision of 1st Petty Bench). These decisions are reprinted in MIKOKAN
SAIBANREISHG, supra note 301, at 133, 144, and 151, respectively.
401. Judgment of March 11, 1977 (Akabori v. Japan), Chisai [District Court],
348 HANTA 125 (Shizuoka).
402. Judgment of May 23, 1983 (Akabori v. Japan), Kasai [High Court], 1079
HANJI 11 (Tokyo).
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later, in 1986, primarily on the basis of concerns over the reliability of the confessions.4 3 The prosecutors again appealed
this decision to the Tokyo High Court, which affirmed the
decision ten months later.4° When the prosecutors elected
not to pursue a further appeal to the Supreme Court, the retrial order took effect--some eighteen years after this fourth
retrial request was filed.
The new trial itself, which included extensive new medical
testimony from both sides, spanned an additional two years.
Despite rejecting the alibi and several other defense contentions, the court acquitted Akabori.4 °5 While upholding the
voluntariness of his confessions, the court found them highly
unreliable, noting that "Akabori is of low native intelligence
and is highly emotional and unstable" and may simply have
told the police what he thought they wanted to hear."' The
primary corroborating evidence was the rock, yet there was no
proof that it was really the rock used to beat the girl, and
medical studies suggested that it was more likely that another
rock had been used.4 7 Given these and related doubts, and

the absence of other solid corroborating evidence, 408 the court
acquitted for failure to prove guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt.4 9 As in the other death penalty retrial cases, the prosecution waived its right to appeal. Akabori was released in

403. Judgment of May 29, 1986 (Akabori v. Japan), Chisai [District Court],
1193 HANJI 31 (Shizuoka).
404. Judgment of March 25, 1987 (Japan v. Akabori), Kdsai [High Court], 1227
HANJI 3 (Tokyo).
405. Judgment of Jan. 31, 1989 (Akabori v. Japan), Chisai [District Court],
1316 HANJI 21 (Shizuoka).
406. Id. at 33.
407. The autopsy findings and medical studies suggested that the rock used
was probably soft with jagged edges, rather than hard and flat, as was the rock
Akabori identified. Id at 38-41.
408. As corroborating evidence, the prosecution also pointed to eyewitness accounts of having seen Akabori or someone who resembled him walking away from
the temple grounds with the girl; however, the court rejected the identifications as
being too vague and noted that, even if accurate, the identifications would only
establish that Akabori had left with the girl, not that he had murdered her. I& at
49-51.
409. Id. at 50-51.
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early 1989, nearly thirty-one years after he was first sentenced
to death.
Common Features: These four cases share a number of
features. Although they occurred in four distinct regions of
Japan, each involved one or more rather gruesome murder in a
rural area. Pressures to apprehend the killer were undoubtedly
strong, yet in each case the police were initially unable to
identify a clear suspect. The suspects the authorities ended up
prosecuting were all young and quite poor. Three of the four
had previously committed minor offenses, and at least two
were of rather low intelligence. The prosecutions were. all
based primarily on confessions obtained after rather long and
intensive interrogations. Although the confessions described
the crimes in considerable detail, they contained no new details that the police and prosecutors had not already known.
Moreover, there was relatively little corroborating evidence in
any of the cases. Most of what did exist consisted of blood type
analyses, which later were shown to be of doubtful validity
(and in at least one case may have been based on fabricated
evidence). Accordingly, in each case it was possible that the
police may have picked up a suspect on a hunch (in some cases
legally, in others illegally), and then induced a confession that
fit the facts as they knew them at the time.
The subsequent proceedings in all four cases also show
great similarities. In each case, the convicted individual was
able to forestall execution in part by filing a series of retrial
requests. In two of the cases, Menda and Saitakawa, district
courts reviewing retrial requests undertook careful re-examinations of the cases and identified serious doubts about the
original convictions. In the former, the district court actually
ordered a new trial; in the latter, the court declined to do so
but outlined its doubts in requesting the High Court to review
the case carefully. In each of those cases, the High Court firmly rejected the retrial requests, finding that the new evidence
asserted was insufficient to justify a new trial under the existing standards.
With the Supreme Court's Shiratori and Saitakawa rulings, the situation changed dramatically. Apart from the
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Shizuoka district court's first post-Saitakawa ruling, all subsequent decisions in these four cases went in favor of the
death-sentenced prisoners. As in Saitakawa itself, the new
evidence presented was at times rather limited, and in each of
the cases the new evidence for the most part consisted of new
expert opinions relating to blood type analyses and/or autopsy
findings which were often based on new scientific techniques.
Given the Supreme Court's adoption of the "comprehensive
evaluation" standard,"' the reviewing courts were willing to
undertake a thorough re-examination of the evidence in each of
the cases. Apart from a careful review of the original trial
record, this included requestioning surviving witnesses and
considering new evidence from both sides. In addition, many of
the reviewing courts undertook examination of new matters on
their own initiative.
Given the passage of two or more decades from the original trials, many witnesses inevitably were no longer available
and certain key pieces of evidence had been disposed of or lost.
Although the reviewing courts occasionally referred to the
difficulty of getting at the truth so many years after the fact,
they were not critical of the prisoners in this regard. To a large
extent, this is understandable. The defendants had not, after
all, been sitting on their claims. Rather, the strict manner in
which the governing standards were interpreted had precluded
earlier relief. Yet none of the reviewing courts even directly
addressed such issues as whether the evidence presented to
support the retrial petition was truly "new" or simply a rehash
of claims raised earlier or whether the petitioners had been
negligent in not raising the claims at an earlier date. In sharp
contrast, in Matsuyama the retrial court was openly critical of
the prosecution's failure to preserve evidence (although suspicions of deliberate attempts to cover up exculpatory evidence
may account for the vehemence of that opinion)."'

410. See supra text accompanying note 347.
411. Judgment and Ruling of July 11, 1984 (Japan v. Saitd), Chisai [District
Court], 1127 HANJI 34, 57 (Sendai).
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Moreover, the courts considering the retrial requests in
these cases were willing to undertake their own thorough reevaluations of the evidence, rather than simply examining the
original trial courts' evaluations for obvious errors. This is
particularly true with regard to the issue of reliability of the
confessions. In all four cases, the reviewing courts highlighted
inconsistencies, gaps and unnatural aspects in the confessions
and emphasized that, despite their detailed nature, the confessions failed to disclose any secrets that only the true offender
could have known and that were subsequently corroborated by
concrete physical evidence. Ultimately, none of the confessions
was able to withstand this level of scrutiny-despite, at least
in Shimada, the existence of such circumstantial evidence as
eyewitness testimony to having seen Akabori or someone who
resembled him walking away from the festival with the young
victim.
In these cases, and in every other retrial case to date, the
ruling granting the retrial has been followed by acquittal of the
defendant in the subsequent retrial. This has led some defense
counsel to argue that the statutory retrial provisions should be
revised to eliminate prosecution appeals from decisions granting retrials or otherwise to conserve time and resources.'

412. See, e.g., Okabe, supra note 234, at 34-35 (limits on appeals by prosecution); Kitayama Rokur6, Saitakawa jiken, saishin bengo no genba kara [The
Saitakawa Case: From the Frontlines of Retrial Defense], JIYO TO SEIGI 34-9-21, 21
(1983) (limits on evidence); Manabe Tsutomu, Menda saishin hanketsu [Menda
Retrial Judgment], JIY TO SEIGI 34-9-12, 16 (1983) (limits on evidence).
In each of the death penalty retrial cases, much of the delay between the
original trial and the ultimate acquittal was consumed by the period preceding the
Supreme Court's relaxation of the applicable standards. Nonetheless, the current
system practically guarantees that a substantial period will elapse between the
first trial and retrial in any case. In addition to the possibility of two levels of
appeals by either side from the original judgment, each side may also pursue two
levels of appeal from rulings on retrial requests. A retrial will commence only
after these appeals have concluded. In addition, either side may take two levels of
appeal from the district court's judgment following the retrial. Since hearings are
often scheduled a month or more apart, it is not uncommon for proceedings at
each level of each of these stages to take two to three years or even more. Accordingly, even under normal circumstances well over a decade might easily pass
between the original conviction and the grant of a new trial, followed by a few
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The defense bar and- some academics, cognizant of the fact that
a Supreme Court ruling is inherently vulnerable to modification by a later decision, have also argued for codification of the
Shiratori standards.418 On the other hand, critics from the
side of the prosecution have argued that the relaxed standards
go too far and in the process have rendered the supposedly extraordinary remedy of a retrial into the equivalent of just another level of appeal.414 At least for the time being, however,
frontal attacks on the Shiratori/Saitakawastandards seem unlikely to succeed at either the legislative or judicial level.
This does not necessarily mean that the standards will
continue to be interpreted in quite such a generous manner.
Without ever intimating that they are modifying "the
Shiratori/Saitakawastandards, Japanese courts might subtly
revise them by treating the initial group of retrial cases that
followed Saitakawa as rare exceptions and requiring a higher
level of new evidence to win retrials in the future. In this con-

more years in the retrial proceedings and subsequent appeals. In each of the
death penalty retrial cases to date the prosecutors have appealed the ruling granting the retrial but have chosen not to appeal the acquittal on retrial.
413. See, e.g., Kenkyilkai, Keiji saishin no genja to ripp6 mondai [Study Group,
The Current Situation for Criminal Retrials and the Issue of Legislation], HORiTSJ
JIHO 51-11-8, at 18 (1979) (comment of Prof. Odanaka Toshiki); Okabe Yasuo,
Saishinh5 kaisei mondai no genj6 [The Current Status of the Issue of Amendment
of the Retrial Law], HORITSU JIRO 57-10-40 (1985); Okabe, supra note 374, at 61.
For a side-by-side comparison of existing law and separate sets of amendments
proposed by JFBA and the Socialist Party, see Kenkyizkai, supra, at 30-35, and for
another JFBA proposal, see ZOKU SAISHIN, supra note 243, at 429-38.
414. See, e.g., Yonezawa Keiji, Saishin-kensatsu no tachiba kara [Retrials-From the Standpoint of the Prosecution], in 2 KEWII TETSUZUKT, supra"note
281, at 1026; Usui Shigeo, Hij6 kyazsai tetsuzuki to tsajo sosh6 tetsuzuki to no
fuchowa [The Disharmony between Proceduresfor Extraordinary Relief and Normal
Litigation Procedures], in 2 KEIJIHO NOTO [NOTES ON CRIMAL LAW, VOL. 2] 173
(Usui Shigeo & Kawakami Kazuo eds., 1983). Somewhat ironically, Usui was
among the first to detail just how strictly the standards were applied in the years
prior to Shiratori. See supra note 243. While retrial proceedings were pending in
each of the four death penalty retrial cases, a former judge, Aoyagi Fumio, at a
hearing before the Legal Affairs Committee of the House of Representatives of the
Japanese Diet in June of 1979, expressed similar concerns about the possibility
that retrials might become just another level of appeals. See Takezawa Tetsuo,
Saishin-bengo no tachiba kara [Retrials-Fromthe Standpoint of the Defense], in
2 KEIJI TETSUZUIa, supra note 281, at 1036.
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nection, one judge recently noted that the Supreme Court's
Saitakawa ruling rested on very little new evidence and might
be viewed as "extraordinary (irei) in its reconsideration of the
factfinding of a prior final judgment solely on the basis of old
evidence, without considering new evidence." 45 If this interpretation of Saitakawa is correct, the judge concluded, that
ruling should be regarded as highly exceptional in nature.
Even if a subsequent reviewing court is convinced that an
earlier final conviction was wrong, he stated, it should not
substitute its judgment for that of the prior court by ordering a
new trial in the absence of new and clear evidence.416 If these
comments are reflections of a widespread skepticism of retrial
petitions shared by most other judges, the direct impact of
Shiratori and Saitakawa on retrial standards may prove to be
more limited than it would at first appear.
Even if Japanese courts are not as generous hereafter as
some were in the immediate wake of Shiratoriand Saitakawa,
it seems inconceivable that in the foreseeable future the applicable standards will ever become as strict as they were before
those decisions. Moreover, those decisions, and the miscarriages of justice that they helped bring to light, have had a broader
influence over attitudes toward criminal justice, reflected in
part by more careful scrutiny of contested cases the first time
around.417
IV. COMPARATIVE EVALUATION

As the preceding account reveals, the United States and
Japan have witnessed the same types of debates over capital
punishment and post-conviction review of death sentences.
With respect to the constitutionality of capital punishment, the
response has been much the same. Decisions in each nation
called into question the continued constitutionality of the death
penalty, in part based on notions of changing values; but the
415. Konishi, supra note 281, at 1017-18.
416. Konishi, supra note 281, at 1017-18.
417. See Foote, supra note 6, at 82-83, and sources cited therein.
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respective Supreme Courts subsequently reaffirmed capital
punishment's constitutionality as a valid legislative choice.418
Patterns of application of the death penalty tell a different
story, with death sentences having slowed dramatically in
Japan but currently on the rise in the United States.419
The differences between the two nations are even more
striking with respect to post-conviction review of death sentences. Over the past few years, the Rehnquist Court has
sharply tightened limits on habeas review 4 ' and has frequently voiced concern that death row inmates are abusing the
judicial process through repetitive, last-minute habeas petitions filed to stave off execution.
In contrast, the Japanese
Supreme Court has relaxed the standards petitioners must
satisfy to obtain post-conviction review and has scarcely
seemed troubled by the phenomenon of repetitive, piecemeal
petitions for review, sometimes filed decades after the original
conviction.4 2
These differences, I believe, reflect fundamental differences in the ideological underpinnings of the two criminal justice
systems and in attitudes toward the factfinding process and
punishment-topics to which I turn in the second half of this
section. Before doing so, I wish to consider the process of
change in the legal standards in the two nations.
A.

The Process of Legal Change

A common stereotype of the Japanese judiciary is that it is
conservative and passive. While the Supreme Court's treatment of capital punishment itself provides some support for
this image, the retrial issue reveals a far different side, one of
progressive activism. First, though, a brief re-examination of
the factual background is in order.

418.
419.
420.
421.
422.
423.

See supra text accompanying notes 32-34, 82-86.
See supra text accompanying notes 37-41, 92-95.
See supra text accompanying notes 130-226.
See, e.g., supra note 112 and accompanying text.
See supra text accompanying notes 340-417.
See, e.g., sources cited supra note 11.
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1. Factual Background
In the United States, state death penalty legislation has
gone through many changes over the past century, some in
response to judicial rulings-most notably the backlash to
Furman v. Georgia,4' but primarily as a result of political
pressures. Since the enactment of the Habeas Corpus Act of
1867, however, statutory provisions governing federal habeas
corpus review of state cases have remained quite stable. In
1948 and again in 1967 Congress enacted procedural amendments, but the underlying substantive standards have remained unchanged.
In Japan, the statutory standards governing both the
death penalty and petitions for retrials have been even more
stable. Postwar legislation eliminated the death penalty for
minors, but otherwise left the substance of the capital punishment provisions as it has been since their enactment in 1907.
And the statutory framework governing retrials in Japan has
remained virtually unchanged since its adoption in 1922.
Over the years, however, judicial interpretations of the
relevant provisions have gone through various phases in both
nations. In the United States, the issue of capital punishment
has produced some of the sharpest divisions on the Supreme
Court over the past quarter century. Individual Justices have
held strong and widely differing views on the constitutionality
of the death penalty. Hence, from Furman,425 through
Gregg426 and its companion cases, down to McCleskey v.
Kemp427 and subsequent decisions, changes in the membership of the Court have been accompanied by sharp shifts in
judgments on capital punishment issues. These developments
have led one observer to comment that "judicial disrespect for
[the value of stare decisis] has been especially pronounced [in

424.
425.
426.
427.

408 U.S. 238 (1972). See supra text accompanying notes 28-30.
408 U.S. 238 (1972).
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
111 S. Ct. 1454 (1991).
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this area]. Each phase of the Court's work apparently has been
viewed by the Justices not as an end to the battle, hardly even
as a formal truce, but more as a momentary pause in the pursuit of irreconcilable hostilities. ' 2S
Much the same can be said of the Court's habeas corpus
jurisprudence. With Brown v. Allen429 and Fay v. Noia,"'

the Vinson and Warren Courts greatly relaxed the standards
governing federal habeas review of state court convictions. The
Burger Court gradually tightened some of the relevant standards, and the Rehnquist Court has since followed with sharp
limitations spanning numerous aspects of habeas.4 '
On the judicial front in Japan, the constitutionality of
capital punishment has generated some controversy, but considerably less than in the United States. The Supreme Court's
unanimous en banc decision in 1948 upholding the death penalty4"2 seemed to resolve any doubts on that score. The Tokyo
High Court effectively reopened the question in Nagayama in
1981 ,4 3 but the Supreme Court promptly reversed.4 Although that decision clarified and somewhat tightened standards for application of the death penalty, the Japanese Supreme Court has remained consistent and united in upholding
the constitutionality of capital punishment.
The Japanese judiciary's treatment of the retrial standards
provides a marked contrast. For the first three decades after
World War II, the lower courts utilized very strict criteria in
reviewing retrial petitions. Although the Supreme Court never

428. Burt, supra note 21, at 1741-42.
429. 344 U.S. 443 (1953).
430. 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
431. See supra text accompanying notes 130-226; Joseph L. Hoffmann, Starting
from Scratch: Rethinking Federal Habeas Review of Death Penalty Cases, 20 FLA.
ST. U. L. REV. 133, 134-35 (1992). See generally Franklin E. Zimring, Inheriting
the Wind: The Supreme Court and Capital Punishment in the 1990s, 20 FLA. ST.
U. L. REV. 7 (1992).
432. Judgment of March 12, 1948 (Murakami v. Japan), Saik6sai [Supreme
Court], 2 KeishOi 191 (Grand Bench).
433. See supra text accompanying notes 66-73.
434. Judgment of July 8, 1983 (Japan v. N), Saik6sai [Supreme Court], 37
Keishai 609 (2d Petty Bench).
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explicitly upheld those criteria, it never questioned their use
435 followed the next year by
until 1975. Then, in Shiratori,
4
3
6
Saitakawa, the Court relaxed the standards, thereby greatly widening the door to post-conviction review.
2. Analysis
While cast in terms of the Court's traditional role in interpreting a "complex and evolving body of equitable principles,"43 7 the Rehnquist Court's decisions on habeas reflect judicial activism from the right just as surely as any decisions of
the Warren Court may have represented judicial activism from
the left. The vehemence that some Justices, most notably
Rehnquist himself, have displayed on the issue is striking.
Moreover, the speed of the change, and the manner in which it
was engineered in a handful of opinions at the same time that
Congress was seriously considering legislative efforts that
Rehnquist himself had actively supported and promoted, have
undoubtedly left some observers with mouths agape. Yet the
fact that the United States Supreme Court has played an active role comes as no great surprise. That, after all, is simply
part of a longstanding tradition for that Court.
In contrast, the widespread image of Japan's Supreme
Court is one of fundamental conservatism: resistance to dramatic change in any direction, with the Court's actions characterized by judicial restraint and great deference to precedent. 438 The Japanese Supreme Court has held statutory provisions unconstitutional in only five cases in its history of over
forty-five years.43 9 Moreover, for more than ten years the Supreme Court has convened the Grand Bench (en banc panel)-as it must if it is to consider unresolved constitutional
435. Judgment of May 20, 1975 (Murakami v. Japan), Saik6sai [Supreme
Court], 29 Keishfi 177, 180 (lst Petty Bench).
436. Judgment of Oct. 12, 1976 (Taniguchi v. Japan), Saik6sai [Supreme Court],
30 Keishia 1673, 1675-84 (1st Petty Bench).
437. McCleskey v. Zant, 111 S. Ct. 1454, 1467 (1991).
438. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 11.
439. See, e.g., Okudaira, supra note 11, at 37.
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issues or overturn prior precedent-for an average of only one
or two cases each year."'
A former Justice once told me that the reason the Court
now hears so few cases en banc, in contrast to an average of

about twenty Grand Bench cases each year through the mid-

1960s,M ' is that most of the major questions relating to the
Constitution and other basic laws have already been resolved.42 The judiciary's treatment of the constitutionality of
capital punishment provides support for that statement, while
at the same time reflecting greater dynamism and complexity
in the judicial review process than the stereotype assumes.
True, the Supreme Court affirmed the death penalty's constitutionality in 1948 and has neither overturned that decision nor

even convened the Grand Bench to reconsider it since. Yet this
440. See Naya Hiromi, Saihesai daihtei [The Supreme Court's Grand Bench],
149 HOGAKU KYOSHITSU 6, 7 (1993) (between 1979 and 1991, four years in which
the Grand Bench heard no cases, five years in which it heard one, and two years
in which it heard two; figures show 32 cases in 1983 and 46 in 1985, but all
except one of those cases involved the same constitutional issue: disparities in the
weight of votes, with challenges from numerous electoral districts handled together).
441. See id. (figures through 1953 are not available; very high figures for 1954
(90 cases) and 1955 (236 cases) aie distorted by large numbers of cases relating to
violations of Occupation-era statutes; between 1956 and 1965, Grand Bench heard
between low of eight and high of 26 cases, averaging 19.7 cases per year during
that decade).
442. Interview with Nakamura Jir6, former Justice, in Tokyo, Japan (June 19,
1984). See also Naya, supra note 440, at 7 ("[Bly about 1965, the Supreme Court
had largely completed reviewing constitutional issues' surrounding the postwar
establishment, revision and abolition of laws ... . Since then, the Petty Benches
have been able to apply [the laws] in a businesslike fashion itsumuteki ni], within the bounds established by the Grand Bench's earlier constitutional decisions.").
To some extent this state of affairs may also reflect the fact that the conservative Liberal Democratic Party and its conservative predecessor were in power
from 1948 through 1993 and had ultimate say over all appointments to the Supreme Court except for the very first group of Justices. In practice, the Prime
Minister typically chooses a new Justice following discussion with the Chief Justice. See generally Itoh, supra note 11, at 24; SAIKOSAIBANSHO, supra note 282, at
122-23; Nomura Jir6, Hanji k6sei saikento no toki [A Time to Reassess the Makeup
of the Justices], ASAHI SHINBUN, Oct. 27, 1985, at 1. It remains to be seen how
differently appointments may be made now that a non-LDP coalition has come
into power or how such appointments may affect the Court's attitude toward precedent.
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does not mean that the judiciary has never revisited the issue.
Many lower court judges undoubtedly engaged in a re-examination of the constitutionality of capital punishment during the
judiciary's self-imposed moratorium on issuing death sentences
during the period between the Tokyo High Court's decision in
Nagayama and the Supreme Court's reversal. And even though
the Grand Bench of the Supreme Court did not convene to
consider Nagayama, the informal polling of the Justices on the
other Petty Benches that the Second Petty Bench undertook
before issuing its decision in that case' ensured that the entire Court reconsidered the issue at that time. Moreover, the
High Court's decision ultimately led to clarification and some
tightening of the standards for imposing the death penalty.'
Judicial treatment of the retrial standards contrasts even
more sharply with the stereotype of a conservative, passive
Supreme Court. As discussed earlier, 445 prosecutors and judges were among the first to focus attention on the strictness of
the limits on retrials. During the 1960s and early 1970s the
Diet held hearings on the topic and groups advocating the
innocence of various petitioners coalesced into a national movement demanding relaxation of the standards. Yet change in the
standards did not come about through action by the prosecutors, the bureaucracy, or the Diet. Instead, the judiciary played
the key role. Moreover, the judicial change came about not
from the bottom up, through the accretion of progressive lower
court rulings," 6 but rather from the top down, through two

443. See supra text accompanying note 81.
444. See supra text accompanying note 87.
445. See supra text accompanying notes 330-32.

446. For an argument that this is the more common pattern of legal change at
the judicial level in Japan, with the courts becoming steadily more conservative as

one moves from the district court level to the High Courts, and then to the Supreme Court, see USHIOlM TOSHITAKA, SHIHO NO HOSHAKAIGAKU ITHE SOCIOLOGY

OF LAW OF THE JUSTICE SYSTEM] 58-60 (1982). But see Hiroshi Ith, Judicial Review and Judicial Activism in Japan, 53 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 169, 170-74
(1990) (describing several celebrated instances in which progressive lower court
rulings have been reversed on appeal, but also noting that the Supreme Court has

been more activist than lower courts in some instances; ultimately finding "no
empirical verification" for the contention that a conservative Supreme Court has
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rather sweeping decisions by the Supreme Court. In keeping
with Japanese practice, these decisions were not signed; however, other evidence leaves little doubt that they resulted from
the efforts of two individual Justices who had long harbored
concerns over the strictness of the existing standards.
In these latter respects, the process of change in the retrial standards bears a striking resemblance to the process by
which the federal habeas standards have been modified in the
United States. The retrial situation provides a clear example
that, just as in the United States, there are instances in Japan
in which individual Justices come to the Supreme Court with a
firm desire to"modify particular legal standards and are able to
effectuate those changes during their years on the Court.
The greater judicial activism with regard to retrial standards than capital punishment undoubtedly derived from a
number of factors apart simply from the personal views of Justices Kishi and Dand6"--and I discuss some of the other.factors below. But the issue of capital punishment differs from
the retrial standards in one obvious yet important respect: the
former involves the Constitution of Japan, whereas the latter
is purely a matter of statutory interpretation." 8 Unlike the
United States Supreme Court, which, as reflected by the capital punishment debate, frequently questions the constitutionality of state and federal statutes, the Japanese Supreme
Court has been very reluctant to declare statutes unconstitutional."'9 Yet the Japanese judiciary has on numerous occasions proven much more willing to develop important new
standards at the statutory level."5 0 The retrial standards pro-

constrained reform-minded lower courts).
447. See supra text accompanying notes 291-92, 341-42.

448.
matter
449.
450.

Moreover, the latter relates to a statute regulating the courts' workload, a
that would seem to be squarely within the Supreme Court's own expertise.
See, e.g., sources cited supra note 11.
See, e.g., Okudaira, supra note 11, at 38-41; FRANK UPRAM, LAW AND

SOCIAL CHANGE IN POSTWAR JAPAN 28-77, 124-65 (1987) (describing judiciary's role

in developing new standards in the environmental law and equal employment
opportunity contexts).
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vide one more example of progressive change through statutory
interpretation.
Finally, the role of foreign opinion in this history also
warrants mention. In recent years, there has been much talk
in Japan of gaiatsu---"foreign pressure."45 ' For virtually every
issue on which foreigners have expressed opinions about the
desirability of change in Japan-and even for issues on which
most foreigners have expressly declined to take a position-the
topic of gaiatsu arises. To Japanese supporters of the change in
question, the existence of gaiatsu serves as confirmation of the
need for change: either so that Japan will "rise" to the level of
other nations or in order to satisfy foreign demands or expectations. To Japanese opponents of the change, in contrast, the
gaiatsu represents inappropriate meddling by foreigners in
Japanese affairs and provides all the more reason to resist the
sought-after change.45 2
If the retrial debate occurred today, the involvement of
Professor Peters undoubtedly would be characterized, as
gaiatsu. Yet as that episode reflects, there are really several
different patterns to so-called gaiatsu. In some cases, foreign
parties truly do press for change of a sort that very few Japanese have focused on or would support. (While some might
disagree, I would put calls for elimination of keiretsu-business
groupings-into this category.4 5 ) In other cases, concerns
that may have been identified independently by foreign parties
in fact are virtually identical to concerns already widely shared

451. In a sense, this is nothing new. For most of the nearly century and a half

since the arrival of Admiral Perry's "black ships," Japan has been sensitive to
foreign views and criticism. Yet, in my view, based on close personal observation
of Japan over the past twenty years, the tendency to characterize virtually all
foreign comment as gaiatsu is a recent phenomenon.
452. For a recent example, see David E. Sanger, U.N. Chiefs Advice Stirring
Japanese Criticism, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 7, 1993, at A17 (describing reaction in Japan
to U.N. Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali's suggestion that Japan should
amend its Constitution to eliminate any question over the constitutionality of
Japan's participation in U.N. peacekeeping operations).
453. See, e.g., U.S.-JAPAN WORKING GROUP,ON THE STRUCTURAL IMPEDIMENTS
INITIATIVE, JOINT REPORT, at V-1 to V-4 (1990) (report by the Japanese delegation
responding to concerns raised regarding keiretsu relationships).
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by groups within Japan. (In this category I would include numerous consumer rights issues.4 ") In still others, however,
the "foreign pressure" never really originated abroad at all.
Rather, groups seeking change within Japan have themselves
actively promoted their causes outside Japan in an attempt to
generate international sentiment, and then have sought to use
that international opinion to strengthen their own calls for reform.455 Professor Peters' involvement plainly falls into this
last category.
In marked contrast, foreign opinion typically plays far less
of a role in the process of legal change in the United States.
Amnesty International's attempts to influence attitudes toward
the death penalty by reference to international trends456 have
largely fallen on deaf ears in the United States. Moreover, it is
454. See, e.g., id., at III-1 to IH-16 (report by the Japanese delegation responding to concerns raised regarding the distribution system).
455. In the criminal justice field, examples include access to counsel and the
issue of "substitute confinement" of suspects in police holding cells where they are
readily available for questioning. See, e.g., Kazuo Itoh, On Publication of the
"Citizens' Human Rights Reports," 20 LAW IN JAPAN 29, 54-63 (1988) (describing
report to the U.N. Human Rights Committee decrying use of "substitute prisons,"
which was part of an effort to focus foreign attention on the issue); Lawrence
Repeta, The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and Human
Rights Law in Japan, 20 LAW IN JAPAN 1, 2-3 (1988) ("Always aware of the great
power of the national media . . . and . . . of the media's hypersensitivity toward
criticism from abroad . . . citizens activist groups and activist attorneys looked to
the International Covenant as a deus ex machina with the potential to rescue
them . . . through heavy media campaigns including resort to international -opinion."). In the labor field, karashi-death from overwork-provides another example;
those advocating greater recognition of kardshi have actively sought to focus foreign attention on the issue. See, e.g., NATIONAL DEFENSE COUNSEL FOR VICTIMS OF
KAROSHI, KAROSHI: WHEN THE "CORPORATE WARRIOR" DIES (1990).
456. See, e.g., John G. Healey, Keeper of the Flame, in AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, A PUNISHMENT IN SEARCH OF A CRIME: AMERICANS SPEAK OUT AGAINST THE
DEATH PENALTY 371, 373 (1989) ("South Africa and the United States are the only
'Western' nations that continue to kill their own people.").
This attitude of placing little importance on international views and trends
may be seen even among the five Justices who voted against the death penalty in
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972). Although the petitioners in that' case
emphasized the worldwide trend toward abolition, see id. at 434 (Powell, J., dissenting), in the five opinions authored by the five Justices who voted against the
death penalty, that trend garnered only a brief mention by Justice Marshall at the
very end of his opinion, id. at 371 (Marshall, J., concurring).
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hardly conceivable that the current United States Supreme
Court would regard foreign opinion or foreign experiences as
relevant factors in determining the proper scope of federal
habeas, notwithstanding Chief Justice Rehnquist's confident
reference to comparative experience in asserting that, "This
system is unique to the United States; no such collateral attack is allowed on a criminal conviction in England, for example, where the writ of habeas corpus originated."4 57
B. The Standards Governing CollateralReview of Death Sentences
Turning to a comparative examination of developments in'
the United States and Japan, substantive differences in the
chief mechanisms for post-conviction review and prevailing
interpretations of the relevant standards reflect deepseated
differences between the two nations. Part of the explanation
for the contrasting approaches lies in structural differences
relating to federalism and to the judicial system itself. Yet
fundamental differences in attitudes toward the factfinding
process and punishment play important roles as well. Japan's
reliance on a "new evidence" provision as the primary tool for
post-conviction review appears to reflect a greater faith than
exists in the United States that the judiciary truly can determine the "actual facts." And Japan's willingness to reopen
criminal cases years and even decades after the original conviction, as well as the current decline in the use of capital
punishment, are not simply luxuries that Japan can afford as a
nation with low and stable crime rates.458 Rather, they rest

457. Rehnquist, supra note 124. It is unclear whether Rehnquist meant that
the U.S. system is unique in the fact that it permits review of state proceedings
by federal courts, or whether he also meant that it is unique in sanctioning long
delays through post-conviction collateral proceedings. If he had the latter in mind,
,he clearly did not take the Japanese experience into account. In any event, there
seems little doubt that his statement was a rhetorical flourish, rather than a, serious proposal to look to England or any other nation for guidance on the scope of
modem-day habeas.
458. See, e.g., RESEARCH AND TRAINING INST., MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, GOV'T OF
JAPAN, SUMMARY OF THE WHITE PAPER ON CRIME 1989, 3-11 (1989) [hereinafter
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in part on Japan's characteristic approach to punishment-one
based on rehabilitation and specific prevention, rather than
general deterrence. Before examining these themes in more
detail, however, a preliminary matter must be considered: Are
habeas corpus and the retrial system really comparable?
1.

Comparability

On the surface, of course, habeas corpus and the retrial
system appear similar. Both provide means for post-conviction
collateral review of sentences. Similarly, the two systems respectively represent key means by which many death-sentenced prisoners in the United States and Japan have challenged their convictions and thereby delayed their executions.
Yet the two systems serve quite different functions in
theory. The retrial provision used in the vast majority of cases
in Japan-article 435, item 6, which provides for review based
on "new evidence"--goes squarely to the accuracy of the conviction and sentence. Other retrial provisions, and Japan's
Habeas Corpus Act itself, provide mechanisms for challenges
based on certain types of investigative and procedural abuses.45" But item 6 is above all a tool for attacking determinations of fact, based on the discovery of new evidence undermining the earlier findings.
In contrast, the United States Habeas Corpus Act of 1867
is not concerned primarily with the weight of the evidence. The
express purpose of federal habeas corpus review of state cases,
as set forth in the terms of the statute, is to remedy violations

WHTE -PAPER ON CRIME].

459. See supra notes 239-40, 255-56 and accompanying text. Despite the Habeas Corpus Act's broad reference to violations of "due process," as interpreted there
is no provision authorizing challenges for constitutional violations in general. The
various retrial provisions other than item 6 are specifically limited to narrow and
extreme types of violations, such as falsification of evidence. Given the Japanese
Supreme Court's narrow interpretation of constitutional and statutory rights that
might warrant relief from conviction, see, e.g., Daniel H. Foote, The Benevolent
Paternalism of Japanese Criminal Justice, 80 CAL. L. REV. 317, 332-39 (1992)
[hereinafter Foote, Paternalism], the absence of such a provision may not'have
great practical significance, in any event.
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of the federal Constitution and laws. In 1963's Townsend v.
Sain,46 Chief Justice Warren observed: "Where newly discovered evidence is alleged in a habeas application,.., such evidence must bear upon the constitutionality of the applicant's
detention; the existence merely of newly discovered evidence
relevant to the guilt of a state prisoner is not a ground for
relief on federal habeas corpus."4 ' Earlier this year, in

Herrera v. Collins,462 Chief Justice Rehnquist reaffirmed that
view, firmly stating that federal habeas is not simply a substitute for a "new evidence" standard.c
Despite these differences in the fundamental purposes of
the two schemes, decisions in recent years have heightened
similarities between the two systems, and at one time even
seemed to place them on a convergent course. No Japanese
court has yet granted an item 6 retrial based on a finding of a
constitutional or legal violation; nor, where retrials have been
granted, has any court conducting the actual retrial acquitted
a defendant on the basis of such a violation.4 At an implicit
level, however, the Japanese courts considering retrial petitions appear to be affected by evidence of constitutional and
legal violations. In granting retrials, some courts-including
those in Menda and Matsuyama-have referred to illegal or
improper activities by the investigative authorities with evident disapproval, and the decisions following the retrials in
those cases have been even more explicit in their condemna-

460. 372 U.S. 293 (1963).
461. Id. at 317.
462. 113 S.Ct. 853 (1993).
463. Id. at 859 ("Claims of actual innocence based on newly discovered evidence
have never been held to state a ground for federal habeas relief absent an independent constitutional violation occurring in the underlying state criminal proceeding.").
464. As the most striking example of this sort, no retrial court has excluded a
confession on voluntariness grounds, which would rest on a finding of a violation
of either the Constitution or the Criminal Procedure Code. Rather, the courts
invariably have rejected confessions on the alternative ground of reliability, which
focuses squarely on an evaluation of the weight of the evidence. For a discussion
of this issue, see Daniel H. Foote, Confessions and the Right to Silence in Japan,
21 GA. J. INTL & COMP. L. 415 (1991) [hereinafter Foote, Confessions].
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tion of those activities. 465 Thus, while the liberalized interpretation of the item 6 "new evidence" standards has fallen far
short of creating a generalized right in Japan to review of
constitutional or legal violations that may have occurred in
connection with the original conviction, some retrial courts
have highlighted concerns over such violations in the process of
granting relief.
Until recently, apparent signs of convergence were even
more pronounced on the United States side. There is still a
right to raise most "dispositive" federal constitutional claims in
the first round of federal habeas, assuming the petition is not
otherwise barred on procedural grounds.466 Yet in rulings
over the past few years, the United States Supreme Court has
effectively restricted virtually all subsequent habeas petitions
to "fundamental miscarriages of justice." Given the strictness
with which the Court has construed the duty to raise all foreseeable claims in one's first habeas petition, only a truly new
and unforeseeable development might justify a second or successive petition. In theory, such new developments might be of
either a legal or factual nature. Yet the Court's restrictive
holdings on retroactivity have virtually precluded habeas petitioners from relying on new legal rules. That would appear to
have left new factual evidence as the only remaining viable
ground for a second or successive federal habeas petition, just
as in the Japanese retrial system.
This focus appeared to be matched by a fundamental
change in the thinking of the United States Supreme Court.
The Warren Court regarded federal habeas corpus review of
state convictions as a key mechanism for vindicating the constitutional rights of the innocent and guilty alike. In contrast,
despite rhetorical deference to the role of habeas in deterring
constitutional errors by state courts,467 the Rehnquist Court
seemed to regard habeas-at least in the second and successive

465. See supra text accompanying note 381 and note 397 and accompanying
text.
466. See supra text accompanying notes 129-37.
467. See supra text accompanying note 141.
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petition context-as an extraordinary device to provide the
wrongfully convicted innocent with a remedy for mistaken
convictions. Again, the Court's approach seemed to parallel the
philosophy of Japan's system.
Early in 1993, however, Herrera v. Collins4 ' dashed any
notions of convergence. That decision flatly held that federal
habeas is not a remedy for mistaken factfinding, but rather for
violations of rights under federal law and the Constitution.
Every petitioner must establish such a violation. In the second
and successive petition context, the Rehnquist Court has superimposed upon that duty the additional requirement that the
petition also establish her factual innocence.4 9 This is not an
either/or proposition; the successful petitioner must show both,
except perhaps in extreme and very rare circumstances. 47" As
Rehnquist stated in Herrera, "[A] claim of 'actual innocence' is
not itself a constitutional claim, but instead a gateway through
which a habeas petitioner must pass to have his otherwise
barred constitutional claim considered on the merits." 471
While not technically inconsistent with prior holdings of the
Rehnquist Court, Herrera differs sharply from the "actual
innocence" rhetoric in the cases that preceded it. 472 As Justice

Blackmun observed in his Herreradissent: "[H]aving held that
a prisoner who is incarcerated in violation of the Constitution
must show he is actually innocent to obtain relief, the majority... now hold[s] that a prisoner who is actually innocent
must show a constitutional violation to obtain relief."473 In
468. 113 S. Ct. 853 (1993).

469. See id. at 861. Whether even that will be sufficient remains to be seen.
Although Herrera elaborated on prior precedent in explaining the requirements of
the "fundamental miscarriage of justice exception," id. at 862, the Court did not
actually apply that exception and might well impose additional restrictions if it is
ever faced with a case posing the exception squarely.
470. See id. at 869 (assuming "for the sake of argument" that "in a capital
case a truly persuasive demonstration of 'actual innocence'.. . [might] warrant
federal habeas relief if there were no state avenue open to process such a claim,"
but stating that "the threshold showing for such an assumed right would necessarily be extraordinarily high").
471. Id. at 861.
472. See supra text accompanying notes 146-48, 157-58, 164.
473. 113 S. Ct. at 881 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Blackmun added, "The only
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this key respect, therefore, the Rehnquist Court's vision of
federal habeas differs sharply from both that of the Warren
Court, where it was usually sufficient to establish a violation
of federal law or the Constitution, and Japan's retrial system,
where new evidence of innocence is all that matters.4
principle that would appear to reconcile these two positions is the principle that
habeas relief should be denied whenever possible." Id.
474. The standards adopted by the Rehnquist Court are narrower than those
applied in Japan in several other respects as well. The courts of both nations
agree that a petitioner may not rely on evidence that she deliberately failed to
disclose at trial; in fact, even the Warren Court agreed on this point. See supra
text accompanying note 170. Under the "inexcusable neglect" standard, however,
the Rehnquist Court, unlike the Japanese courts, would not treat evidence as
"new" if petitioner or her counsel could have discovered it through greater diligence at an earlier stage. Nor, except perhaps in extreme circumstances, would
the United States Supreme Court allow a petitioner to assert a new claim or
reassert an earlier claim following the discovery of new evidence that simply provided further support for evidence that was available earlier. As the Court emphasized in McCleskey v. Zant, "If what [a] petitioner knows or could discover upon
reasonable investigation supports a claim for relief in a federal habeas petition,
what he does not know is irrelevant. Omission of the claim will not be excused
merely because evidence discovered later might also have supported or strengthened the claim." 111 S. Ct. 1454, 1472 (1991). In contrast, the Japanese courts,
through their "comprehensive evaluation" approach, have permitted petitioners to
cumulate evidence relating to the same claim over the span of two or even several
iietitions. As the Japanese Supreme Court's own ruling in Saitakawa made clear,
even very limited new evidence, when coupled with evidence adduced at trial and
in subsequent appeals and petitions, may be sufficient to tip the scale and convince the reviewing court that there is now a likelihood of acquittal. See supra
notes 359-60 and accompanying text.
The role prescribed for reviewing courts is also far narrower under the new
habeas than it is in Japan. Without expressly overruling the Warren Court's conclusion in Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 18 (1963), that decisions on the
disposition of successive writs "are addressed to the sound discretion of the federal
trial judges," the Rehnquist Court sharply limits that discretion by defining virtually any largesse by a reviewing court as an abuse of its discretion, see, e.g.,
McCleskey v. Zant, 111 S. Ct. at 1462-71, discussed in The Supreme Court, 1990
Term, supra note 109, at 324. Given this restrictive approach, the Rehnquist Court
would undoubtedly be aghast at the thought that a district court might on its own
initiative undertake investigations into issues never even raised by the petitioner,
as the Takamatsu District Court did in Saitakawa, see supra note 351; Foote,
supra note 6, at 35-36. If a petitioner sought to rely on expert opinions about a
blood type analysis undertaken decades earlier, even though the piece of evidence
in question had long since been lost, as was the case in Menda, see supra text
accompanying note 380; Foote, supra note 6, at 29, the Rehnquist Court surely
would look askance, given its comments on the "prejudice [to] the government,"
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Thus, while the rhetoric of "actual innocence" employed by
the Rehnquist Court and the frequent references in the major
Japanese retrial cases to illegal or improper acts by the police
and prosecutors suggest close comparability between federal
habeas and Japanese retrials, in the final analysis, that rhetoric masks fundamental differences between the systems. Federal habeas, even after the restrictive interpretations of recent
years, currently still provides one level of federal review for

most kinds of alleged constitutional violations-and, following
Herrera,virtually no opportunity for relief once the first petition has been disposed of. Item 6 retrials in Japan, in contrast,

do not focus on constitutional violations at all, but instead
provide a mechanism for factual review of convictions based on
new evidence, whenever it is discovered.

McCleskey v. Zant, 111 S. Ct. at 1468, of re-litigation so long after the original
trial and the "enormous burden [of] having to retry cases based on ... stale evidence." Herrera v. Collins, 113 S. Ct. 838, 869 (1993). And the Rehnquist Court
would likely regard the thorough reweighing of evidence that Japanese courts have
undertaken in reviewing at least some of the retrial petitions as improper secondguessing of the original factfinder.
A final aspect in which the "fundamental miscarriage of justice' exception
in the new habeas is far stricter than Japanese retrials relates to the degree of
proof required to obtain relief. Under Shiratori and Saitakawa, in Japan a retrial
petitioner need not establish actual innocence, but only the probable existence of a
reasonable doubt of guilt. In the United States, under Sawyer v. Whitley, 112 S.
Ct. 2514 (1992), "to show 'actual innocence' [for purposes of the 'fundamental miscarriage of justice' exception, a petitioner] must show by clear and convincing
evidence that but for a constitutional error, no reasonablejuror would have found
the petitioner eligible for the death penalty under the applicable state law." Id. at
2517. As discussed earlier, see supra text accompanying note 209, it is unclear
whether a petitioner alleging new evidence going solely to the question of guilt or
innocence would be entitled to any relief at all under Herrera, no matter how
compelling the new evidence. If such an exception ever exists, though, the HIrrera
majority clearly contemplates that the "extraordinarily high" degree of proof necessary to justify federal relief would exceed that required by Sawyer. See Herrera,
113 S. Ct. at 869. In fact, even the dissenters in Herrera conceded that such a
petitioner should have to establish "not just that there was probably a reasonable
doubt about his guilt but that he is probably actually innocent." Id. at 878
(Blackmun, J., dissenting). This is the standard that most courts followed in Japan
prior to Shiratori.
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2. Factors Underlying the Differences in the Basic Approach
to Post-Conviction Review
Given these fundamental differences in approach, direct
comparison of the specifics of the two schemes would be difficult and would not be particularly instructive. Yet this does
not mean that attempts at comparison on a broader level are
pointless. To the contrary, the sharply contrasting manner in
which the two nations approach post-conviction review point
the way toward basic differences in numerous aspects of the
criminal justice systems.
In comparing the two nations' experiences, one confronts
two major elements: the differences in the basic statutory
framework for post-conviction review, and the sharply contrasting trends in interpretation of the respective standards over
the past two decades. This section examines the first of these
topics; the next section considers reasons for the changing
trends.
A partial explanation for the difference in approaches may
lie in the historical influence in Japan of the German criminal
justice system, with its reliance on the "new evidence" standard.475 Yet in 1948 the Occupation introduced into Japan a
Habeas Corpus Act expressly based on United States principles.4 76 It has languished, while the new evidence approach
has dominated. By the same token, habeas corpus is not. the
only post-conviction remedy in the United States. State and
federal statutes and rules permit motions for new trials based
on various grounds, including new evidence.47 7 Yet this approach traditionally has been regarded with great skepticism
in the United States;47 8 as the Court observed in Herrera,
seventeen states still limit new trial motions based on new evi-

475. See supra text accompanying notes 252-53.
476. See supra text accompanying note 239.
477. See generally DONALD
E. WILKES, JR.,
FEDERAL
POSTCONVICTION REMEDIES AND RELIEF 7-9, 17-20 (1992 ed.).
478. See id. at 18-20.
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dence to no more than the first sixty days after a conviction,
and only fifteen states permit such a motion after more than
three years have passed.4 79 Thus, despite the existence of alternatives in each nation, the neWv evidence standard represents the approach of choice in Japan, whereas habeas-despite the recent cutbacks-remains the key avenue for
post-conviction review in the United States.
Structural factors may account for part of this difference.
Numerous aspects of the trial process in Japan facilitate postconviction evidentiary review there, whereas the United States
trial process militates against such review. Moreover, the federal structure of the United States has had an important influence over federal courts' willingness to undertake searching
review of state cases, whereas no such constraint operates in
Japan.
In addition, the contrasting approaches reflect certain
basic attitudinal differences between Japan and the United
States, among them: the level of respect for (or distrust of). authority; the degree of faith (or lack thereof) in the possibility of
true factfinding accuracy; and views regarding the proper role
of the punishment process. These factors help explain the difference in the basic approaches to post-conviction review in the
two nations. And, as I will explore in the next section, differences in the degree to which the Supreme Courts of the two
nations have evaluated the various factors help explain the
recent shifts in interpretations of the relevant standards.

479. Herrera v. Collins, 113 S. Ct. 838, 865 (1993) (cataloguing state standards).
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a. Trial Process
The trial process in the United States is premised on
factfinding by a jury.' Trials are conducted mainly through
in-court testimony by live witnesses, with one of the jury's
important functions being to evaluate the credibility of those
witnesses. At the conclusion of the trial, which is ordinarily
conducted in a continuous proceeding, the jury deliberates and
then announces its verdict, typically without elaborating on the
grounds for its decision. Appeal of the decision is normally
limited to issues of law. With the exception of clear error, the
jury has the final say on questions of fact.
Based on a continental model, the Japanese trial process is
very different."' There is no jury; depending on the gravity of
the case, either a single judge or a panel of judges will decide.
Minor matters are normally concluded in one court session, but
in other cases weeks-and on occasion even months-may pass
between court sessions, with the entire trial sometimes lasting
several years. Given a career judiciary in which judges are
reassigned approximately every three to five years, the composition of the panel hearing a case may even shift during the
proceedings. Although defendants have the right to demand
the presentation of live witnesses, the vast majority of testimony is introduced in documentary form, in the form of written
statements prepared by the prosecutors and attested to by. the
witness. At the conclusion-of the trial, the court considers the
record and then drafts an opinion setting forth its verdict,
findings of fact and conclusions of law. Particularly in major or

480. Even where the case is tried by a judge sitting without a jury, the basic
procedures are governed by structures established with the jury in mind.
481. For an excellent discussion of the role of the courts in criminal cases in
Japan, see Atsushi Nagashima, The Accused and Society: The Administration of
Criminal Justice in Japan, in LAW IN JAPAN: THE LEGAL ORDER IN A CHANGING
SOCIETY 297, 313-21 (Arthur T. von Mehren ed., 1963). Despite the passage of
thirty years, the debate in Japan over most of the issues discussed by Nagashima,
who later became a Justice of the Supreme Court, remains virtually unchanged.
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contested cases, the decision will often go into considerable
factual detail. In the first level of appeals, the defendant may
challenge both the legal and factual findings of the original
trial court, and the appeals court may, and on occasion must,
hear additional evidence." 2 That court's decision may also go
into great factual detail. Subsequent appeal by right to the
Supreme Court is limited to issues of constitutional error, violations of precedent and the like,4 8 but the Supreme Court
may also choose to review other matters.4 When the Supreme Court does review a case, one of the grounds under
which it may set aside a lower court judgment is "grave error
in factfinding." Based on this authority, on occasion the Supreme Court itself undertakes a thorough review (f the factual
record.4" 6
These differences help explain the differing approaches to
post-conviction review. Given respect for the jury as ultimate
factfinder, coupled with the importance placed on directly evaluating the credibility of witnesses, there is great reluctance to
reassess issues of fact in the United States. Moreover, when
the factfinder has issued a general verdict without further
elaborating on its reasoning or findings, it is impossible to
know exactly what facts it found. Accordingly, the United
States system is premised on a single round of factfinding with
limited opportunity for subsequent review of the facts, unless
the verdict is clearly contrary to the weight of the evidence.

482. KEISoHO arts. 382-2, 393(1) (court may examine whatever facts it deems
necessary to investigate matters raised in the appeal, and must examine evidence
if it is essential for determining errors in factflnding or in sentencing and if it
could not have been presented prior to the close of trial in the first instance).
483. KEISOHO art. 405.
484. Id. art. 406 (in addition to cases of types specified in art. 405, the Court
may review cases deemed to involve important matters of statutory interpretation).
485. Id. art. 411(1)(iii).
486. This was the case, for example, in its review of Saitakawa. See supra text
accompanying notes 351-61. For a summary of three recent cases in which the
Supreme Court has undertaken careful review of the entire factual record on direct appeal, see Kadono Hiroshi, Jijitsu nintei-saiban no tachiba kara
[Factfinding-From the Standpoint of the Judiciary], in 2 KEWII TETSUZUKI, supra
note 281, at 773-78.
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This approach is reflected in the "substantive standards for
habeas.
In contrast, under the Japanese trial system-with its
heavy use of documentary evidence, its reliance on judges as
factfinders, its use of verdicts containing specific factual findings, and its repeated opportunities for factual review during
the direct appeals process-post-conviction review of the facts
does not face many of the obstacles found in the United States.
To the contrary, post-conviction review based on new evidence
fits quite cleanly into the overall pattern of Japan's trial system. In view of these structural differences, it should not be
surprising that Japanese courts are more willing to review evidentiary issues raised in retrial petitions than their United
States counterparts in habeas.
b. Federalism
The federal system in the United States constitutes another basic structural difference between the two nations that
may help to explain the difference in approaches to post-conviction review. In Japan, the court that reviews the retrial
petition is typically the same court that entered the original
conviction. Given Japan's system of rotating judges among
various postings throughout their careers, it is unlikely that
the same judges will hear the case; however, the court is likely
to be the same. In contrast, in federal habeas, members of one
judicial system-the federal-sit in after-the-fact judgment on
decisions made by members of a coordinate but separate judicial system-the state's. Even if one accepts the argument that
federal courts are more appropriate bodies than state courts to
decide issues relating to the United States Constitution and
federal laws, and thus are entitled to substitute their views on
those issues for good-faith decisions by state courts, the suggestion that federal courts may second-guess the factfinding of
state courts runs counter to notions of federal/state comity and
respect for state court decisionmaking.
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c. Attitudes Toward Authority
A basic difference underlying the contrasting approaches
to post-conviction review may be found in societal attitudes
toward authority. Concern for the potential for abuse of authority lies at the root of numerous aspects of the Anglo-American criminal justice system, including habeas corpus.' Historically, the Great Writ of Habeas Corpus in England represented a classic example of protection of the individual against
the arbitrary or unlawful exercise of central authority;4" and
the federal Habeas Corpus Act sought to extend that protection
to victims of the exercise of authority by the states in violation
of federal law.489 Thus, distrust of authority is one of the animating premises of the United States approach to post-conviction review.490
A high degree of deference to authority in Japan provides
one reason for the limited impact of the Habeas Corpus Act49'
and the statutory retrial grounds focusing on procedural improprieties or the abuse of authority,492 as opposed to -the
"new evidence" standard contained in item 6 of article 435 of
the Criminal Procedure Code.4 ' Arguably, deference to au-

487. For an excellent exposition of this theme, comparing Anglo-American and
Continental criminal procedure, see Miijan DamaAka, Structures of Authority and
Comparative Criminal Procedure, 84 YALE L.J. 480 (1975).
488. See, e.g., WILKES, supra note 477, at 41-45.
489. See Wechsler, supra note 96, at 168-71.
490. On the other hand, that same distrust of concentrated, centralized authority represents one reason for the reliance on the jury as factfinder in the AngloAmerican system. See, e.g., HARRY KALVEN JR. & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN
JURY 6-9 (1966); Damaika, supra note 487, at 507-10; Gordon Van Kessel, Adver-

sary Excesses in the American Criminal Trial, 67 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 403, 50506 (1992). The ideal of a jury verdict as the collective judgment of one's peers
constitutes an important reason for the traditional reluctance to intrude upon that
determination except where a conviction is clearly contrary to the facts.
491. See supra notes 239-42 and accompanying text.
492. See supra note 256 and accompanying text (describing the other retrial
grounds).
493. In fact, the other retrial grounds are so closely circumscribed by statute
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thority might imply an unwillingness to recognize new evidence claims, as well. Yet in that context the courts in theory
are implying no criticism of anyone's performance: no abuse of
authority has occurred; rather, the discovery of new evidence
has simply altered the equation. 4' Through use of the new
evidence standard, rather than habeas corpus or other conceivable alternatives, the courts have provided remedies for wrongly convicted individuals without directly intruding on other au-

thorities and without significantly expanding available constitutional or statutory rights.
d. Attitudes toward Truth and the FactfindingProcess
Another important attitudinal difference concerns
factfinding and the "search for truth." To a certain extent, this
factor parallels the earlier observations about the trial process.
In the United States, for example, the dominant role played by

testimonial evidence makes it especially important that the

that it is difficult to mount an effective challenge thereunder, see supra note 256
and accompanying text, and Supreme Court Rules implementing the Habeas Corpus Act reserve its use to cases in which there is a "clearcut" absence of authority
or "clear violation of procedures prescribed by law" and no other reasonable remedy exists. See supra text accompanying notes 240. At least as to the latter, the
Supreme Court presumably could amend the relevant rule or modify interpretations of the applicable standards so as to expand the availability of habeas corpus
relief. To do so, however, would place the Court in the position of permitting more
direct challenges to the exercise of authority by police and prosecutors. Judging
from its stance in other criminal justice areas, the judiciary appears reluctant to
take such a step. See, e.g., SETSUO MIYAZAWA, POLICING IN JAPAN: A STUDY ON
MAKING CRIME 16-25 (1992); Foote, Confessions, supra note 464, at 455-62 (describing judicial reliance on issue of credibility, rather than voluntariness, in invalidating confessions, thereby avoiding direct criticism of investigative practices); Foote,
Paternalism,supra note 459, at 332-39 (describing extensive discretion and deference accorded to prosecutors and apparent reluctance to significantly expand available constitutional and statutory protections).
494. In practice, of course, the grants of retrials and subsequent acquittals in
Japan have carried implicit-and at times even explicit--criticism of earlier proceedings in those cases. Yet the stated reason for granting the new trial-the
discovery of new evidence-carries no direct criticism of the criminal justice
authorities' performance of their duties.
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factfinder be able to observe the demeanor of witnesses and
heightens concerns over stale evidence.
Yet two further aspects appear to be at work in the United
States: a belief that the absolute truth is unknowable and a
belief that the results arrived at through the adversary process
should be treated as the best approximation one is likely to
achieve. 49 5 Expressing the former sentiment, in McCleskey v.

Zant496 the Court quoted the following language from Professor Paul Bator: "A procedural system which permits an endless
repetition of inquiry into facts and law in a vain search for
ultimate certitude implies a lack of confidence about the possibilities of justice.. .. "4 The Court sounded the same theme
in Herrera v. Collins,49 stating, "There is no guarantee that
the guilt or innocence determination [at a second trial following discovery of new evidence] would be any more exact [than
at the first trial]."" As these quotes reflect, for many in the
United States criminal justice system, the search for absolute
truth is a "vain!'0 undertaking.
Moreover, the system itself is firmly premised on the assumption that the adversary process is a superior means of
determining the facts.5"' The system is (or at least pretends
to be) troubled by elements that prevent the adversary process
from functioning properly in that regard-hence the expressions of concern over ineffective assistance by counsel 5 0 -- and
495. An excellent analysis of this point is contained in Patchel, supra note 148,
at 943-58.
496. 111 S. Ct. 1454 (1991).
497. Id. at 1469 (quoting Bator, supra note 101, at 452).
498. 113 S. Ct. 838 (1993).
499. Id. at 862.
500. McCleskey v. Zant, 111 S. Ct. at 1469 (quoting Bator, supra note 101, at
452).
501. See, e.g., Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 675 (1984) (The "very
premise of our adversary system ... is that partisan advocacy on both sides of a
case will best promote the ultimate objective that the guilty be convicted and the
innocent go free") (quoting Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853, 862 (1975));
LaFave & Israel, supra note 140, at 35-37; MirJan Dama~ka, Presentation of Evidence and Factfinding Precision, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1083, 1091-95 (1975).
502. See, e.g., Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. at 685 (1984) ("The Sixth
Amendment ... envisions counsel's playing a role that is critical to the ability of
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is uncomfortable with the possibility that the adversary system
at times may actively hamper the search for truth."3 Yet, in
a world in which ultimate certitude is impossible to achieve,
the United States criminal justice system is content to treat
the results obtained through the adversary process as conclusive in most instances. Reopening criminal proceedings to
remedy violations of the Constitution or laws may be appropriate, but reopening proceedings simply to reconsider issues of
fact is viewed with considerable skepticism.'"
Japanese courts and scholars seem far more optimistic
about the possibility of attaining the "truth" yet far less convinced of the effectiveness of the adversary process for doing
so. Japanese judges surely would not claim the ability to
achieve absolute certainty, but clearly do believe that by carefully reviewing the existing record and considering new evidence they may be able to come to a better understanding of
the facts than earlier courts. In recent years, courts at all levels in Japan have undertaken very detailed investigations into
factual issues in many major contested cases-both on direct
appeal and in collateral review. 5 '
the adversarial system to produce just results."). In fact, a major issue presented
by many capital cases in the United States relates to the adequacy of representation at the original trial. Defendants who are sentenced to death are typically poor
and rely on counsel provided by the state, and tales abound of shockingly weak
representation. See, e.g., Vivian Berger, The Chiropractoras Brain Surgeon: Defense Lawyering in Capital Cases, 18 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 245 (199091). For many of these defendants, it is only when the execution date looms near,
if even then, that counsel experienced in capital defense becomes involved. Despite
the Supreme Court's recognition of constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel
as "cause" excusing procedural default at the state trial level, see McCleskey v.
Zant, 111 S. Ct. 1454, 1470 (1991), the Court's strict standards for ineffective
assistance, see Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. at 689-96; Berger, Dead End,
supra note 10, at 76-77, 88-96, coupled with the unavailability of this ground for
claims of ineffective assistance in the post-conviction review process, see supra text
accompanying notes 218-21, render this a narrow exception.
503. See, e.g., Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 168-71 (1986); Marvin E.
Frankel, The Search for Truth: An Umpireal View, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1031
(1975). See generally Van Kessel, supra note 501, at 447-59.
504. See, e.g., Eric M. Freedman, Innocence, Federalism, and the Capital Jury:
Two Legislative Proposalsfor Evaluating Post-Trial Evidence of Innocence in Death
Penalty Cases, 18 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 315, 316-18 (1990-91).
505. The Supreme Court itself has instituted a searching review of the factual
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In this process, the courts do not evince great faith in the
operation of the adversary process. Despite the adoption of the
adversary system during the Occupation, in Japan the judges
themselves are the ultimate factfinders and continue to have
the authority to investigate relevant evidence on their own
initiative." 6 When convinced that the parties themselves
have not developed the relevant evidence sufficiently, judges
regard it as proper to push the parties to do so and, where
necessary, to investigate the evidence themselves.0 7 This attitude has carried over to the retrial arena. In several major
cases, when reviewing courts became concerned that the original proceedings may have been in error, the courts instituted a
searching re-examination of the entire case, at times even
undertaking new lines of investigation on their own initiative."' Viewed in this way, the "new evidence" approach to
retrials followed in Japan reflects the following: a basic faith
that the "real truth" can be determined; a belief that judges
have a right and duty to ferret it out; a mistrust that the adversary system will always do so properly; and a confidence
that, through careful re-examination and development of relevant new evidence, later courts can come closer to the absolute
truth than earlier courts.

record in a number of direct appeals from convictions, even though the cases presented no significant legal issues. On occasion, the Supreme Court has reversed on
purely factual grounds even though both the district and High Court agreed that
the defendant was guilty. See, e.g., Kadono, supra note 486, at 775-78 (describing
two such cases).
506. KEISOHO art. 298(2). Moreover, the Criminal Procedure Code expressly

authorizes judges considering retrial petitions to undertake investigations of the
evidence on their own. Id. art. 445.
507. See, e.g., Kadono, supra note 486, at 785 (Judges "must make parties
aware of concerns and push both sides for proof of the key issues .... Coopera-

tion by the parties is important, but the court's own zeal and effort must be even
greater.").
508. See supra text accompanying notes 340-414.
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e. Attitudes Toward Punishment: The Roles of Speed and
Finality
A final set of attitudinal differences relates to views concerning the proper role of punishment-and indeed of the criminal justice system itself. In the United States these days,.one
is hard-pressed to identify a single dominant theme for that
system. After a brief heyday for rehabilitation--or at least for
rhetoric about the rehabilitative ideal-notions of general
deterrence and retribution now appear to pervade debate over
the goals of the United States criminal justice system."' To
many observers, achieving these goals deiends in part upon
ensuring the speed and finality of convictions and sentences for
all offenders (at least all offenders who are actually apprehended), to assure swift and certain punishment."' This attitude,
in turn, militates against recognition of any broad rights to
post-conviction review, including review based on the discovery
of new evidence. 12
In contrast, as I have discussed elsewhere,1 the dominant goal of the Japanese criminal justice system is clear: specific prevention, with an emphasis on reintegration and rehabilitation.1 4 The interest in general deterrence, it is thought,
is served largely by maintaining swift and sure apprehension
509. For excellent accounts of the. rise and fall of the rehabilitative ideal, see
Francis A. Allen, Criminal Justice, Legal Values and the RehabilitativeIdeal, 50 J.
CRim. L., CRnMNOLOGY & POLICE SCI. 226 (1959); FRANCIS A. ALLEN, THE DECLINE OF THE REHABILITATIVE IDEAL (1981).
510. See, e.g., ALLEN, supra note 509, at 1-9; Comment, Calculating Injustice:
The Fixation on Punishment as Crime Control, 27 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 575,
590-645 (1992).
511. Herbert L. Packer has provided the classic statement of this view in his
"crime control" model. See HERBERT L. PACKER, THE LIITS OF THE CRIMINAL

SANCTION 158-165 (1968).
512. See id. at 160.
513. See Foote, Paternalism,'supra note 459.
514. Others who have expressed similar views include JOHN BRAITHWAITE,
CRIME, SHANE AND REINTEGRATION 61-65 (1989), and JOHN 0. HALEY, AUTHORITY
WITHOUT POWER 121-35 (1991).

19931

CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN JAPAN

489

of offenders (or at least the perception that apprehension is
virtually certain).515 Following apprehension, however, the
primary focus normally shifts to reintegrating the offender and
utilizing the least intrusive means appropriate to the circumstances-ideally, without having to resort to formal punishment at all.516 The system is premised upon individualized
determinations, based on the personal circumstances of each
offender. Accordingly, while speed and certainty of apprehension are important, speed and finality of convictions and sentences are not such vital aspects of the Japanese criminal
justice system.517 Given this situation, post-conviction review
based on the discovery of new evidence does not offend basic
attitudes regarding punishment and deterrence in Japan in the
same way it does for some in the United States.
3. Factors Underlying the Changes in Standards
The preceding factors help explain the fundamentally
different approaches to post-conviction review in the United
States and Japan: in the United States the primary focus is on
abuse of authority and violation of the Constitution and laws,
with a great reluctance to reopen issues of fact; in Japan it is

515. See Foote, Paternalism, supra note 459, at 389-90, and sources -cited
therein.
516. See Foote, Paternalism, supra note 459, at 341-60.
Capital punishment, of course, represents the other extreme. While one
might view the death penalty as simply the ultimate expression of a system premised on special prevention, reserved for those cases in which rehabilitation is
deemed truly inconceivable, that rationale has not prevailed in Japan. In
Nagayama, the Tokyo High Court premised its reduction of the death sentence
largely on Nagayama's "remarkable transformation while in prison. See supra
notes 70-72 and accompanying text. In reversing, the Supreme Court disagreed
with the High Court over the true extent of the asserted "transformation," but
also expressly referred to the interests in general deterrence and retribution as
valid grounds for capital punishment. See supra text accompanying notes 82-83. In
light of the absence of any formal announcement or, except in rare instances, any
publicity when executions are actually carried out in Japan, however, the speed
and ultimate certainty of execution would appear to play relatively limited roles in
general deterrence in Japan. See infra text accompanying note 608-09.
517. See Foote, Paternalism,supra note 459, at 340-41.
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precisely the converse. But what accounts for the changes in
judicial interpretations of the collateral review standards that
have occurred in both nations?
One rather obvious factor is simply the difference in the
numbers of petitions filed in the two nations. As noted earlier,5 18 some death row inmates in Japan have forestalled execution through repeated piecemeal retrial petitions; and in
some of those cases the numbers of petitions and the extent of
delay prior to execution has been far greater than for any cases
in the United States. Yet such cases remain rare exceptions in
Japan. Despite the vast range of potential retrial petitioners
(which includes individuals who have completed their sentences and even family members of deceased individuals519 ) and
the evident incentives for seeking retrials (which include the
possibility of substantial monetary awards52 °), the total number of retrial petitions peaked at 135 in 1976; on average fewer
than 100 petitions have been filed each year since then.52 ' In
contrast, in the United States the federal courts face nearly
10,000 habeas petitions each year. 2
This vast disparity would provide an interesting focus for
further research as part of the debate over relative litigiousness in the United States and Japan. Whatever the reasons for
it, however, the sheer difference in numbers of petitions may
help explain the differing judicial attitudes toward post-conviction review in the two nations. In the United States, the large
number of petitions has given rise to concerns over judicial
economy 5 23 and to expressions of frustration by several Jus-

tices-some of whom have reviewed successive petitions from a
518. See supra text accompanying notes 235-36.
519. See supra text accompanying notes 361-63.
520. See supra text accompanying notes 363-65.

521. See supra text accompanying notes 367-68. Approximately a third of these
cases, moreover, relate to such relatively minor matters as traffic violations, see
Konishi, supra note 281, at 1011-1013. Most such cases are filed by the prosecu-

tors, rather than the convict, typically after the prosecutors find that a subordinate has assumed responsibility for an offense actually committed by his or her

superior, see supra notes 278 and 281 and sources cited therein.
522. See supra note 104 and accompanying text.

523. See, e.g., Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 112 S. Ct. 1715, 1719-20 (1992).
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number of death row inmates and appear to have begun to lose
patience-over perceived abuse of the process.5" On the other
hand, in Japan the retrial system has been treated as a special
remedy, to be used sparingly, and the rarity of retrial petitions
may enhance the level of care they are accorded.
Public perceptions in the United States to the contrary
notwithstanding, the number of habeas petitions has remained
relatively stable during the past quarter century.525 This does
not necessarily mean that the frustration the Justices have
described is any less real. Yet this stability in the number of
habeas petitions, coupled with a similarly stable pattern for
retrial petitions in Japan (ranging from approximately fifty to
slightly more than one hundred petitions each year since the
1950s5 26 ), suggests that something apart from the number of
petitions lies behind the shift in judicial treatment. A partial
explanation may be found in exactly the same factors identified
in the previous section: changing views within the judiciary-particularly among the Justices of the respective Supreme
Courts-regarding the weight to be accorded to factors relating
to the trial process, federalism, attitudes toward authority, the
search for truth, and the role of punishment.
a. The United States
Over the past four decades, while the scope of federal
habeas has expanded and then contracted again, the basic
contours of the trial process in the United States have remained generally stable. On each of the other factors, however-federalism, deference to authority, the "search for truth,"
and the role of punishment-the prevailing views of the Supreme Court have shifted, in some cases rather dramatically.

524. See supra notes 110-14 and accompanying text.
525. See supra text accompanying note 106.
526. See SAIKCSAIBANSHO JIMUSOKYOKU, supra note 341, at 5 (table 2-3 for District Court filings through 1990, table 2-4 for Petty Court filings).
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Federalismand Deference to Authority: In 1953's Brown v.
Allen,5 27 Justice Frankfurter drew a clear distinction for federal habeas purposes between issues of fact, as to which state
court decisions would govern, and questions of federal law, as
to which federal courts should have the last word:
Unless a vital flaw be found in the process of ascertaining
[the basic] facts in the State court, the [federal judge considering a habeas application] may accept their determination in
the State proceeding ....On the other hand, State adjudication of questions of law cannot, under the habeas corpus
statute, be accepted as binding. It is precisely these questions
that the federal judge is commanded to decide.5"
Similarly, for the Warren Court in Fay v.Noia just over a
decade later, federal habeas represented a "precious heritage
...of Anglo-American civilization" 5 9 essential for vindicating
the constitutional rights of state prisoners. To Justice
Brennan, writing for the Court, comity concerns simply were
not relevant: "[tihe availability of the Great Writ of habeas corpus.., offends no legitimate state interest in the enforcement
of criminal justice or procedure."3 0
Over twenty years later, again writing for the Court, albeit
for a very different group of Justices, Brennan was not nearly
so one-sided in his approach. While continuing to characterize
the purpose of federal habeas as being to "provid[e] a federal
forum for the vindication of the constitutional rights of state
prisoners," Brennan acknowledged the existence of a second set
of concerns: "the State's interest in the integrity of its rules
and proceedings and the finality of its judgments."5 31 For
Brennan, this state interest revolved around ensuring the
proper functioning of the adversary system and the judicial
process, "channeling, to the extent possible, the resolution of

527. 344 U.S. 443 (1953).
528. Id. at 506 (opinion of Frankfurter, J.).

529. 372 U.S. 391, 441 (1963).
530. Id. at 440.
531. Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 10 (1984).
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various types of questions to the stage of the judicial process at
which they can be resolved most fairly and efficiently."53 2
To several members of the Rehnquist Court, the state's
interests are of an even higher magnitude. Chief Justice
Rehnquist and other members of the current Court display far
greater trust than did Justice Frankfurter that state court
judges will properly execute their duty to uphold the federal
Constitution; they appear to regard it as a considerable affront
and intrusion for federal court judges to second-guess good
faith. decisions made by state court judges. As early as 1977, in
Wainwright v. Sykes, 3' the Court criticized Fay for failing to
accord state procedural rules the respect they deserve, a point
the Court reiterated in 1991's Coleman v. Thompson.5 . In
1992 Justice White described the comity concerns at length in
Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 535 stating:
[The cause-and-prejudice standard] advances comity by
allowing a coordinate jurisdiction to correct its own errors .... It reduces the 'inevitable friction' that results when
a federal habeas court 'overturn[s] either the factual or legal
conclusions reached by the state-court system.'...
... Just as the State must afford the petitioner a full
and fair hearing on his federal claim, so must the petitioner
afford the State a full and fair opportunity to address and
resolve the claim on the merits.u 6
Hence, concerns over federal or state comity and respect for
state court decision making constitute one ideological strand in
the reasoning of many of the Court's recent habeas decisions.5 3 ' In numerous opinions and other writings, members

532. Id.

533. 433 U.S. 72, 88 (1977).
534. 111 S. Ct. 2546, 2565 (1991).
535. 112 S. Ct. 1715 (1992).
536. Id. at 1719-20 (quoting Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539, 550 (1981)).
537. Whether reliance on federalism concerns constitutes the true motivation
for the Supreme Court's decisions, or simply a convenient justification, has been
subject to debate. See Judith Resnik, Tiers, 57 S. CAL. L. REv. 837, 907 (1984);
Patchel, supra note 148, at 1024-25 & n.497..
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of the Rehnquist Court have also displayed considerable deference to and trust in the actions of state authorities. 8
Factfindingand Punishment-The Role of Finality: In Fay
v. Noia, Justice Brennan dismissed concerns over finality in
the habeas context by flatly declaring that "conventional notions of finality in criminal litigation cannot be permitted to
defeat the manifest federal policy that federal constitutional
rights of personal liberty shall not be denied without the fullest opportunity for plenary federal judicial review."3 9 On the
other hand, finality is of paramount importance to the
Rehnquist Court. In the words of McCleskey v. Zant, "One of
the law's very objects is the finality of its judgments ....

Per-

petual disrespect for the finality of convictions disparages the
entire criminal justice system."540
This talismanic reference to finality embraces a number of
separate concerns. Some of these relate to factfinding and to
ensuring the proper functioning of the trial process and the
adversary system. Recognizing exceptions to the principle of
finality, the Court concluded in McCleskey, "places a heavy
burden on scarce federal judicial resources,... threatens the
capacity of the system to resolve primary disputes[,] ...

may

give litigants incentives to withhold claims for manipulative
purposes and may establish disincentives to present claims
when evidence is fresh." 4 ' Similarly, in Engle v. Isaac the
Court stated, "Liberal allowance of the writ... degrades the
prominence of the trial itself ...

by suggesting to the trial

participants that there may be no need to adhere to... safeguards [for the accused] during the trial."542 These state538. See, e.g., McCleskey v. Zant, 111 S. Ct. 1454, 1471 (1991) ("Abuse of the
writ may undermine the orderly administration of justice and therefore weaken
the forces of authority that are essential for civilization.") (quoting Brown v. Allen,
344 U.S. 443, 512 (1953) (opinion of Frankfurter, J.)); Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., The
Supreme Court-Comment, Arizona v. Fulminante: The Harm of Applying Harmless
Error to Coerced Confessions, 105 HARV. L. REV. 152, 170-71 (1991), and sources
cited therein (examining Rehnquist's views).
539. 372 U.S. 391, 424 (1963).
540. 111 S. Ct. at 1468-69.
541. Id. at 1469.
542. 456 U.S. 107, 127 (1982).
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ments reflect a concern that recognition of broad rights to
habeas would encourage piecemeal assertions of claims.
In addition, the Rehnquist Court has expressed the view
that, if the habeas petition results in a new trial, the delay
between the crime and the new trial will render it more difficult to determine the facts accurately. In McCleskey the Court
stated, "[W]hen a habeas petitioner succeeds in obtaining a
new trial, the 'erosion of memory and dispersion of witnesses
that occur with the passage of time' prejudice the government
and diminish the chances of a reliable criminal adjudication."us And in Herrera v. Collins Rehnquist flatly concluded,
"[Tlhe passage of time only diminishes the reliability of criminal adjudications."' Thus, in the Rehnquist Court's view,
finality plays an important role in ensuring the proper functioning of the adversary system and accuracy of the factfinding
process.
To the Rehnquist Court, finality serves another important
purpose: deterrence. As noted above, in Fay v. Noia Justice
Brennan declared that federal habeas "offends no legitimate
state interest in the enforcement of criminal justice." 5 Despite later acknowledging the importance of finality in ensuring the proper functioning of the judicial process, he never
suggested that finality might play a legitimate role in deterring crime. Other Justices, however, gradually elevated the
status of deterrence as a basis for concern over finality 54 un-

543. 111 S. Ct. at 1468 (quoting Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 453 (1986)
(plurality opinion)).
544. 113 S. Ct. 838, 862 (1993).
545. 372 U.S. 391, 440 (1963).
546. In Engle v. Isaac in 1982, Justice O'Connor in a footnote observed that
"Judge Friendly and Professor Bator suggest that [the] absence of finality also
frustrates deterrence ... ." 456 U.S. 107, 127-28 n.32 (1982). (In that same footnote, though, she listed the interest in rehabilitation on an apparently equal level
with deterrence.) In 1986, Justice Powell, writing for a plurality in Kuhhmann v.
Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 452 & n.14 (1986), quoted from Justice O'Connor's earlier
footnote in elevating the interest in deterrence to the body of the opinion. Then,
in 1989, for another plurality in Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 309 (1989), Justice
O'Connor placed deterrence concerns first in the list of interests served by finality,
this time treating the matter as a self-evident proposition that needed no further
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til 1991 when Justice Kennedy, writing for a six-member majority in McCleskey v. Zant,' 7 implied that deterrence had become the leading interest served by finality. In that opinion,
Kennedy stated, "Without finality, the criminal law is deprived
of much of its deterrent effect.' "' As though to drive the
point home, he later added, "[Tihe power of a State
to pass
549
laws means little if the State cannot enforce them."
These majority opinions have phrased the deterrence issue
as one of finality, without expressly drawing a link between
finality and speed. In separate opinions and private remarks,
however, some Justices explicitly highlighted that connection.5 ' Then, in 1992 the Court in a per curiam opinion referred to an interest in prompt punishment, expressing concern
that "the State... has sustained severe prejudice by [a] twoand-a-half year stay of execution."551 The Court added: "The
stay has prevented [the State] from exercising its sovereign
power to enforce the criminal law, an interest we found of
great weight in McCleskey when discussing the importance of

support.

547. 111 S. Ct. 1454 (1991).
548. Id. at 1468 (quoting Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. at 309 (plurality opinion)).
549. McCleskey, 111 S. Ct. at 1469.
550. Not surprisingly, Rehnquist has been the most outspoken in this regard.
In 1981, in announcing his intention (on which he did not subsequently follow
through) to vote to grant certiorari in all capital cases so as to dispose of all
federal claims at once and thereby enable prompt executions, Rehnquist asserted,
[T]his Court.. . has made it virtually impossible for States to enforce with reasonable promptness their constitutionally valid capital punishment statutes. When
society promises to punish by death... and the courts fail to do so, the
courts . . . lessen the deterrent effect of the threat of capital punishment ....
Coleman v. Balkeom, 451 U.S. 949, 959 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting from
denial of certiorari). Since then Rehnquist has continued to emphasize the "delay"
in executions and its presumed effect on deterrence. See, e.g., Burt, supra note 21,
at 1782-92; Rehnquist, supra note 124 (Ns]tates seeking to carry out the [death]
sentence... should not have to wait eight years to do that."). Justice Powell and
the Powell Committee have echoed those views. See, e.g., Lewis F. Powell, Jr.,
Review of Capital Convictions Isn't Working, CRIM. JUST. 10, 13 (Winter 1989)
( [D]eterrence may be significantly weakened by the delay of repetitive review");
Powell Committee Report, supra note 115, at 3241 ("[S]ociety is rightfully entitled
to have the penalty prescribed by law carried out with6ut unreasonable delay").
551. In re Blodgett, 112 S. Ct. 674, 676 (1992) (per curiam).
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finality... ," and went on to observe that if a federal court
orders a stay of execution in a capital case, it has a "duty to
take all steps necessary to ensure a prompt resolution of the
matter.""2 The Court has now closed the circle: for the
Rehnquist Court, delays occasioned by habeas review undermine both speed and finality, thereby reducing the deterrent
effect of the criminal law.
In sum, the increasingly strict limitations on habeas over
the past few years reflect shifts in the views of the Supreme
Court (accompanying shifts in the membership of that body) on
such fundamental issues as the importance of federalism concerns, trust for authority, and the role of finality in both the
factfinding and deterrence realms.
b. Japan
An emphasis on finality is of course not uniquely limited
to members of the Rehnquist Court. On the other side of the
Pacific, the Fukuoka High Court expressed a similar view in
1959 in Menda when, in reversing the Nishitsuji Panel's grant
of a retrial, it stated that the district court's review "unjustifiably impairs the stability of judicial decisions and jeopardizes
the existence of the justice system."5 3 That same year the
Nagoya High Court voiced similar sentiments, stating, "Once a
decision has become final, the concept of legal stability demands that the propriety of the judgment not be open to challenge and that the judgment cannot be modified ... [unless
the grounds for a retrial are] so strong that the prior judgment
simply cannot be tolerated.""' The contrast between those
statements and the Supreme Court's position in Shiratoriand
Saitakawa is stark. What brought about that change?
In Japan's unitary system, federalism concerns do not
exist. Yet postwar changes in the trial process and, most im552. Id553. See supra note 303 and accompanying text.
554. See supra note 276 and accompanying text.
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portantly, key Justices' attitudes toward the search for truth
help account for the shift (with attitudes toward authority and
punishment perhaps playing a tangential role).
Japanese scholars and judges frequently characterize the
retrial system as reflecting a tension between the competing
interests ofrespectfor the finality of judgments and the search
for truth, and sometimes rephrase this as a balance between
the adversary system and the search for truth.555 One may
question whether this rephrased characterization is appropriate. After all, the search for truth is also one of the primary
goals of the adversary system.556 Still, using this characterization one can construct a plausible scenario for the trends in
Japanese retrial standards by focusing on the impact of
Japan's postwar adoption of the adversary system.
That formulation would run as follows: In the prewar era,
the emphasis was heavily on the search for truth and judges
bore responsibility to investigate all relevant evidence and
elucidate the true facts. In keeping with that attitude, they
granted retrials rather liberally whenever new evidence warranted. In contrast, after World War II, Japan, under the influence of the Occupation, adopted an adversary system in which
the parties themselves bear responsibility for collecting and
presenting the evidence. Early enthusiasm for the adversary
system led to greater emphasis on the finality of judgments-presumably the product, right or wrong, of the efforts
of the adversaries-and away from the pure search for truth.
Then, after the first flush of excitement about the adversary
system faded, things settled down. While the respective sides
bear initial responsibility for presenting evidence under the
current system, the judge remains ultimately responsible for
making sure that all relevant facts are developed. Accordingly,

555. See supra notes 265-66, 279-82 and accompanying text; Foote, Confessions,
supra note 464, at 471-82.
556. See, e.g., LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 140, at 33-35. Some Japanese
scholars have also acknowledged this point. See, e.g., Tamiya Hiroshi, Menda
muzai hanketsu ni miru gohan no kdzd [The Structure of Mistaken Judgments, as
Seen in the Menda Acquittal], 799 JURISuTJO 29, 34 (1983).
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the balance has shifted back to the side of the pure search for
truth, again resulting in a more liberal judicial approach favoring the grant of retrials where the ultimate objective of discovering the truth would be served.
This scenario provides a nice theory and certainly has
many elements of truth. Prewar courts did bear responsibility
for elucidating all relevant facts.. 7 and a flush of excitement
did surround adoption of the adversary system.55 In the
words of one judge, "[Y]ounger judges, particularly those educated in the immediate postwar years, tended to embrace. the
adversary philosophy."559 Moreover, at least certain influential judges thought that the shift to the adversary system necessitated changes in the attitude toward retrials.56 In fact,
in rejecting the Nishitsuji Ruling that would have reopened the
Menda case in 1956 (rather than twenty-four years later when
Menda finally won retrial), the Fukuoka High Court emphasized that the postwar Code established stricter standards on
evidence and the appeals process than the 1922 Code.5"' Finally, it is clear that among courts today there is a strong
sense that the judge remains ultimately responsible for making
sure that all relevant facts are developed
if the judge feels that
5 62
the adversary system is not working.
557. See, e.g., Fujino, supra note 248, at 89.
558. See, e.g., Kohi Tanabe, The Process of Litigation: An Experiment with the
Adversary System, in LAW IN JAPAN, supra note 481, at 71, 82-83 (with respect to
civil trials).
559. Tanabe, supra note 558, at 92.
560. As noted earlier, in 1958 a Supreme Court chasakan who had worked on
one of that Court's key retrial rulings wrote that stricter interpretation of the
term "new evidence" was a natural consequence of the "new Criminal Procedure
Code, which has strengthened the adversary system structure." Takada, Keiji
hanrei, supra note 282, at 98. Similarly, in 1961 Judge Fujino of the Fukuoka
District Court wrote that, while the relevant language of the 1922 Code and the
postwar Code is identical, "under the old Criminal Procedure Code retrials were
regarded as reflecting a harmonization of the stability of judgments with the
search for substantive truth, whereas under the new Code the two additional factors of protection of human rights and respect for the results of the adversary
system.., should also be taken into consideration." Fujino, supra note 248, at
90.
561. See supra notes 303-04.
562. See, e.g., Koizumi Sukeyasu, Shikeisha saishin muzai hanketsu o kangaeru
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Yet the above explanation is too facile and ignores certain
facts. First, even prior to World War II some Japanese courts
had taken a restrictive view of the retrial provisions, notwithstanding the rather liberal stance taken by the Daishin'in in
the 1924 decision quoted earlier.5" In fact, decisions by that
same court in 1938 and 1939, taking a much narrower view of
the "new evidence" provision and declining to apply the reasonable doubt standard, were what first attracted the attention of
Justices Dand6 and Kishi to this issue.5 ' Thus, characterizations of the prewar courts as liberal on this issue are overly
simplistic.
Perhaps even more importantly, postwar courts, even in
the early years after the war, can scarcely be characterized as
having plunged headlong into the adversary system. Notwithstanding articles praising the adversary system, many judges
expressed skepticism about relying too heavily on it, fearing
that it would impede their search for truth.565 Accordingly,
although the adversary system may have had real meaning for
some people as a ground for narrowly construing the retrial
provisions, it would probably be overstating its impact to attribute overall trends in attitudes toward retrials to the adversary system alone.
In any event, the ultimate relaxation of the standards
derived largely from attitudes relating to the search for truth.
The Shiratori and Saitakawa decisions reflect the view that,
when meaningful new evidence is presented, the reviewing
court will be able to determine the facts more accurately than
the original trial court, even if substantial time has passed in

[Thoughts on the Retrial Acquittals of Death Row Inmates], in GENDAI NO SAIBAN,
supra note 346, at 276, 277 (in order to prevent mistaken convictions "we must
regard the development of measures to check the excesses of the adversary system
as a necessary task").
563. See supra text accompanying notes 267-73.
564. See supra notes 290-92 and accompanying text.
565. Thus, even Judge Fujino, at the same time that he was arguing for the
need to respect the results of the adversary system, emphasized that judges have
no choice but to take personal responsibility for ferreting out the truth. Fujino,
supra note 248, at 89-90.
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the interim. Those decisions also reflect a belief that the
search for truth should outweigh whatever interest in finality
may exist.566
Of course, those decisions did not occur in a vacuum. Although Justices Kishi and Dand5 expressed their views regarding the proper interpretation of the "new evidence" standard
long before they were appointed to the Court,56 ' their task of
convincing other Justices to go along with the change may well
have proven easier because of the publicity surrounding the
retrial issue and the efforts of the nationwide movements asserting the innocence of various death row inmates.5s6 The
new interpretation announced in Shiratoriwas not limited to
capital cases. In fact, Shiratori itself was not even a capital
case. Nonetheless, publicity suggesting that innocent men were
facing death because of the restrictive standards may have had
a psychological impact on the Supreme Court's ruling. Thus, to
the extent that narrow interpretations of the retrial standards
in the name of the adversary system precluded earlier relief for
Menda and other death row inmates, those rulings may indirectly have helped to spur greater liberalization in the end. At
the very least, as I discuss in the next section, the miscarriag-

566. One might argue that shifting attitudes toward punishment also played a
role in the revised interpretation. In doing so, one could point to declines in
Japan's crime rates from the late 1940s and early 1950s, a period of great dislocation following the war, to the mid-1970s when Shiratori and Saitakawa were decided. See, e.g., WHITE PAPER ON CRIME, supra note 458, at 23 (Table 1, supra, at
21, showing decrease in crimes per 100,000 inhabitants from high of 2,000 in 1948
to low of 1,091 in 1973, followed by gradual increases) and argue that the perceived need for finality to promote general deterrence has also diminished. I have
seen nothing in the Shiratori and Saitakawa decisions themselves or the commentary about those cases to suggest that that was a significant factor for the change,
however.
In a similar vein, several of the retrial proceedings that have occurred since
the standards were relaxed have contained revelations of illegal or improper activities by police and prosecutors, and those revelations may have led courts to be a
bit more skeptical of criminal justice authorities, see Foote, supra note 6, at 88,
95-96. Yet nothing in Shiratori or Saitakawa suggests that distrust of authorities
was a substantial reason for the relaxation, either.
567. See supra notes 290-92 and accompanying text.
568. See supra text accompanying notes 333-36.
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es of justice that have been revealed by the retrials that followed the relaxation of standards have strengthened the commitment within Japan to provide thorough opportunities for
review of new evidence claims in the future.569
C. Attitudes toward Capital Punishment in the Aftermath of
the Changes
1. The United States
As discussed in the preceding section, there are various
strands to the thinking underlying the United States Supreme
Court's recent cutbacks on habeas, and there is no reason to,
think that all of the Justices who have supported the cutbacks
are ardent supporters of capital punishment. To the contrary,
as Professor Franklin Zinring has suggested, the dominant
desire for many of the Justices may simply be to "disengage"
the Court from the divisive issue of capital punishment.57 °
Yet the end result of the cutbacks is a review structure
that bears close resemblance to the "crime control" model of
Herbert Packer: a system "that throws off at an early stage
those cases in which it appears unlikely that the person apprehended is an offender and then secures, as expeditiously as
possible, the conviction of the rest, with a minimum of occa571 This, in turn,
sions for challenge, let alone 'post-audit."
bears a striking resemblance to the political right's law and
order agenda. Against a backdrop of frustration over high and
rising crime rates and low apprehension rates,572 to some
conservatives the only possible answer seems to lie in increas-

569. See infra text accompanying notes 646-47.
570. Zimring, supra note 431, at 13, 15.
571. PACKER, supra note 511, at 160 (emphasis added).
572. See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS 1991 at 372 (Table 3.127: estimated crime rates from 1960 through 1990),
464 (Table 4.22: clearance rates from 1972 through 1990), 195 (Table 2.26: attitudes toward crime rate), and 211 (Table 2.45: attitudes toward the death penalty); WHITE PAPER ON CRIME, supra note 458, at 3-11 (international comparisons
for crime and apprehension rates).
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ing general deterrence by ensuring that those who are caught
are subjected to swift, sure, and harsh punishment.573
Whatever the motivations of the individual Justices, this
crime control mind set now constitutes a major theme in the
debate over the proper scope of federal habeas review. Given
that mindset, an average period of eight years between commission of the crime and execution has come to represent an
unthinkably long delay, and, except in extraordinary circumstances, anything more than a single round of federal habeas
is an impermissible intrusion that "disparages the entire criminal justice system."5 74 The fact that twenty-five or more judges have reviewed a given case shows that the death row inmate must not have had a valid claim in the first place.575
And studies showing that very high percentages of death sen-

573. See, e.g., Leigh Dingerson, Reclaiming the Gavel: Making Sense Out of the
Death Penalty Debate in State Legislatures, 18 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE

873, 875-82 (1990-91); James Alan Fox et. al., Death Penalty Opinion in the PostFurman Years, 18 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 499, 508-513 (1990-91); Glenn
L. Pierce & Michael L. Radelet, The Role and Consequences of the Death Penalty
in American Politics, 18 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 711, 720-25 (1990-91).
Chief Justice Rehnquist gave voice to the frustration over crime a dozen
years ago, stating, in an opinion decrying the long delays in execution of death

sentences:
When our system of administering criminal justice cannot provide security to our people in the streets or in their homes, we are rapidly approaching the state of savagery .... In Atlanta, we cannot protect our
small children at play. In the Nation's Capital, law enforcement authorities cannot protect the lives of employees of this very Court who live
four blocks from the building in which we sit and deliberate the constitutionality of capital punishment.
Coleman v. Balkcom, 451 U.S. 949, 962 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting from
denial of certiorari). Cf Payne v. Tennessee, 111 S. Ct. 2597, 2627 (1991)
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (characterizing majority's decision overruling prior precedents and permitting reference to impact on victims in death penalty sentencing
as "[having] been moved by an argument that has strong political appeal but no
proper place in a reasoned judicial opinion.").
574. McCleskey v. Zant, 111 S. Ct. 1454, 1469 (1991).
575. See, e.g., Woodard v. Hutchins, 464 U.S. 377, 380 n.4 (1984) (Powell, J.,
concurring) (noting that case had been reviewed by more than 25 judges, in voting
to vacate stay of execution); Gray v. Lucas, 463 U.S. 1237, 1239 (1983) (Burger,
C.J., concurring) (noting that 26 different state and federal judges had reviewed
the case, in voting to vacate stay of execution).
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tences576 are reversed either on appeal or subsequent collateral review do not establish a need for heightened care. To the
contrary, they may simply reflect the need for stricter limits on
review: after all, enterprising lawyers, given "so many bites at
the apple,"577 are bound to be able to get someone off on a
technicality. Finally, for those truly extraordinary cases-which nonetheless seem to recur with disturbing regularity57s-in which a truly innocent person has been sentenced to
death, executive clemency, "the 'fail safe' in our criminal justice system,"579 will always remain. That is, it will remain if
the inmate or her supporters can convince the governor and/or
board of pardons or other responsible officials58 to take the
political risk of issuinga pardon, a risk that can be great indeed in some states today.5"'
Despite their close connection in many cases, the debate
over the proper contours of federal habeas and the debate over
the constitutionality and propriety of capital punishment are of
course distinct matters. Yet for ardent advocates of capital
punishment, broad federal habeas has proven a popular target.
As one group of commentators has observed:

576. See, e.g., Burt, supra note 21, at 1792-93 (citing 1982 finding of reversals
in 60 to 75% of cases); AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, THE
DEATH PENALTY 89 (1987) (36% of death sentences imposed between 1977 and
1984 reversed on state or federal appeal).
577. Coleman v. Balkcom, 451 U.S. at 957 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
578. See, e.g., Peter Applebome, Alabama Releases Man Held On Death Row for
Six Years, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 2, 1993, at 1 (describing case of Walter McMillian);
MICHAEL L. RADELET ET AL., IN SPITE OF INNOCENCE (1992); Jill Smolowe, Must
This Man Die?, TIME, May 18, 1992, at 40 (describing case of Roger Keith
Coleman).
579. Herrera v. Collins, 113 S. Ct. 838, 866 (1993).
580. Depending on the state, the clemency power may be vested in the governor or in an advisory board, or may require the joint action of both the advisory
board and the governor. See id.
581. See, e.g., Hugo Adam Bedau, The Decline of Executive Clemency in Capital
Cases, 18 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 255, 268-72 (1990-91); Pierce & Radelet,
supra note 573, at 720-26. For an examination of the capital punishment issue in
the context of President Bill Clinton's political career, see Marshall Frady, Annals
of Law and Politics: Death in Arkansas, THE NEW YORKER, Feb. 22, 1993, at 105.
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To [some],... federal habeas is a constant irritant-an expensive, time-consuming, and redundant enterprise that
frustrates law enforcement and needlessly injects the federal
courts into matters better left to the states. By this... account, habeas is the paradigm of all that was wrong with the
Warren Court-namely that Court's asserted failure to appreciate the societal threat posed by crime and its palpable distrust of the states and state courts.582
For crime control advocates sharing these views, federal habeas has served as something of a rallying point.
Opponents of capital punishment, for their part, have been
united by concern over the recent limitations on habeas.' So
far, though, the cutbacks appear to have had only modest impact on the abolition movement in the United States.'" It is
possible that, as the cutbacks take effect and executions previously delayed by habeas become a regular occurrence in the
United States, public revulsion to the death penalty will rise
and the abolition movement will take on new steam. Yet to
date, federal habeas has served as a much more potent focal
point for death penalty advocates than for opponents. 5"
2. Japan
The contrasts with Japan could not be more striking. Japan enjoys low crime rates-including some of the lowest violent crime rates of any developed nation-and high apprehension rates for those who do commit crimes.586 Moreover, few

582. Richard Faust et al., The Great Writ in Action: Empirical Light on the
Federal Habeas Corpus Debate, 18 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc." CHANGE 637, 638 (199091) (emphasis in original; footnote omitted).
583. See, e.g., symposia on the death penalty in 18 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc.
CHANGE 243-949 (1990-91); 20 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 7-228 (1992).
584. See, e.g., Dingerson, supra note 573, at 874 (discussing need, given cutbacks on habeas and other legal devices for blocking executions, for the "abolition'ist community to redirect its strategy... [and develop] a coherent legislative and
political strategy for abolition").
585. See Dingerson, supra note 573, at 875-83.
586. See, e.g.,'WHITE PAPER ON CRIME, supra note 458, at 3-11.
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offenders go free on what crime control advocates in the United
States would consider "technicalities," since the exclusionary
rule and the constitutional and procedural rights of suspects
and defendants are narrowly construed in Japan." 7 Given
this backdrop, Japan does not face great pressure to achieve
heightened general deterrence by punishing offenders more
strictly. To the contrary, Japan has maintained very lenient
levels of sentencing, largely based on an ethos of specific prevention and rehabilitation." To the extent that the death
sentence is seen as an extreme form of specific prevention, life
imprisonment without parole is a true option in Japan. Moreover, parole is never mandatory, nor is prison overcrowding
likely to be a problem for the foreseeable future. And while the
vast majority of cases are processed quickly,58 lengthy proceedings are by no means rare."9 When one includes periods
for direct appeals, it is not uncommon for proceedings to last
five or ten years or even longer before the original cbnviction
becomes final.59' These prolonged proceedings may be regarded as exceptional, but they are not treated by the prosecutors-much less by the courts themselves-as an affront to
592
interests in deterrence.
587. See, e.g., Foote, Paternalism, supra note 459, at 332-39.
588. See Foote, Paternalism, supra note 459, passim.
589. See, e.g., lida Yoshinobu, Jinsoku saiban to sosh6 sokushin-saiban no
tachiba kara [Speedy Trials and Speeding Up Proceedings-Fromthe Standpoint of
the Judiciary], in 2 KErII TFISUZUKI, supra note 281, at 497, 503-06. The degree
of speed and finality is even higher if one takes into consideration cases that are
closed with the prosecutors' decision to suspend prosecution despite evidence of
guilt. See Foote, Paternalism,supra note 459, at 340 n.150, 346-50.
590. Somewhat over one percent of the criminal trials in Japanese district
courts last more than two years. SAIK0SAIBANSHO JIMUSOKYOKU, supra note 341, at
11 (table 14). This represents a great increase in speed over the past two dedades.
As of 1974, nearly two percent of district court criminal trials lasted over two
years. See Iida, supra note 589, at 504.
591. See Niwayama Sh6ichir6, Komento 2 [Comment 2], in 2 KEI TET-SUZUKI,
supra note 281, at 511, 512 (citing earlier study showing 29 cases in which 10 or
more years elapsed from the date of the indictment through final judgment). In a
case in which the Supreme Court recently upheld death sentences for two members of the Japanese Red Army, some 21 years elapsed between the crimes and
conclusion of the direct appeal process. See Death Sentence Upheld for 2 Japan
Radicals, L.A. TIMEs, Feb. 20, 1993, at A4.
592. Cf Death Sentence Upheld for 2 Japan Radicals, supra note 591 (quoting
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The retrial cases themselves provide an even more graphic
contrast between the two nations. In the United States, the
"problem" of multiple, piecemeal, and last-minute habeas corpus petitions lies at the heart of legislative proposals for habeas reform and most of the Rehnquist Court's restrictive decisions. In Japan one can identify a similar phenomenon, with
even longer delays, yet it is scarcely treated as a "problem."
Multiple successive petitions, often raising claims in a piecemeal fashion and frequently filed in apparent attempts to
forestall the possibility of execution, are accepted as a matter
of course under the Japanese system, despite delays in many
executions of twenty years or more."'
Since Shiratori and Saitakawa, judicial decisions have
contained few references to the interest in finality. Even the
earlier decisions emphasizing finality did so in terms of judicial
stability and the proper functioning of the adversary process,
not by reference to deterrence or the state's desire to enforce
its sentences promptly. There simply does not seem to be a
substantial concern in Japan that deterrence or public confidence in the criminal justice system will be undermined if
some prisoners-apparently including a substantial majority of
those facing the death penalty-are able to delay their executions for a decade or more.
In what might come as one of the biggest shocks to American readers, this attitude appears to extend even to politicians.
In a 1985 survey, members of the Japanese Diet were asked
their views about the proper timing of executions for prisoners
whose death sentences had become final. Forty-eight percent of
those responding stated that executions should be delayed "as
much as possible, giving absolutely thorough Uinibun] consideration to retrial requests and other proceedings"; only eight

Justice Minister Gotoda Masaharu as saying, upon affirmation of death sentences
21 years after crime, 'Tials just last too long. I must offer my condolence to the
families of the victims.").
593. But see supra text accompanying notes 521-24 (noting difference in sheer
numbers of petitions, with some 10,000 habeas petitions each year in the United
States but only approximately 100 retrial petitions annually in Japan).
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percent expressed the view that, "given the existence of the
death penalty, executions should be carried out promptly."5 4
In another contrast to the United States, in Japan the fact
that some of the death penalty retrial cases had been reviewed
by fifty or more judges over the years has served as a sobering
reminder that, when it comes to judicial review, numbers do
not necessarily guarantee accuracy. 95
An important reason for the great difference in current
attitudes between the United States and Japan rests with the
four death penalty retrial cases themselves. In the United
States, reports that innocent individuals have been wrongly
sentenced to death appear from time to time.5" These reports
often attract widespread attention and concern initially, 9 '
but then quickly recede into the background. One reason for
this phenomenon may simply be that Americans have become
inured to such reports because they appear so often. Another
reason may be the sense that, however regrettable such cases
are, they are an inescapable consequence of a factfinding process in which absolute certainty can never be attained.598 The
criminal
justice system, as Herrera acknowledged, is "falli599
ble."
In contrast, in Japan the prosecutors have long enjoyed a
reputation for' only indicting suspects when the evidence of
guilt is overwhelming,' and criminal convictions have been
regarded as nearly infallible."°1 Given these popular percep594. See MURANO, supra note 66, at 70.
595. See, e.g., MURANO, supra note 66, at 108-09 (a total of 67 judges and justices reviewed Menda case, 56 of whom upheld the death penalty).
596. See, e.g., RADELET ET AL., supra note 578.
597. See, e.g., Smolowe, supra note 578; Applebome, supra note 578.
598. See supra text accompanying notes 495-500.
599. Herrera v. Collins, 113 S. Ct. 838, 868 n.15 (1993).
600. See, e.g., Rydichi Hirano, Diagnosis of the Current Code of Criminal Procedure, 22 LAW IN JAPAN 129, 130 (1989) ('mass media and the great majority of
the Japanese people' think that prosecutors should only indict 'if,
through the
questioning, their suspicions have been confirmed fully (jabun ni)--or even more
than fully (janibun ni)).
601.- See, e.g., Nagashima, supra note 481, at 315 ("It is generally thought in
Japan that the trial judge is not only an impartial umpire of the trial but also a
personificationof justice, in that he is able to discern the true from the false so as
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tions, the revelation that four innocent men spent the bulk of
their adult lives on death row following miscarriages of justice
has led to increased concern and willingness to accept extensive delays and repeated review in order to ensure against
mistaken executions.
Under these circumstances, and in view of the relatively
passive public support for capital punishment," 2 the key
question may not be why the courts and criminal justice- authorities are willing to accept the repeated petitions and long
delays in executions. After all, there is very little public pressure to carry out executions;"°s but if any execution was performed and then later discovered to have been in error, every
prosecutor, judge and Ministry of Justice official involved
would likely be subject to criticism.'
The more intriguing question may be why the death penalty survives at all. In marked contrast to the Tokugawa Era,
when executions were staged publicly and the heads of those
executed for certain crimes were paraded through the streets
to serve as forceful reminders of the consequences of crime, 5
executions in Japan today are performed behind closed doors
and normally are not publicly reported." 6 This does not necessarily mean that there is no general deterrent effect, since
the original death sentences are publicly announced. But the
deterrence message is certainly more muted now. Statistics

to convict the real offender and discharge the innocent.") (emphasis added).
602. See supra text accompanying notes 90-91.
603. See MURANO, supra note 66, at 70 (in a 1985 survey of Diet members,
only four percent of those responding felt that the death penalty issue would have
any effect on voters).
604. As a practical matter it seems highly unlikely that a subsequent court
would grant a retrial for or acquit someone who had already been executed, unless
overwhelming new evidence of innocence were discovered. Theoretically, however, it
is entirely possible, since family members may request retrials after the convicted
individual has died, see supra note 364 and accompanying text.
605. See ISHiu, supra note 44, at 11-12.
606. As described infra text accompanying notes 639-40, the mass media gave
wide coverage to executions that were carried out in late March 1993. This was
an exceptional development, presumably reflecting the heightened recent attention
to capital punishment in Japan.
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lead one to wonder, moreover, just how much of a general
deterrent effect the death penalty has in Japan. As noted earlier, violent crime rates are low, and they have remained low
and even decreased over the past thirty years, at the same
time that the numbers of death sentences and executions have
plummeted. 6 7 Given the availability of true life imprisonment without parole if needed for specific deterrence purposes,
retribution would seem to be the primary remaining concern in
Japan.
One might expect that, in the wake of the retrial cases,
the movement to abolish the death penalty would have gained
strength in Japan. In fact, the Tokyo High Court's decision
reducing Nagayama's sentence to life imprisonment came in
1981, following the wave of publicity that accompanied decisions granting retrials in three of the death penalty cases."es
Yet the Supreme Court's decision reversing the High Court
and reaffirming the constitutionality of the death penalty came
just a week before Menda was acquitted following his retrial,
the first of the retrial acquittals. The Supreme Court's
Nagayama ruling clearly foreclosed prospects for abolition by
judicial fiat.
It has not stopped efforts at abolition through political
means, however. Since 1980 Japan has witnessed a steady
stream of books, articles, and activities aimed at ending the
death penalty."ee Again, one can find elements of "foreign
pressure." Amnesty International is active in Japan, just as in
other nations around the world.610 In addition, abolition advo-

607. See, e.g., RESEARCH AND TRAINING INST., MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, GOVT OF
JAPAN, SUMMARY OF THE WHITE PAPER ON CRIME 1989, at 27 (1989) (homicide
rate declining steadily from 3.0 to 1.3 per 100,000 population over period from
1960 to 1987); WHITE PAPER ON CRIME, supra note 458, at 10 (further decline to
rate of 1.2 per 100,000 in 1988); DANDO, supra note 44, at 280-81 (death sentence
statistics) and 284-85 (execution statistics).
608. See MURANO, supra note 66, at 97-98 (noting apparent impact of the retrial cases on death sentences).
609. See, e.g., MURANO, supra note 66, at 145-51 (bibliography); Saka
Yasuyuki, Eunken gaido-shikei o kangaeru tame ni [Bibliographic Guide-For
Thinking about the Death Penalty], in SHIE I NO GENZAI, supra note 46, at 282.
610. See, e.g., AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, JAPAN: THE DEATH PENALTY AND THE
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cates within Japan point to the approval of the "Second .Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights Aiming at the Abolition of the Death Penalty"
(conveniently shortened in references by most such advocates
to simply the "Treaty for Abolition of the Death Penalty") by
the United Nations General Assembly in December 1989611
and to the strong trend toward abolition within developed nations6" as reasons for abolition by Japan. Yet the abolition
movement is not an example of gaiatsu-foreign pressure-per
se. Rather, as with the movement for reform of the retrial
standards, it is primarily a domestic movement in which foreign experiences
and views have helped to bolster reform ef613
forts.

Interestingly enough, former Justice Dand6 has recently
taken a prominent role in this movement as well. In December
of 1990, at the invitation of four of the leading organizations in
the abolition movement, he presented a speech at the so-called
"Forum '90 Demanding the Ratification of the Treaty for Abolition of the Death Penalty." 14 Drawing on his own judicial experiences in the retrial and death penalty cases, he delivered
an impassioned plea for abolition.615
NEED FOR MORE SAFEGUARDS AGAINST ILL-TREATMENT OF DETAINEES 44-48 (1991).
611. See, e.g., Abe Kbki, Kaisetsu-shikei haishi jyaku [Commentary-The Treaty for Abolition of the Death Penalty], in SHIKEI NO GENZAI, supra note 46, at 205.
612. See, e.g., id. at 212-14.
613. See, e.g., DANDO, supra note 44, at 113-50, 203-21, 274-78.
614. See DANDO, supra note 44, at 1.
615. DandS's remarks included the followingThe problem of mistaken convictions came under close examination
only after the Supreme Court's First Petty Bench, of which I was a
member, issued the Shiratori ruling relaxing the retrial standards in
1975. Since that time there have been four acquittals in retrials of death
penalty cases ....
Appeals in two of those cases, Menda and
Saitakawa, by chance were assigned to the First Petty Bench. To be
frank, in reading through the files of those two cases I could not help
feeling that the factfinding was strained. Yet even that sort of case could
not make it past the retrial barriers prior to Shiratori. That means there
is a strong possibility that individuals, previously may have been put to
death for crimes they never committed, without being able to obtain retrials. Moreover, the number of such mistaken executions since the Meiji
Era may be fairly large. When I think of that it makes my heart ache.
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Since then, Dand6 has published a major book-already
entering its third edition-arguing for abolition, 61 6 and has
been active in other activities aimed at that goal." 7 Will the
movement to abolish the death penalty have as much success
as the retrial movement? At the judicial level, surely not. Standards for retrials in Japan, like those for federal habeas in the
United States, may have great meaning for individual death
row inmates, but first and foremost they are statutory matters
relating to the regulation of the courts' own dockets. Accordingly, it is relatively easy for the Supreme Court in either
nation to modify those standards. In contrast, to abolish the
death penalty the Supreme Court of Japan would have to issue

Now the path to retrials has become somewhat wider, and it
seems that the original trial and appeals courts are being even more
careful, so there is no question that the number of mistaken convictions
should decrease. But no one can say with certainty that mistaken convictions will disappear ....
...When I was on the Supreme Court, in one death penalty appeal, no matter how closely I read the record I could not conclude that
there was a reasonable doubt. Yet, when I asked myself whether I could'
be certain, I could not help feeling somewhat uneasy ....
[Plolice had
searched half the town and found a suspicious person [who fit the circumstantial evidence they had collected] ....
If they had searched the
other half of the town, they may have found someone else who fit the
evidence too ....
The day for our decision came, and the presiding Justice read the
judgment rejecting the appeal. As we turned to walk out of the court,
room, members of the defendant's family screamed the word "murderers"
after us. To this day those voices remain etched into my conscience ....
For years people have been saying, "When you make a mistake
with the death penalty, there's no way of going back." I knew of this
expression and thought I understood what it meant. But I never truly
did. When I was on the Supreme Court and had to handle death penalty
cases myself, for the first time I truly realized what a heavy weight
factfinding bears in death penalty cases. Now I firmly believe that in
that old saying lies the key for abolition of the death penalty.
DANDO, supra note 44, at 7-12.
616. DANDO, supra note 44.
617. See, e.g., Intabya,.Naze, shikei haishi e no ketsui o tsuyoku shita no ha
[Interview, Why Did You Strengthen Your Resolve for Abolition of the Death Penalty?], in SHIKEI NO GENZAI, supra note 46, at 30 (interview with Dand6
Shigemitsu); Yomiuri Shinbun, Nov. 18, 1991, at 9 (promoting abolition cause in
profile article).
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a constitutional ruling overturning long-established and recently reaffirmed precedent. If every other developed country had
already abolished the death penalty and there were widespread international judicial consensus that capital punishment is cruel and unusual, Japan's Supreme Court might well
follow suit. 18 With thirty-seven of the states in the United
States and the Rehnquist Court to serve as counter-examples,
however, one can be sure that that situation will not arise for
a long time to come.
Even Dand5 himself does not hold out much hope that
Japan's Supreme Court will declare the death penalty unconstitutional. 19 Rather, he envisions the route to abolition as
lying first in administration of the current system: the courts
should issue virtually no death sentences and those prisoners
who have been sentenced to death should not be executed.620
Then, in his scenario, after a trial period without executions,
the entire system could be abolished.62 '

618. If it wanted to justify such a decision, the Supreme Court could use logic
set forth by Justice Shima in his supplementary opinion to the 1948 decision declaring the death penalty constitutional. While agreeing with the majority that the
death penalty could not be considered "cruel" under views then prevailing, Justice
Shima (joined by three of his colleagues) went on to state:
The Constitution was established in reflection of the feelings of the public
at the time it was created. It cannot be regarded as having approved of
the death penalty for all time . . . . A punishment that was not regarded
as cruel at one point in time may become cruel at some later point.
Accordingly, if the time comes when the national culture has advanced to
a higher level and a peaceful society based on fairness and order has
been achieved, and it is no longer felt that the death penalty's deterrent
effect is needed to prevent crime and thereby promote the public welfare,
surely the death penalty will then be rejected as a cruel punishment in
the view of the public.
Judgment of March 12, 1948 (Murakami v. Japan), Saik6sai [Supreme Court], 2
Keishfi 191, 196 (Grand Bench) (Shima, J., supp. op.). See DANDO, supra note 44,
at 16-17 (arguing that this approach could be used by the Japanese courts to
declare the death penalty unconstitutional).
619. See DANDO, supra note 44, at 16-17.
620. See DANDO, supra note 44, at 18.
621. See DANDO, supra note 44, at 19 n.28 (citing others who have proposed
such a phase-out process).
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At first glance, that process seems to have derailed on the
first step. For only the second time in two decades, the number
of defendants sentenced to death by district courts reached
double digits (albeit at exactly ten) in 1988.622 Thereafter,
though, the numbers again dropped sharply, to only two each
in 1989 and 1990, and three in 1991.6'

A potentially far more important development relates to
the second step: execution orders. Over the years, most Justice
Ministers have regarded stamping execution orders as an unpleasant task.6" As a result, a custom developed in which the
sitting Justice Minister would order at least one execution
every year.6" In this way, it was believed, the Justice Ministers and others involved in the process could maintain the
fiction that this was simply one more routine administrative
function.6 26 During a period of more than three years, however, following an execution in November 1989,627 the pattern

was broken. It is unclear whether any execution orders were
sought during the following year; but no execution was performed.6" Former Justice Minister Sat5 Megumu, who served
in 1991, has confirmed that officials within the Ministry of
Justice completed preliminary paperwork for ordering an execution that year and sent the papers to him for his final
stamp; but "I am also the chief priest of a [Buddhist] temple
and, based on my deep appreciation of the value of human life,
I refused to sign [the order.]" 62 9
When Justice Minister Tawara Takashi took office in late
1991, following the formation of the Miyazawa Cabinet, attention turned to whether he would restore the custom. During
622. See DANDO, supra note 44, at 281.
623. DANDO, supra note 44, at 281.
624. See MURANO, supra note 66, at 74-78.
625. See MURANO, supra note 66, at 70.
626. MURANO, supra note 66, at 70.
627. See Inoue, supra note 232, at 46 (quoting Yomiuri Shinbun, Nov. 16,
1991).
628. See, e.g., Inoue, supra note 232, at 46.
629. See Sata Masako, Shikei haishi o uttaeru higaisha izoku no fukuzatsu [The
Complex Situation for Victims' Bereaved Families Calling for Abolition of the Death
Penalty], FUJIN KORON, March 1993, at 352, 355 (quoting Justice Minister Sat).
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his tenure as Minister, before his replacement by Gotoda
Masaharu in December 1992, Tawara did not stamp any execution orders, either;"0 and as of the end of that year, Japan
had gone more than three years with no executions-very
possibly the longest period without executions in Japan since
the twelfth century. '
The Justice Ministry continued to take the official position
that, in view of a 1989 survey indicating that 66.5% of the
Japanese people opposed and only 15.7% favored abolition, it
would be inappropriate to abolish capital punishment at the
time.3 2 Still, it could only have given abolition advocates
hope when a report appeared in February 1993 indicating that
the Ministry was seriously considering conducting a new opinion poll on the issue.63 Assuming the report was accurate,
abolitionists might well have hoped that the de facto moratorium on executions would hold at least until the new poll could
be conducted.' They might further have hoped that if, by
chance, the new poll revealed a shift in public opinion to opposition to capital punishment, pressure would mount for the
Justice Minister to delay further executions at least until the
Diet had a chance to reconsider the death penalty.
Any such hopes would have turned out to be short-lived.
When Gotoda, the former Director General of Japan's National
Police Agency, 5 was appointed as Justice Minister in December 1992, he reportedly indicated his support for capital

630. See, e.g., Japan's 1st Execution in 3 Years, THE DAILY YOMIMUI, March 27,
1993, at 1.
631. See supra text accompanying notes 44-95.
632. See Sat6, supra note 629, at 355 (quoting Ministry official's testimony
before Diet).
633. See Number of Death-row Convicts, supra note 95 (citing "Ministry sources").
634. Given the attention that Dand6 and other abolition advocates have paid to
the importance of the wording of questions on this topic and the manner in which
surveys are conducted, see DANDO, supra note 44, at 12-13, 31-33; Fujiyoshi, supra
note 90, at 151-54, it seems likely that the methodology of any such poll would be
carefully examined and debated.
635. See, e.g., Japan: Secret Policemen on the Beat, THE ECONOMIST, Apr. 24,
1993, at 34.
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punishment.1 6 He left no doubt on that score by proceeding
to authorize not just one, but three executions, which were performed on the same day-March 26, 1993."37 This action
plainly was intended to send a message that the abolitionists
have not won and that Japan remains solidly in the capital
punishment camp. In the words of one senior Justice Ministry
official, Japan "executed a multiple number of death row inmates to demonstrate to society the state's strong determination to keep the capital punishment legal."'
Notwithstanding that statement, the Justice Ministry, in
keeping with its established policy, did not publicly announce
the March executions and has refused to officially confirm or
deny whether they took place. 9 In sharp contrast to prior
executions, however, these executions were widely reported by
the press, apparently based on information released by the
families or lawyers of the condemned prisoners." ° The widespread media coverage presumably reflects the heightened
recent attention to capital punishment in Japan; and Dand6
and other opponents of the death penalty have sought to channel publicity over the executions into stronger opposition to
capital punishment."'
Only time will tell whether those efforts are successful.
Recent reports indicate that the abolition movement has gradually gained strength in the Diet, with 182 Diet members-including former Justice Minister SatS-reportedly favoring abolition as of early 1993.2 That still represented
less than one-quarter of the Diet's total 764 members,6 43 how636. See, e.g., Japan's 1st Execution in 3 Years, supra note 630.
637. See, e.g., Itoh, supra note 94.
638. Senior Justice Ministry official speaking on condition of anonymity, quoted
in Mutsuo Fukushima, The Hangman's Noose-Japan Ponders Deterrent Value,
Kyodo News Service, Japan Economic Newswire, June 3, 1993, available in LEXIS,
ASIAPC Library, ALLNWS File.
639. See, e.g., Itoh, supra note 94.
640. See Itoh, supra note 94.
641. Letter from Professor Inouye Masahito, University of Tokyo Faculty of
Law, to Daniel H. Foote, Professor of Law, University of Washington School of
Law (June 29, 1993) (on file with author).
642. See Number of Death-row Convicts, supra note 95.
643. See STATISTICS BUREAU, MANAGEMENT AND COORDINATION AGENCY, GOV'T
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ever, and within the then-majority Liberal Democratic Party
(LDP), a much lower percentage of members supported abolition.' As this Article goes to press, the LDP had just lost its
first lower house election in nearly forty years. 5 Yet capital
punishment was not a major campaign issue; and the general6
public appears content with that aspect of the status quo.
Regardless of the LDP's defeat, unless a new public opinion
poll is conducted and reveals a major shift in attitudes toward
capital punishment, formal Diet action abolishing the death
penalty seems unlikely in the near future. At the same time,
there is no significant public, clamor for any expansion in use
of capital punishment. Accordingly, the most likely scenario is
that the recent pattern will continue, with a few new death
sentences and at most a few executions in Japan each year
(althought the Justice Minister under the new coalition government may well fall into the nonstamping camp).
V. CONCLUSION
For the time being, Japan and the United States share the
death penalty. Each also maintains a system for post-conviction collateral review of death sentences. Yet the key review
mechanisms in the two nations are very different. In the United States, federal habeas provides a potential remedy for violations of the Constitution or federal laws, but not for claims
based solely on new evidence relating to guilt or innocence. In

OF JAPAN STATISTCAL ABSTRACT OF JAPAN 1992, 707 (512 members in House of

Representatives, 252 members in House of Councillors).
644. See SatS, supra note 629, at 354 (support for abolition gaining even within
Liberal Democratic Party, "albeit slowly").
645. See, e.g., Robert Delfs, Reform or Else ... , FAR E. ECON. REV., July 29,
1993, at 10.
646. See, e.g., Fujiyoshi, supra note 90, at 150-51 (describing heavy weight
placed by the Government of Japan on 'public opinion" as a reason for maintaining the death penalty, and noting 66.5% support shown by 1989 survey); Two
Thirds of Japanese Back Death Penalty-Poll,The Reuter Library Report, June 1,
1993, available in LEXIS, ASIAPC Library, ALLNWS File (poll conducted by
Yomiuri Shinbun in May 1993 found more than 80% approval for March 1993
executions and nearly two-thirds support for retaining the death penalty).
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contrast, the most frequently used provision in Japan focuses
expressly on new evidence claims.
There is no sign of any movement in Japan to expand the
availability of post-conviction claims based on violations of the
Constitution or laws. Yet one can say with some confidence
that, in the wake of Menda and the other death penalty retrial
cases, no death-sentenced prisoner in Japan who wants to
contest her conviction or sentence 7 on evidentiary grounds
will die without the opportunity to mount thorough challenges
both at the appeals stage and after conviction. Under current
case law, where new and potentially probative evidence exists,
the prisoner will be allowed to raise it, even if she could and
should have discovered it earlier; even if the evidence relates
to a claim that was raised and rejected previously; even if the
new evidence was derived through technology that did not
exist at the time of the original trial;"5 even if she is filing a
second or successive retrial petition many years after the conviction became final; and even if the new evidence simply raises a reasonable doubt as to guilt, rather than firmly proving
innocence.

647. In cases in which death-sentenced prisoners have knowingly and willingly
decided not to press appeals, the Japanese courts have rejected attempts by counsel and other third parties to press appeals on behalf 'of prisoners. See DAILY
YOMIURI, Feb. 4, 1992, at 2 (reporting on Tokyo High Court ruling approving
prisoner's request to withdraw appeal of conviction and death sentence, over objections of counsel). At least six of the prisoners on Japan's death row voluntarily
withdrew their appeals, see MURANO, supra note 66, at 258-64, although three of
them did so in 1988, perhaps out of the hope that they might benefit from an
anticipated general amnesty as a result of the enthronement of Emperor Akihito,
see MURANO, supra note 66, at 124. As it turned out, there was no such general
amnesty.
In one case, over 16 years have elapsed since the prisoner withdrew an
appeal filed by his counsel, saying he would prefer death over life imprisonment,
see MURANO, supra note 66, at 157 (Ohama case).
648. Compare the ready willingness to utilize results of new testing techniques
in the death penalty retrial cases in Japan, supra text accompanying notes 378408, with O'Dell v. Thompson, 112 S. Ct. 618 (1991) (Blackmun, J., writing with
respect to the denial of certiorari, noting that the state appeals court had denied
state habeas relief, "specifically holding that the fact that current [blood type]
testing methods would have produced a different result does not justify the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus").
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Many of the Rehnquist Court's cutbacks on habeas relief
affect first-time petitioners, as well as those filing second or
subsequent petitions. Yet in principle a first-time petitioner in
the United States currently remains entitled to assert most
constitutional violations without regard to whether or not she
is innocent of the underlying offense.' 9 In the second or successive petition context, however, the Court increasingly has
been reserving habeas for those able to establish their actual
innocence. In Herrera v. Collins,65 the Court smothered any
notion that habeas might develop into a broad mechanism for
reviewing new evidence claims, similar to Japan's retrial system. Rather, the "actual innocence" exception exists only if a
second or successive petitioner can establish both a constitutional violation and actual innocence. And Sawyer v. Whitley 651 made clear that the burden such a petitioner faces in

establishing actual innocence is high indeed: "clear and convincing evidence that.., no reasonable juror would have
found the petitioner eligible for the death penalty."652 Federal
habeas will most assuredly not replicate Japan's retrial system
anytime soon.
Given the fundamental differences in the purpose and
structure of the two systems, the debates over the retrial standards in Japan are of limited direct relevance in considering
the proper scope for federal habeas. 3 The Japanese experience nonetheless provides valuable lessons-lessons that may
be of even greater importance in the coming days of the nowsolidified conservative majority on the Rehnquist Court.
Japan's criminal justice system is in many respects the ideal
model for crime control advocates:M it provides investigators
with most of the tools they might want, construes the
exclusionary rule very narrowly, and treats many of the consti649. But see supra text accompanying notes 129-37
650. 113 S. Ct. 838 (1993).
651. 112 S. Ct. 2514 (1992).
652. Id. at 2517.
653. Many of the same issues recur at the state level, however, in connection
with post-conviction collateral remedies based on newly discovered evidence.
654. See PACKER, supra note 511, at 158-62.
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tutional rights of criminal defendants as in essence being reserved for the factually innocent." Notwithstanding widespread respect for the relative quality and integrity of Japanese police and prosecutors, 6 Japan's experience plainly reveals that mistakes of life and death dimensions can and do
occur in that system. Currently in the Japanese setting, the relaxed retrial standards, the emphasis on certainty, and numerous other aspects of the criminal justice system provide some
measure of assurance against conviction-and execution-of
the innocent.6 7
Even if one does not believe that broad protection of the
constitutional rights of the guilty is important in its own right,
or is valuable for ensuring respect for the rights of the innocent, if the United States were to permit the same latitude to
criminal justice authorities that is recognized in Japan-as
there are some indications the Rehnquist Court may already
be doing" -- yet at the same time restrict opportunities for
post-conviction review, the consequences could be grave even
for the innocent. One can only hope that Justice Marshall was
overly pessimistic when, in one of his last impassioned dissents
in a capital case, he concluded that in the process of erecting

655. See, e.g., Foote, Paternalism,supra note 459, at 332-39; Foote, Confessions,
supra note 464, at 429-64.
656. See, e.g., DAVID H. BAYLEY, FORCES OF ORDEI POLICING MODERN JAPAN
1-4 (2d ed. 1991).
657. In one popular characterization of the respective criminal justice systems,
it is frequently said that guilty individuals would prefer to have their cases handled in the United States and innocent individuals in Japan. I have my doubts
about the accuracy of this statement as a general matter. After all, as the retrial
cases reflect, innocent individuals may be convicted-and even sentenced to
death-in Japan, as well as the United States. Moreover, with the nowstrengthened conservative majority on the United States Supreme Court it remains
to be seen how many of the constitutional rights of suspects and defendants will
continue to provide protection against conviction where strong evidence of guilt
exists. See generally Ogletree, supra note 538. At least with regard to post-conviction collateral review, however, there seems little doubt that an innocent individual would prefer Japan's retrial system over federal habeas corpus in the United
States.
658. See, e.g., Arizona v. Fulminante, 111 S. Ct. 1246 (1991); Ogletree, supra
note 538.
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restrictions on habeas the current Court has "valued finality
over justice. [and] ...expediency over human life." 59

659. McCleskey v. Bowers, 112 S. Ct. 37, 38 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting
from denial of stay of execution).

